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Thomas Hylland Eriksen
1  The Meaning of ‘We’
Some words typically used to characterise our present age – Western or non-Western 
– are flux, mobility, identity politics and multiculturalism, hybridity and the ongoing 
contestation of social and cultural boundaries. Issues taken on in the present volume 
include minority rights, citizenship, the dilemmas of multiculturalism in liberal 
societies, the often fraught relationship between state and civil society, and questions 
to do with the identity of the demos of a democracy. From this cluster of contentious 
and intellectually challenging questions I take my cue, and will use this opportunity 
to reflect on possible meanings of the word ‘we’ in the contemporary world. 
The word ‘we’ is situational in that it can refer to a variety of collectivities 
depending on the context. It implies both inclusion and exclusion: by logical 
extension, the word ‘we’ implies ‘they’. Of particular interest is the question why 
certain ways of delineating a collective identity become empirically predominant 
while others are forgotten. This is not an issue of mere academic interest in a world 
which witnesses the upsurge of ethnic, religious and national identities – sometimes 
from below, in opposition to the state, sometimes from above, in defence of the state 
– while other forms of identification (based on, say, place or class) tend to be less 
visible. Regarding the contemporary state, the issue at hand concerns who is to be 
included in the state, and what it entails to be included. 
In the following, I shall approach the question of ‘we’ from three perspectives. 
First, I simply ask what a society is. Secondly, I consider some kinds of dominant 
relationships that may lead to exclusion within a given society. Thirdly and finally, 
I distinguish between different forms of integration. As a result, it may be possible 
to explore questions of societal boundaries and collective identities slightly more 
accurately in the future. 
1.1  What is a society?
‘What is a society?’ asks the anthropologist Maurice Godelier (2009:137) in a book that 
discusses Melanesian village societies and modern state societies in a comparative 
spirit. The question has been raised many times before. It is, in fact, much older than 
social science. In our era, this simple, but complex question has developed new 
meanings, and perhaps a more acute character than usual in human society. Rapid 
processes of change and enhanced mobility have made the boundaries of societies 
and their content less obviously clear than before.
When the classic sociologists, from Tönnies and Durkheim to Simmel and Weber, 
discussed the nature of society, they wrote against a backdrop of dramatic social 
transformations, that is the shift from agrarian to industrial society. In the decades 
 © 2015 Thomas Hylland Eriksen
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around the last turn of the century, frantic industrialisation and urbanisation took place 
around Europe and North America, closely interconnected with the consolidation of 
colonial empires in Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Formerly autonomous tribal societies 
were incorporated into colonial empires, at the same times as millions of Europeans 
moved from rural areas to towns. During the 19th century, the industrial capitalist took 
over from the feudal landowner as the engine of economic processes. International 
migration was widespread then as now, but the main currents went from countries in 
the north to European settler colonies such as Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. 
Actually, a significantly higher proportion of the world’s population lived outside 
their country of birth in 1911 than in 2011 (Castles and Miller 2003), although absolute 
numbers were lower. In 1911, the total population of the planet was 1.7 billion; it has 
been quadrupled in a hundred years, in other words.
Like most social scientists in our century, Godelier writes against a backdrop of 
globalisation processes, but his vantage point is not the Northern metropoles. Instead, 
he takes his point of departure in his own long-term research among the Baruya, a 
people in the New Guinea highlands who number roughly two thousand individuals. 
Before the Australian-British colonisation of Papua New Guinea reached the lands 
of the Baruya in 1960, they doubtless constituted a society, according to Godelier. 
They were an autonomous group, which stood in contact with other autonomous 
peoples (with whom they traded salt and other goods), but who were themselves in 
charge of their social, cultural and ritual institutions. Following the Australian and 
later Papuan incorporation of Baruya territory into a state formation, it is increasingly 
debatable whether the concept ‘society’ is appropriate for them. For a society is not 
merely an aggregate of persons with certain formal traits in common (e.g. language or 
religion), or simply a state or otherwise delineated territory. More is required for the 
term society to fit. Godelier formulates his question like this:
What are the connections – political, religious, economic, kinship, or other – that have the capacity 
to bring together groups and individuals who thereby form a ‘society’ (with borders that are known 
if not recognized by the neighbouring societies) and so fuse them into an all-encompassing whole 
that endows them with an additional, overarching, shared identity? (Godelier, 2009:142) 
The Baruya have been integrated into a social system at a high level of scale (the 
nation-state Papua New Guinea) and partly into an economic system at an even 
higher level of scale (global capitalism). They have lost their sovereignty over ‘their 
mountains and rivers, and over their own selves’ (Godelier, 2009:142), and have been 
subjected to the power of a state - an institution totally alien to them. From being an 
independent society, they have been re-defined as a ‘local tribal group’ that forms 
part of a larger regional ethnic group (the Anga) in PNG. The system boundaries have 
become unclear. The state has redefined the Baruya language into a dialect. The word 
‘we’ has become ambiguous and contested. This kind of historical process has been 
common in many parts of the world, and some of the results can be observed first 
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4   The Meaning of ‘We’
hand in Native American reserves (where violence and alcoholism are endemic) or in 
Australian cities (where most homeless are Aborigines). The changes in question are 
not primarily cultural; they do not chiefly pertain to changes in language, clothing or 
food habits. Anthropologists tell of communities in the Amazon that, on first contact 
with Europeans, happily don Manchester United T-shirts and dance to Western music 
without considering any of this as a threat to their culture. However, changes in their 
social relations and kin patterns, as a result of wage work or enforced migration, or 
subjugation by the law and other institutions of the state, would be perceived as a grave 
threat. The history of modernity is the story of the transition from the concrete to the 
abstract, from small to large scale. Autonomous communities have been incorporated 
with or (usually) without their consent into mighty states and empires. Many have 
been erased from history, while others continue to exist, now as local communities 
or ethnic minorities within a state. Godelier is aware that he cannot write about 
the Baruya today independently of globalisation processes – or, rather, the tension 
between the global and the local, the big and the small, the abstract and the concrete. 
No society, small or large, governs its own destiny fully and is defined by sharp, 
uncontested boundaries. Even the most isolated, most closely-knit community has 
porous boundaries, but in our time, the currents connecting societies and relativising 
their boundaries are stronger and more comprehensive than ever before. Autonomy 
becomes a question of degree, just as internal cohesion or integration. In his analyses 
of the Baruya, Godelier emphasises the ‘politico-religious’ as the foundation of 
society. Put differently: Political power and economic integration are essential, but 
a system of symbolic meaning is also necessary in order to provide the members of a 
society with an ‘overarching shared identity’. In most of the societies we know from 
anthropology and history, religion and rituals constitute the most important symbolic 
foundation for integration. The separation of religion from politics was established 
late if at all; in Europe, the Treaty of Westphalia from 1648 is often mentioned, but a 
few countries, such as Norway, still have a state church, and it was only in 1945 that 
Emperor Hirohito was forced to concede that he was not of divine stock, following the 
nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The question is, accordingly, which shared basis of identity, which can also 
legitimise political power, is possible in a country with no shared religion. In much 
of the 20th century, nationalism largely took the place of religion as a secular 
alternative to it, but it has increasingly been shown to separate as much as it 
unites; not only because the growing numbers of minorities feel uncomfortable 
with the nationalism of the majorities, but also because many members of the 
majorities orient themselves in other directions than inwards and backwards. 
Whereas Godelier writes from one of the outposts of globalisation – the mountain 
valleys of New Guinea – the chapters in this book deal with a less marginal area. 
Although Finland and the other Nordic countries may be geographically peripheral 
and climatically hostile, they are in other respects typical rich countries in the 
era of globalisation, seamlessly integrated into global economic processes, which 
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entails wide-ranging exchange relations comprising, among other things, persons, 
commodities, services, symbols, commitments and insults with respect to the rest of 
the world, inside and outside of the European Union. The question concerning the 
boundaries of society and its substance are being raised here, as among the Baruya, 
but against a very different version of global modernity, characterised by migration, 
porous boundaries and global networks of information and communication. 
Whereas the early social theorists saw industrialisation, bureaucratisation and 
colonialism as the most powerful agents of change in their time, the focus now has 
to be shifted to other forces, such as transnational processes, instantaneous global 
communication, complex and contested identities, demographic change and value 
pluralism. In order to make sense of this new world, a varied analytical toolbox is 
necessary, utilising both old concepts (tailored to fit the situation around the last 
turn of the century) and new ones made to measure to suit the present era; some 
of the classic sociological concepts are still useful, whereas others have become 
‘zombie concepts’ (Beck 2009): undead words. They are still in circulation, but no 
longer have anything to say. Looking at the debates about citizenship, national 
identities, ethnic diversity and transnationalism, one may well ask if ‘society’ may 
be such a concept.
In his popular textbook in cultural anthropology from 1981, Roger M. Keesing 
defined (a) society like this: 
Society: A population marked by relative separation from surrounding populations and a distinc-
tive culture (complex societies may include two or more distinctive cultural groups incorporated 
within a single social system) (Keesing 1981:518).
Note the caveat ‘relative separation’. Anthony Giddens, in his no less widely read 
textbook in sociology from 1993, defined the concept of society as follows:
SOCIETY: A society is a group of people who live in a particular territory, are subject to a common 
system of political authority, and are aware of having a distinct identity from other groups around 
them. Some societies, like those of hunters and gatherers, are very small, numbering no more than 
a few dozen people. Others are very large, involving many millions…(Giddens 1993:746).
Like Keesing, Giddens emphasises physical separation from the surroundings. 
Keesing’s formulation ‘two or more distinctive cultural groups’ is theoretically 
dated, however, since complex societies contain many borderline cases, frontier 
areas and overlapping or hybrid cultural worlds. Giddens’ phrase ‘a distinct identity’ 
is conceptually better, but needs to be checked against diverse empirical realities. 
Indeed, much current research on complex societies and their internal dynamics of 
inclusion and exclusion indirectly responds to general phrases of this kind, although 
the theoretical implications are too rarely spelled out.
Many have proposed new terminologies tailored to help conceptualise the current 
era, partly replacing the ‘zombie concepts’ of old in the process. Among the most 
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6   The Meaning of ‘We’
radical bids is John Urry’s proposal to replace the term ‘society’ with ‘mobility’ (Urry 
2000). What if, he reasons, we study social life through a lens of mobility rather than 
stability? The result would doubtlessly be quite different from a conceptualisation 
(still common in social science) assuming, almost in an axiomatic way, that stable 
societies are the stuff that social life is made of. At the same time, however, much 
would be lost if the concept of society was relegated to the dustbin of history, since it 
is an empirical fact that people all over the world seek stability, continuity, security 
and predictability (Eriksen, Bal and Salemink 2010), often by defending or creating 
spatial belonging, border demarcations and collective memories anchored in 
particular places (Connerton 2009). What has been ‘dis-embedded’ is, in a multitude 
of ways, being ‘re-embedded’.
Less revolutionary, but still fairly radical attempts to renew the conceptual 
apparatus of the social sciences, can be found in works by, inter alia, Castells (1996–
8), Giddens (1991), Beck (2009), Bourdieu (1977) and Bauman (2000), who have 
suggested terms such as the global network society (Castells), globalised risk society 
(Beck), multidimensional social spaces (Bourdieu) and the era of reflexive modernity 
(Giddens), in a series of attempts to conceptualise the social in a time characterised 
by accelerated change and fuzzy boundaries. 
The chapters comprising this book are less revolutionary at the conceptual level, 
but empirically they are more convincing than the jet set of high-flying theorists 
tends to be. If anything, this book shows why it remains pertinent to ask analytically 
and empirically informed questions about the nature of society – its boundaries, 
its substantial content, its modes of legitimation, its symbolic foundation. Seen 
as a whole, the contributions indicate the need for a complex methodology. As 
Gregory Bateson (1979) puts it, two descriptions are better than one. In this context, 
the diversity of contemporary European states must be studied from a variety of 
viewpoints in order to be properly understood. 
1.2  The need for complex methods
An example illustrating the need for a complex methodology could be the 
phenomenon of female circumcision among migrants and the controversies 
surrounding it. Circumcision of girls is widespread in North-Eastern Africa and also 
exists in some other regions of the world. This kind of practice, painful and potentially 
physiologically damaging, customarily takes place in girlhood, before puberty. A 
common Western interpretation of the practice would be that female circumcision 
(often described as genital mutilation) is an expression of male control over female 
sexuality, depriving women of the possibility to experience sexual pleasure. However, 
it remains that women often are responsible for carrying out the surgery, and that 
many circumcised women hold that they would be less ‘complete’ and pure if they 
were not circumcised (Talle 2007).
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At least four different perspectives, or gazes, on female circumcision are needed 
for a full understanding of it, both as practice and as ideology:
(a)  From within, in a context where virtually everybody is circumcised, the incision is 
seen as a natural and necessary part of the transition to womanhood.
(b)  From within, in a European context, uncertainty and disagreement about the 
practice emerge, since one is surrounded by women who have not been circumcised 
but appear to cope reasonably well with life, notwithstanding.
(c)  From outside, in the same European context, the practice is considered barbaric 
(this is the context in which the term ‘genital mutilation’ is being used), and the 
authorities ban it.
(d)  In the frontier area between (b) and (c), a fourth perspective develops, where 
negotiations – often involving NGOs and health personnel –  take place aiming 
to get rid of the practice without violating the self-esteem and agency of those 
affected by the change.
In politics, the typical, methodologically nationalist interpretation of circumcision 
is that it represents something ‘we’ did not have before, but do have now, that is a 
deterioration from a condition without circumcision to a situation where probably 
several hundred girls in a country such as Sweden or Norway, possibly more, are 
being circumcised. A position building on methodological cosmopolitanism would 
instead focus not on the destiny of the nation, but that of the persons involved, and 
would note a dramatic decline in the number of cases following migration to the 
West. Many Somali, Ethiopian and other immigrants in Europe avoid circumcising 
their daughters, which they would almost certainly have done had they not migrated 
(Johnsdotter 2002). The nationalist conclusion would be that persons from these areas 
should be kept outside of the country or be surveilled closely by the authorities, so 
that Western country X does not get more female circumcision than necessary, while a 
cosmopolitan conclusion would be that immigration from exactly these areas should 
be encouraged, so that as many as possible are allowed to evade the knife.
Any social or cultural phenomenon must, in other words, be seen from several 
perspectives in order to be understood. If there is a common cultural identity in a 
European country such as Finland or Norway today, it cannot be described as a list 
of cultural traits or substantial values, but rather as conditions for communication, 
that is mutual comprehension. A strong form of evidence for cultural commonalities 
is the possibility of proper disagreement, which indicates a shared fund of common 
understandings. 
This theme is inscribed into the long conversation about who we are, which must 
immediately be supplemented by the question ‘what does we mean?’ – and, through 
simple dialectical negation, ‘what does they mean?’. Many languages distinguish 
between several words referring to different kinds of communities, and which are all 
translated with the word ‘we’ in Western languages, for example ‘we who are together 
in this room now’, ‘we, that is you and I’, ‘we, that is my clan’, or ‘we, the people of Z’. 
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8   The Meaning of ‘We’
The inclusion and exclusion denoted by the word ‘we’ is, obviously, situationally 
contingent. When politicians speak, possibly unthinkingly, about ‘our children and 
the immigrants’ children’ in debates about, for example, the minority percentage 
in schools, they reproduce notions of ethnic nationhood which are being contested 
by others. What is required to constitute a ‘we’, be it big or small, depends on the 
circumstances. Sometimes, it suffices to take the bus together to feel as a ‘we’, but at 
other times, it may be necessary to share language, physical appearance, religion and 
place of origin.
Any complex society offers an almost infinite number of possible criteria for 
delineating subjective communities for whom the term ‘we’ can be used meaningfully: 
Us, the members of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland. Us commuters. Us lesbians. 
Us jazz musicians. Us Christians. Us copywriters. Us women. The underlying question 
remains, and is made acutely relevant in such differentiated societies as these, whose 
underlying symbolic basis exists for a shared subjective identity which is overarching 
and totalising, and which can make it meaningful still to speak of a country as a 
society, that is something other than a mere administrative entity. Methodological 
nationalism, which is based on the assumption that the social is limited by the 
boundaries of a nation-state, has been severely criticised in recent social theory, as 
an insufficient methodology for identifying and understanding fundamental social 
processes taking place today, which may just as well be transnational as national. 
Nationalist ideology has likewise been criticised, often along normative lines, for 
being unhelpful and immoral if one aims for a universalist humanism. Yet, the 
nation still has, in many parts of the world, an indisputable and enduring ability 
to create strong abstract communities, quite the contrary of what many theorists of 
globalisation predicted towards the end of the last century. The political struggles and 
debates dividing many European populations these days do not concern the nation 
as such, but how it should be delineated symbolically and demographically; who 
should be included, and on what conditions. The nation must now share the field of 
belonging with various other symbolic communities, many of them transnational, but 
it remains an important focus for identification. Whether it succeeds or fails in relation 
to different persons and groups, depends on what it has to offer, instrumentally and 
symbolically. 
The nation, seen as a metaphorical kin group or an abstract community, is 
nonetheless under pressure, thanks to a large number of both transnational, 
supranational and subnational processes which do not conform to its logic and 
indeed appear to threaten it. At the same time, it is doubtlessly correct that a certain 
degree of national cohesion is necessary for the economy, the public sphere and civil 
society to function satisfactorily, since such institutions presuppose trust. A society 
arguably needs a ‘social glue’, whether or not of the kind intimated by Godelier.
Now, nations never were particularly homogeneous, even before the recent waves 
of immigration began. As many have shown, it is possible to identify considerable 
cultural variation within any nation, and this variation does not necessarily follow 
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ethnic lines. In terms of dialect, way of life, the role of religion and kinship practices, 
intra-ethnic diversity is considerable even in a smallish country such as Finland. 
However, this kind of variation does not necessarily imply variation regarding the 
strength or degree of national identification. As Jan-Petter Blom demonstrated many 
years ago (Blom 1969), there existed considerable cultural variation between mountain 
farmers and lowland farmers in central Southern Norway, with no consequences for 
collective identification or exclusion/inclusion. There were no norms of endogamy 
or concerted politics of identity taking place in spite of clearly observable cultural 
differences between the categories.
This example shows that whereas culture is continuous, identities are 
discontinuous. Culture – symbolic universes of meaning – flow and mix; one 
is influenced by one’s experiences, surroundings and impulses from near and 
afar, and many such impulses do in fact flow quite freely, unhampered by state 
boundaries, cultural border guards or capitalist profitability. Collective identity, on 
the other hand, is bounded: Either one is a member of the group, or one is not. 
This is why there always exist criteria for group membership, but for the same 
reason – the gap between cultural flows and group identities – there tends to be 
disagreement over the placing of the boundaries. The burning question in many 
societies in our day and age concerns the criteria. As far as the nation is concerned, 
Ernest Gellner wrote in his influential book on nationalism (Gellner 1983) that 
nationalist ideology proposes that cultural boundaries should be coterminous with 
the political boundaries, which is to say that a state should ideally only contain 
people of the same kind. This kind of definition begs the question, however, since 
there is no uncontroversial way of determining who is ‘of the same kind’. When the 
map no longer fits with the territory, there is disagreement over whether the map 
(ideology of nationhood) ought to be changed, or whether one should rather change 
the territory (refuse citizenship to minorities, enforce their cultural assimilation, or 
stop migration, etc.).
In the gap between the relatively free flows of cultural meaning and the 
theoretically fixed boundaries of identities, it is easy to find both a thorny political 
terrain and a fertile field for social research. There exists a frontier area, or a grey 
zone, which expands and contracts from situation to situation, but which as a whole 
grows, and where the boundaries for inclusion and exclusion are under negotiation. 
An analytical approach to these issues must be dialectical in that it accepts 
that every phenomenon is defined through its opposite, implicitly or explicitly. 
Openness in one respect entails closedness in another. The French nation, based 
on Republican values as it is, has historically been open to newcomers, but the 
guardians of the French language have to the best of their abilities tried to close it 
off from unwanted impulses from the outside. If one says ‘similarity’, one also says, 
implicitly, ‘difference’: No two individuals are completely identical, and certain 
differences are always tolerated, even in societies where the hegemonic ideology 
is founded on the principle of similarity. Integration also entails disintegration: 
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When politicians and others talk of the need for immigrants to ‘be integrated’, they 
simultaneously refer to a society where criteria for integration are by no means 
settled.
Since the postwar years, North European societies have changed dramatically 
– urbanisation, migration, changes in the labour market, new family structures, new 
information technology – and it would be unwise to assume that our present societies 
are mere updates of their antecedents. For example, it cannot be taken for granted 
which cohesive and fragmenting – centripetal and centrifugal – forces characterise 
contemporary Norwegian society. It would be intellectually lazy to assume that a 
national sense of identity, for example, is a necessary condition for cohesion in this 
or that society, or that such entities can easily be gauged and measured. As I shall 
discuss below, a person may well be integrated in one respect and disintegrated 
in another. The different parts of a cultural universe change at different speeds, a 
phenomenon which creates dissonance, and a society may be well integrated without 
its culture being similarly integrated. 
1.3   The dual revolution of the 21st century
Nobody presumably disagrees with the view that the world has changed in 
perceptible ways since the end of the postwar years. Yet, it would be inaccurate 
simply to claim that social and cultural complexity (according to one definition or 
another) has become greater. Ethnic diversity and encounters across linguistic and 
cultural boundaries were more widespread in many traditional communities than in 
modern nation-states, which have often pursued policies of active homogenisation 
and exclusion in order to create cultural similarity. And, it is far from certain that 
contemporary societies are linguistically and culturally more diverse than some of 
the cultural crossroads – market and trading towns, ports etc. –  which existed in 
premodern or early modern times. 
Yet, it does make sense to speak of the present era as a period with some important 
new characteristics. Back in 1998, Manuel Castells wrote the following, in a lengthy 
footnote towards the end of his three-volume The Information Age:
Why is this a new world? ... Chips and computers are new; ubiquitous, mobile telecommunications 
are new, genetic engineering is new; electronically integrated, global financial markets working in 
real time are new; an inter-linked capitalist economy embracing the whole planet, and not only 
some of its segments, is new; a majority of the urban labor force in knowledge and information 
processing in advanced economies is new; a majority of urban population in the planet is new; the 
demise of the Soviet Empire, the fading away of communism, and the end of the Cold War are new; 
the rise of the Asian Pacific as an equal partner in the global economy is new; the widespread chal-
lenge to patriarchalism is new; the universal consciousness on ecological preservation is new; and 
the emergence of a network society, based on a space of flows, and on timeless time, is historically 
new (Castells 1998:336).
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A few years later, he could have added the advent of deterritorialised warfare and 
political battles involving the question of humanly induced climate change to the list. 
He might also have spoken of post-Fordist flexible accumulation (Harvey 1989) and 
mass migration (Castles and Davidson 2000).
Since around 1990, when the Cold War faded into oblivion to be replaced by a 
series of new geopolitical conflicts often based on nationality, ethnicity or religion, 
two related tendencies have contributed to shaping life-worlds worldwide, but not 
least in Western Europe; the electronic revolution and ethnic/cultural diversification. 
Since mobile telephones and internet access became widespread in the countries of 
Northern Europe in the early 1990s, the ties connecting people to cultural identities 
and place have become ever more unclear. With the emergence of Web 2.0 (based 
primarily on communication, not information) since the early years of the 21st 
century, it is increasingly possible to build and maintain almost fully assorted social 
worlds which are entirely deterritoralised. Flexibility, which may be defined as 
uncommitted potential for change (Bateson 1972, Eriksen 2005), has been enhanced 
in nearly every field to do with deterritorialised communication. The nation-state 
thereby loses one of its main means for creating shared identities, namely territorially 
based communication. However, research on internet use (Miller and Slater 2000; 
Eriksen 2001; Uimonen 2001) indicates that ethnic, local, religious and national 
identities are not necessarily weakened by the new technologies, but that they are 
re-shaped, often independently of political power structures. One implication for 
polyethnic societies is nonetheless that long distance nationalism (Anderson 1992; 
Fuglerud 1999) and diaspora based identity politics have been boosted considerably 
by the new technologies, making it simple to connect and keep connected people who 
cannot meet in the flesh.
The growth in ethnic complexity has also been considerable and, in the space 
of a few decades, has changed the demographic composition of many cities. Now, 
of course migration is not new, and as noted previously the global proportion of 
people living outside of their country of birth was higher in 1911 than it is in 2011, 
but the current situation with people from practically all parts of the world living 
closely together in large cities, is new. Drawing on research in London, Vertovec 
(2006) has spoken of super-diversity. For many years, most immigrants in London had 
a background from the colonies, and they lived in particular quarters and suburbs 
where they had their shops, places of worship and organisations. Since the mid-1990s, 
the dominant pattern of immigration has shifted, and the largest new groups, such 
as Iraqis, Poles and Somalis, have no historical connection with the British Empire. 
In addition, immigrants now increasingly live in a randomly scattered mode and not 
in particular areas; and finally, it is no longer easy to decide who is an immigrant and 
who is not. Apart from legitimate labour migrants, chiefly from the EU and Australia, 
there are seasonal workers (who do not necessarily know when or if they are going 
home), students employed in the informal sector, refugees with asylum papers and 
asylum seekers who are either waiting for a decision or have been rejected and live 
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underground, tourists who have ‘forgotten’ to return home and an unknown number 
of persons who have entered the country illegally. Apart from all these categories, 
there are grey zones and ambiguous cases, and there are many who live in London 
without knowing whether they are immigrants or not – a statistician’s nightmare, 
perhaps, but a realistic depiction of the uncertainty under which many foreigners live.
Vertovec once mentioned during a seminar that the number of languages now 
spoken in London is over 300. The figure is impressive, but a web search showed 
that the number of languages spoken only in the south-eastern borough of Søndre 
Nordstrand in Oslo, was well over 130! Super-diversity is, in other words, not a 
phenomenon confined to the UK. The growth in immigrant numbers in nearly all 
West European countries has been enormous since around 1990, in many cases 
representing a doubling or trebling of the 1990 figures. In Norway, the proportion of 
the population with a minority background grew from five to ten per cent between 
1995 and 2010 (Statistics Norway 2011).
The growth in immigrant populations has not been as fast as the growth of the 
World Wide Web, but the two processes should be seen as two sides of the same coin. 
Both the electronic revolution and the polyethnic one contribute to placing stable, 
territorially based identities under pressure. The Herderian and nationalist formula 
‘a people = an ethnic group = a territory = a state = a language’ does not function 
properly in a situation like this. This is why debates about national identity have been 
so widespread in so many European countries in the last couple of decades.
The new complexity, epitomised in these two processes, has grown out of a period 
characterised by consolidation, homogenisation and the production of similarity. Gellner 
has compared pre-modern Europe with a painting by Oskar Kokoschka, the Viennese 
artist known for his intricate, mosaic-like pictures with thousands of colourful little 
dots. By contrast, Europe after the great levelling of nationalism had taken place, could 
be compared with a picture by Amedeo Modigliani, whose most famous pictures are 
dominated by large, serene, monochromatic areas. In a comment on Gellner, however, 
Ulf Hannerz (1996) claims that Kokoschka appears to have returned to a time when large 
cities increasingly become cultural crossroads and transit terminals, when all forms of 
mobility and movement become faster and smoother, and where identity politics at the 
micro level ensure that many newcomers resist assimilation to the majority.
There is simultaneously something very new and something much older about 
the contemporary world. Towards the end of a book about Al-Qaeda and what 
it means to be modern, John Gray (2003) writes that ‘it is the interaction between 
growing scientific knowledge and unchanging human needs that will determine 
the future of our species’.  Put differently: Changing circumstances must be taken 
into account in every narrative attempting to make sense of the world in which one 
lives. The development of new technology and science create new frameworks for 
human projects, which are still anchored in fundamental human experiences such 
as community and alienation, security and individuality. This is perhaps nowhere 
clearer than in the identity politics of the early 21st century.
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1.4  Tensions in the 21st century world
The two ‘revolutions’ that by and large define the world after the end of the post-war 
years took off around 1990. It was at roughly this time, too, that the cold war was 
called off once and for all, resulting in the immediate demise of the global two-bloc 
system. The ideological conflict between socialism and capitalism appeared to have 
been replaced by the triumphant sound of one hand clapping. By late 1990, it was 
also clear that apartheid was about to go; Mandela had been released from prison, 
and negotiations between the Nationalist Party and the ANC had begun in earnest. 
The following year, Yugoslavia began to dismantle itself with surprising violence, 
fed by a kind of nationalistic sentiment many believed to have been overcome. 
Around the same time, the Hindu nationalists of the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party, 
Indian People’s Party) went from strength to strength in India. The identity politics of 
the state, or of state like bodies, was thus not something of the past. In other words, 
openness and closure were still twin features of politics, but they were operating 
along new lines. 
1991 was also the year in which the Internet began to be marketed to ordinary 
consumers, so that Mr. and Mrs. Smith could enter the shop and buy their 
subscription to America Online. This was new, just as new as the small pocket-sized 
mobile phones that all of a sudden began to spread all over the world, from Mauritius 
to Iceland, around the same time. Deregulation of markets had taken place in the 
preceding decade, but many of the effects of a weaker state and a less manageable 
and predictable market were being felt only now, helped by new information and 
communication technology. 
This post-1991 world is, in addition to everything else, one of intensified tensions 
and frictions. One needs to only count the present number of transatlantic flights 
or the number of transpacific telephone connections to realise that the webs of 
connectedness are hotter, faster and denser than in any previous period, with 
repercussions virtually everywhere. The growth of urban slums throughout the Third 
World is an indirect result of economic globalisation (Davis 2006), just as the relative 
disconnectedness from the Internet in Africa – bracket South Africa, and there are 
more Austrians than Africans online – is a significant fact alongside the growth in 
text messages in China, from nil to eighteen billion a month in less than ten years. The 
networked capitalist world, in a word, is a framework, or scaffolding, for almost any 
serious inquiry into cultural and social dynamics. 
This is an accelerated world, where everything from communication to warfare 
and industrial production takes place faster and more comprehensively than ever 
before. Speed, in physics, is just another way of talking about heat. In other words, 
when one says of someone that he or she is suffering from burnout, the metaphor is 
apt. The burnout is a direct consequence of too much speed. 
This, I believe, is a main reason why the notion of global warming has caught on in 
such a powerful way in the North Atlantic middle classes. The risk of global warming 
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may be real, but that is not the point: By focussing on literal heat as an unintentional 
consequence of modernity, the narratives about global warming fit perfectly with, 
enrich and supplement, the other narratives about the contemporary age. It functions 
as a natural-science corollary of stories about terrorism and imperialism. All these 
narratives, and their relations, depict the contemporary world as one ‘out of control’, 
fraught with alienation, powerlessness, global forces and injustices brought about, 
and reproduced, by the rich and powerful – yet they are, without knowing it, digging 
their own grave. Above all, the notion of global warming feeds into an even more 
comprehensive story about acceleration.
Zones of tension are manifold in this world. In addition to the old and perhaps 
universal lines of conflict – power versus powerlessness, wealth versus poverty, 
autonomy versus dependence – new conflicts, frictions and tensions appear today: 
 – Globalisation versus alter-globalisation – the new social movements looking for 
viable, locally based alternatives to the TINA doctrine (‘There Is No Alternative’);
 – Environmentalism versus development – a very real, if undercommunicated 
tension in countries like China and India, but also in the rich countries (my 
native, oil-rich Norway being an excellent example);
 – Cosmopolitanism versus identity politics (including xenophobia and religious 
fundamentalism) – a main dimension of politics almost everywhere in the world 
now, sometimes supplanting the left/right divide;
 – Inclusion versus exclusion – walls, physical and metaphorical, preventing the 
free movement of people and their full inclusion in society;
 – Uniformity versus diversity – shared templates of modernity articulating with 
local specificity; and finally 
 – Cultural autonomy versus the quest for recognition – finding the balance, as Lévi-
Strauss once put it, between contact and isolation.
The zones of tension briefly mentioned above cannot be reduced to one another, 
although they are arguably related. The common denominators are increased speed 
and intensified friction. This situation entails a need for a new set of traffic rules – a 
global highway code for interaction. Movement is being regulated. Laws regulating 
immigration and citizenship are obvious examples, but one might also mention 
the attempts in certain countries to protect the local language(s) from unwanted 
contamination from the outside (usually English), and puritanist religious currents 
such as the Deobandi movement in Pakistan, which tries to purge domestic Islam of 
Hindu and syncretist influence. 
Boundary work is always an important element of personal and collective 
identification processes, and it is now carried out with especial fervour and a sense 
of urgency: Who is inside and outside the group, what are the criteria for being an 
insider, and what does it mean to be an individual with proper, socially recognised 
credentials and personal integrity?
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1.5  Dominant relations of inclusion and exclusion
Let us now return to the initial questions concerning what a society is, and what the 
term ‘we’ can mean in this era. Collective identities are always defined in relation 
to that which they are not. They are, in a word, relational. Relational positioning 
is expressed through two main ways: contrasting and matching (Eriksen 2010). 
Contrasting implies that one defines oneself as the opposite of the other; matching 
that one defines oneself as structurally equal to the other. As shown by the chapters 
in this book with a direct focus on minorities such as Sámi or Romani in Finland, 
minorities tend to combine both strategies in a bid to be recognised as ‘equal but 
different’. Majorities in contemporary European countries tend to be split between a 
contrasting strategy, seen clearly in the Islamophobic tendencies criss-crossing the 
continent; and a matching strategy where structural equivalents and compatibilities 
are sought. 
Dominant relationships, seen from a minority perspective, tend to be the 
connections that link them to the majority. Majorities have more options, since they 
have several ‘others’ to choose from. Both religion, race and language may be invoked 
as contrasting devices. Yet other kinds of relationships framing the logic of inclusion 
and exclusion in a complex society may also be invoked. In a public lecture given 
in 2008, Steven Vertovec speaks of a current complexification in the relationships 
defining the insider/outsider boundary in Europe, making plain exclusion more 
difficult than before: 
[O]ver the last ten years in the UK, in Germany, across Europe – basically by way of changing global 
patterns of migration – we’ve seen a lot of the long-standing patterns of migration diversifying, par-
ticularly by way of the relationship between all these sorts of variables (country of origin, gender, 
legal status, duration of stay, etc. ... ). So now you have a new configuration, indeed, of all these 
different variables in relation to each other (Vertovec 2008:6).
Internal variation within every minority, whether it is constituted on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, nationality, religion or language, always makes it problematic to generalise 
about the characteristics of named groups in a society. The current situation, 
according to Vertovec (and I think he is right), makes such generalisations even more 
problematic than before, since the diversity of migrant experiences and migrant 
projects is greater than ever before, and majority encounters and experiences with 
members of minorities also become more diverse and varied.
In spite of these caveats, it is fair to assume that some ways of producing 
differences, some types of relationship, will continue to dominate; that identity 
constructions will tend to gravitate towards what we could call a semantic core, that is 
an ideal-typical symbolic centre which is relatively unchanging, often associated with 
core symbols such as flags, core state rituals such as national days, or core cultural 
practices such as Christmas celebrations or food habits.
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In the relationship between majority and minorities, religion and race are 
often mentioned as constitutive. However, one should be wary of exaggerating the 
importance of new, visible and spectacular differences. Race, language and religion 
are easy to identify and easy to do research on. This does not, however, mean that 
other kinds of relationships cannot be more dominant, even if they are less marked 
in discourse on boundaries and social contrasts in a given society. The fact that the 
educational attainment and income of parents have a decisive impact on a person’s 
possibilities in the labour market is well documented, and is significant both among 
majorities and minorities to the extent that it tends to overrule differences resulting 
from ethnic discrimination. If one were to emphasise these kinds of differences rather 
than those to do with ethnicity and religion, the map of the new Europe would have 
looked different. Religions function in a vertically integrative manner – upstairs 
and downstairs meet in the house of worship – while class functions horizontally 
integrative. Which zones of tension will predominate in the future, depends on which 
relations are given precedence in politics and public discourse – religion, race, class 
or something different altogether. The world is no more ethnic than we choose to 
make it.
1.6  What is integration?
A recurrent problem in the ongoing public debates about social integration is that 
one rarely says, or asks, what kind of integration is at stake. For example, politicians 
and bureaucrats all over Europe talk of the importance of ‘integrating immigrants’, 
with no further qualification. When the term ‘integration’ is being used, however, it is 
necessary to clarify who is supposed to be integrated to what and by whom. Credible 
answers to this kind of question bring us several steps closer to an answer to the 
question of what a society is. In order to ask questions about integration accurately, 
the term must be narrowed down; in fact, it can refer to very different types of 
processes.
Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish between systemic and social integration, a 
conceptual pair first proposed by Giddens (1979). Systemic integration refers to the 
macro level, that is the social institutions, their stability and ability to maintain 
themselves relatively independently of the actors. Social integration, by contrast, 
refers to people’s relational belonging, operative networks and ‘social capital’ 
(Coleman 1998). It is perfectly possible to be well integrated socially in a society 
which is poorly integrated at a systemic level. In many African countries, where the 
state is weak and the shared formal institutions, from police and judiciary to sewage 
and electricity supply, are in poor shape, the inhabitants may nonetheless be well 
integrated socially through kinship, informal networks and other social relationships 
which create trust and mutual commitments. Conversely, it is possible for a person 
to live in a society which is well integrated at the systemic level without being well 
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socially integrated him- or herself. The fact that the buses run on time and the 
bureaucracy is incorruptible and efficient, says nothing about the scope and quality 
of the citizens’ social networks and subjective sense of belonging.
Secondly, a distinction between informal and formal relationships is necessary. 
Such a contrast, which may be highly relevant for the study of multiethnic 
societies in a situation of rapid change, would take, as its point of departure, the 
relationship between systemic and social integration, but grafts this contrast onto 
a distinction of a different kind. The concept of the informal sector in the economy, 
first introduced by Keith Hart in a study of outdoor markets in Ghana (Hart 1973), 
calls attention to those economic activities that take place between individuals 
and groups without being recorded or registered anywhere. Exchange of services 
without any accounting for the exchange of money (or direct payment without 
receipts etc.) would be a typical example. Now, regarding social integration more 
generally, informal networks are very important. The widespread concept ‘social 
capital’ refers to the reach, scope and resources flowing through such networks. 
Granovetter’s influential work on ‘the strength of weak ties’ (Granovetter 1973, 1983) 
discusses the relationship between strong and weak ties. The strong connections, 
to relatives and close friends, display a high degree of redundancy; it is likely that 
your close friends also know each other. Weak ties, of which people have many in 
a complex society, tend to comprise people who do not know each other very well. 
Persons who possess many weak ties have greater access to diverse information 
from the outside world than people who are limited to a few, strong ties, and also 
more social possibilities.
The analysis of weak versus strong ties reminds us that the informal social life is 
crucial for the maintenance of the system. Granovetter moreover argues that ideas are 
disseminated faster in a society with many weak ties than one dominated by strong 
ties. The tendency in the kind of society scrutinised in this book – the complexifying 
modern nation-state – would normally be a growth in the number and reach of weak 
ties, but another possibility could be segregation in bounded groups, in which each 
maintains its integrity and collective identity through the cultivation of strong ties 
internally. This would be the case with strongly incorporated minorities which are also 
endogamous. The concept of ‘parallel societies’, sometimes used disparagingly about 
ethnically complex societies, refers to such a situation, which was also documented 
in mid-20th century studies of ‘plural societies’ such as British Burma and Jamaica 
(Furnivall 1948; Smith 1965).
Thirdly, social integration is not the same as cultural integration. Possibly thanks 
to influence from American cultural anthropology, there is a tendency in much of 
the Scandinavian literature on pluralism to write about ‘societies’ and ‘cultures’ as 
though they were synonymous. This conflation of two very distinctive phenomena 
can only deepen the already significant confusion typical of the public debate. 
Although cultural meaning and social interaction coexist empirically, they must be 
disentangled analytically. Many years ago, Clifford Geertz followed the lead of Talcott 
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Parsons in distinguishing between culture, integrated in a ‘logico-meaningful way’ 
and society, integrated in a ‘causal-functional way’ (Geertz 1973). This meant that 
social and cultural dynamics could be studied relatively independently of each other. 
Shared meaning, i.e. that one understands the world in roughly the same way and 
also largely understands each other, can emerge without interaction; and certain 
forms of interaction (such as trade or war) can take place without much by way of 
shared understandings.
Such a perspective, however, draws the boundary between the social and the 
cultural in too absolute a way (Eriksen 1992). The Greek concept habitus, used to great 
effect by Marcel Mauss and Norbert Elias in 20th century social science (and stolen 
much later by Pierre Bourdieu), refers to the merging of cultural interpretations and 
social behaviour that takes place when the body develops enduring dispositions for 
action. The abhorrence of pork among Jews and Muslims is a cultural value with 
social consequences – it is both symbolic and enacted.
Still, it can be meaningful to distinguish between the social and the cultural. 
Let me give an example: Two persons live in the same block of flats in eastern Oslo. 
One of them is a Somali woman with four children. The husband no longer lives with 
them, and she has filed for divorce. She barely understands Norwegian, and uses 
the children as interpreters in her meetings with representatives of the authorities. 
When the tax return form arrives, she throws it in the bin, believing it to be an ad 
brochure. She covers her body before leaving the flat and gets her daily dose of verbal 
harassment on the street. She has never worked and is functionally illiterate. This 
woman is, briefly, a classic example of a poorly integrated immigrant following the 
commonsensical and political views dominating local perceptions.
Her neighbour, on the next floor, is a single Norwegian in his thirties. He has no 
problems making himself understood and demanding his rights in the welfare office; 
he knows where everything is in the supermarket and submits his betting coupon 
without a problem every week. He is in full command of his remote control, knows 
what is showing on the cinemas downtown, and laughs at every joke made by a 
TV comedian. Nobody sneers at him when he leaves the flat; he is phenotypically 
unmarked.
Which of them is more integrated? Before proceeding to answer, we may add that 
the woman has a long list of persons she can ring up if she has a problem, that she 
sends a hundred euros a month to her sister in Somalia and knows that her children are 
likely to get a better life in Oslo than they would in Somalia. Her upstairs neighbour, 
by contrast, knows nobody. He is on greeting terms with a couple of dozen people 
in the suburb, but he has nobody to call if anything comes up in his life. The short 
answer is that the man is culturally, but not socially integrated; while the woman is 
socially integrated (in her Gemeinschaft) but not culturally integrated (in her local 
community and country of residence).
These examples may represent extremes. The point is, nevertheless, that cultural 
integration (the production of shared meaning) is not necessarily accompanied by 
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social integration (that is committing, stable networks made up by interaction). In 
many multiethnic societies, there is a clear tendency of cultural convergence following 
a certain period of close coexistence – language shift, for example, tends to take place 
after two or three generations – without being accompanied by the disappearance 
of ethnic networks. Culture varies along a continuum, while social communities 
are – at least in theory – sharply delineated. Culture is continuous; identities are 
discontinuous. 
Fourthly, integration takes place at several levels of scale. Scale is not the 
same as macro and micro (which is dealt with in the contrast between social and 
systemic integration), but refers to the reach and scope of the networks within 
which one is acting. When acting on a small scale, one is integrated with a few 
people – family gatherings, school classes and private dinner parties are small-
scale events. When acting on a large scale, by contrast, one is integrated with a 
potentially unlimited number of others, but there is often an inversely proportional 
relationship between the size of the network and its cohesive power. You are 
loosely integrated with many when you pull out your VISA card in a remote city, 
but closely integrated with a few when lounging on the beach with your nuclear 
family. A football training session is in itself an event on a small scale, but as soon 
as the team joins a tournament, the scale grows, and it continues to do so when 
the team plays in a European cup.
Scale is a measure of complexity and the potential reach of individuals through 
their networks. In order to study and gauge the degree of cohesion in contemporary 
societies, integration through various levels of scale is a key factor. It is, for example, a 
common assumption that minority persons often miss job opportunities because they 
lack informal networks (‘someone to ring up’) and the informal cultural competence 
needed to create intimacy and weak ties. In certain situations, as when they send 
remittances to family members in Sri Lanka or go on hajj to Mecca, many immigrants 
participate in networks on a large scale; but the social capital they accumulate in this 
way can rarely be converted to a currency which can be spent in competition over 
scarce resources in Europe.
Both methodologically (‘what are we studying’) and empirically (‘what kinds of 
social glue and solvents exist out there’), there are sound reasons to specify levels of 
scale when one speaks of integration, whether one has cultural or social aspects in 
mind. The concern over ‘loss of national identities’ which is being expressed almost 
everywhere, is frequently a result of the experience that cultural integration takes 
place at too high a level of scale, that is transnationally or globally: People watch 
American television rather than listening to local musicians, and so on – or it could 
be that the level of scale is deemed too low and local, thus incapable of mobilising 
inhabitants countrywide for an abstract community. 
The debates about the future of the nation-state and its presumed reduced 
power can, in this way, be understood as debates about which level of social scale 
is appropriate. There exists a widespread perception that important political 
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decisions are taken elsewhere, and that important economic processes take place 
transnationally in ways difficult to govern. 
There is no easy way out, either politically or intellectually, when confronted with 
the dual question raised in this essay – ‘what is a society?’ and ‘who are we?’. There 
are no quick fixes or simple answers, but the contribution from social theory and 
empirical research may at the very least make it possible to raise the questions in an 
accurate and constructive way, as we continue on our journey through the world of the 
twenty-first century, divided by a shared destiny as we are, eternally busy rebuilding 
the ship at sea.
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Peter Kivisto
2  The Politics of Integration
Achieving solidarity—and it needs to be construed as something to be achieved 
rather than taken as a given—constitutes one of the most pressing demands of highly 
differentiated modern societies. Indeed, David Hollinger (2006: 23-24) contends that 
solidarity is “shaping up as the problem of the twenty-first century.” Since Durkheim’s 
efforts a century earlier to comprehend the new bases for order and harmony in 
what he characterized as societies predicated on organic solidarity, theorists have 
sought to understand the habits of mind and social conditions essential for, as Iris 
Marion Young (2011: 120) put it, “separate and dissimilar actors [to] decide to stand 
together for one another.”  This places front and center two of Eriksen’s binaries in the 
preceding chapter—inclusion/exclusion and uniformity/diversity—which are central 
in determining the precise boundaries of “we” in any particular place at any particular 
time. As Hauke Brunkhorst (2005: 5) describes the integrative processes of modern 
societies as he borrows language from Niklas Luhmnann, “Solidarity dialectically 
combines opposites, contradictions, and differences. The differences, heterogeneity, 
and fragmentation that ‘can still be held together’ are the ‘criterion for solidarity’.”       
If Brunkhorst is correct, we live in a multicultural age, one in which 
multiculturalism as a mode of incorporation takes root far more powerfully than it 
has in the past, albeit under different names, such as cultural pluralism.  In fact, I 
will advance just such an argument in the following section.  However doing so does 
not imply naiveté regarding resistance to expanding the boundaries of the societal 
community by allowing inside the core those minority groups—indigenous peoples, 
ethnonational minorities, and immigrants—who have heretofore been situated on the 
periphery. Indeed, the backlash to multiculturalism is real, with its critics seeking to 
promote exclusion rather than inclusion and demanding a unitary or homogeneous 
national culture rather than a pluralistic one.  These critics are, as Martha Nussbaum 
(2012) put it, proponents of "the politics of fear"—fear that the nation, its culture and 
institutions, are being undermined by diversity.  They include not only dangerous, 
extremist groups operating outside of legitimate political channels, but also radical 
right political parties that work within existing political structures.  That their views 
have tapped into the considerable unease within the publics of the world's liberal 
democracies can be seen from the fact that they have had an impact on mainstream 
parties, which have proven willing in some instances to trim their inclusive policies 
promoting diversity to respond to this unease (Alexander 2013).   Certainly, the 
continental Nordic countries have not been immune from this backlash.  Each of 
them, for example, has a right-wing populist party: the Danish People's Party, the 
True Finns, Norway's Progress Party, and the Sweden Democrats.  
This being said, the best analyses to date concerning the presumed retreat of 
multiculturalism, making use of empirical data from one of a variety of indexes or 
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measures that allow for comparative analyses (MIPEX dealing explicitly with anti-
discrimination, CIVIX with civic integration, and MCP, which  looks at multiculturalism) 
can be used to place these trends into a clearer and comparative perspective.  Keith 
Banting and Will Kymlicka (2012: 18), the creators of the MCP, have concluded that 
while there is evidence of “a retreat from multiculturalism policies in a few countries, 
this is not the dominant pattern.” What they do see is a tendency to layer over existing 
multicultural policies—be they thick or thin policies—new initiatives aimed at civic 
integration.  Some have charged that this move to civic integration is an indication 
of the retreat or abandonment of multiculturalism, a view that Banting and Kymlicka 
dispute. I concur with them when they contend that “there is nothing inherently 
incompatible between multiculturalism and civic integration” (Banting and Kymlicka 
2012: 19).  Given the many misconceptions about what multiculturalism actually 
entails, the following section attempts to sketch out a non-normative sociological 
understanding of the phenomenon.  
2.1  Framing the analysis: Multiculturalism as claims-making
Charles Taylor has pointed out that democratic societies are inclusive insofar as they 
promote popular sovereignty, but this paradoxically can also contribute to exclusion. 
This is the case, he contends, because “of the need, in self-governing societies, of a 
high degree of social cohesion.  Democratic states need something like a common 
identity” (Taylor 1998: 143).  If current members define an outside group seeking 
entry as a threat to that common identity, they seek to effect closure rather than 
attempting to expand the bonds of solidarity.  Groups can be excluded in a variety 
of ways, with such practices extending to three main groups: indigenous peoples, 
ethnonational minorities, and immigrants. As one of the prime spokespersons on 
behalf of multicultural inclusion, he sees it as a mode of incorporation that is ethically 
preferable to the alternative forced assimilation.
In what follows, a parallel argument will be advanced, one based not on the ethics 
of the matter, but on the empirical reality of the ways that groups seek to negotiate the 
terms of inclusion.  In short, the argument that follows contends that not only should 
we be multiculturalists, but in fact we are (Kivisto 2012).   What follows is the outline 
of a theoretical argument that is empirically grounded.  Its primary empirical referent 
is the US, which is the settler nation par excellence with perhaps the most diverse 
population in the world.  However, I would argue that the model is germane to all of 
the globe’s wealthy liberal democracies, which is not to say that the results will be 
everywhere and always the same—only that the processes will proceed down parallel 
tracks.  In short, what follows is a sociological analysis of multiculturalism that seeks 
to treat it, in Durkheimian terms, as a social fact.
 Multiculturalism ought to be viewed as a form of claims-making, expanding 
on Giuseppe Sciortino’s (2003: 264) barebones argument that multicultural claims 
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constitute “political claims expressed by actors on behalf of a social category.”  The 
actors in question—the claims-makers—are the more or less legitimate representatives 
of the category in question, in this case ethnic groups, and are generally individuals 
who hold leadership roles within their respective groups.  What Sciortino broadly 
termed a social category, I prefer to call a community of fate, and contend further 
that the claims revolve around concerns about the fate of the community as well as 
the well-being of its individual members.  Although a precise definition of the term 
community of fate does not exist, for our purposes it will suffice to note that one 
is typically born into this sort of community involuntarily and that members of the 
community experience various levels of marginalization and stigmatization.  They 
understand the individual and the group as involved in, to borrow from Michael 
Dawson (1994), a “linked fate.”  It is important not to reify or essentialize groups, be 
they defined in terms of nationality, ethnicity, or religion.  Rogers Brubaker (2010; 
49) stresses that such identities “need to be understood as particular ways of framing 
political claims, not as real boundaries inscribed in the nature of things.”  With this 
in mind, claims-making takes place within the public spaces afforded by liberal 
democracies, where efforts can be made to mobilize support in the court of public 
opinion.  But claims-making is also directed at the state, for success often requires 
specific legislative actions or court decisions to translate multicultural aspirations 
into concrete institutionalized practices and policies.  These claims should typically be 
viewed as appeals to the state, and not as postnationalist challenges to it (Koopmans 
and Statham 1999). 
Five types of political demands can be distinguished: exemption, accommodation, 
preservation, redress, and inclusion.  A brief look at each of these will indicate that, 
contrary to critics such as Samuel Huntington (2004) and Christopher Caldwell 2009), 
and to some of multiculturalism’s advocates, as well, such claims-making is not entirely 
new.  Indeed, if this is what multiculturalism amounts to, then multiculturalism 
clearly existed avant la lettre, and one can point to examples involving both groups 
that arrived in the past and those who have arrived more recently.  
Exemption refers to calls for differential treatment of a group by waiving certain 
laws, rules, regulations, and the like in order to allow a group to maintain certain 
practices deemed to be demanded by its cultural values.  Examples include the Amish 
seeking an exemption to pay into the Social Security system on the grounds that they 
are theologically opposed to insurance; practitioners of Santeria who have sought 
permission to engage in animal sacrifice in spite of law prohibiting the practice 
based on arguments involving public health or cruelty to animals; and Sikhs who 
have gone to court to seek an exemption from mandatory motorcycle helmet laws. 
Accommodation is similar to but often less controversial than exemption.  It entails a 
call for reasonable adjustments that will permit people to remain part of the societal 
mainstream—keeping jobs, doing well in school, and so forth—while also being 
true to their ethnic identity.  For example, an Orthodox Jew might ask an employer 
to not be scheduled to work on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, making up the time 
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in a mutually agreed upon way. Likewise, Muslim employees might request that an 
employer provide the time and space to permit them to pray during the times that the 
call to prayer occurs during the workday, while making up that time in a mutually 
agreed upon way.
The next two types of claims-making are more controversial than the preceding 
two, and tend in general to come from ethnonational groups and indigenous peoples 
rather than from immigrants. Groups seeking to preserve the community or aspects 
of its culture sometimes conclude that they can’t do it alone and thus they appeal to 
the larger society for assistance, particularly to the state to pass legislation that will 
serve to protect a culture and preserve a collective identity.  Given that language is an 
especially tangible manifestation of a culture and a primary vehicle for its articulation, 
it’s not surprising that calls for preservation frequently revolve around language.  In 
the nineteenth century, German immigrants in the US exerted political pressure in 
a number of cities on public school systems to provide instruction in all subjects in 
German.  In some cities, when enough parents requested it, German became the sole 
language of instruction, while in other places bilingual instruction was mandated. 
This would change as a nativist backlash sought to mandate instruction solely in 
English (Daniels 1990: 159-160), and by the time that the post-1965 immigration wave 
commenced, preservation had given way to bilingual instruction as a means for 
transitioning to English-language proficiency.  Thus, any contemporary effort to engage 
public resources to actually preserve languages is confined to Native Americans, as is 
evident in the Esther Martinez Native American Languages Preservation Act of 2006, 
which promotes programs designed to allow American Indian languages to survive 
and in some instances to be restored. 
Redress is predicated on a reading of history that concludes that grave injustices 
have been inflicted on a community of fate, injustices than can only be rectified by 
various sorts of compensatory actions, typically on the part of the state.  Indigenous 
peoples who had their lands and ways of life undermined by European colonizers 
constitute a prime example, with numerous court cases having been undertaken 
in efforts to rectify treaty violations.  This sort of claims-making is evident in calls 
for affirmative action by African Americans whose lives continue to be impacted by 
the legacy of slavery and the caste-like system of Jim Crow.  Groups residing in the 
nation as a result of voluntary immigration have not been inclined to make this type 
of claim.
Before turning to the final type, note that despite the fact that each of these 
claims is intended to protect particularistic ethnic identities, the very way that 
this is accomplished is through what Alexander and Smelser (1999: 15) refer to as 
“civil-society discourse.”  In other words, multicultural claims-making can be seen 
as simultaneously advocacy on behalf of ethnic identities and solidarities and a 
performance that affirms ones identity and voice as a citizen of a democratic polity. 
As such, there is no inherent or necessary conflict between ethnic identity and 
national identity.
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This is more evident in the final type—inclusion—which calls for an expansion 
of boundaries as a means of overcoming marginalization and stigmatization.  Two 
subtypes of claims in support of inclusion can be distinguished.  The first constitutes 
the least controversial case made for multiculturalism, and it is made with the 
language of reaching out or appealing to rather than demanding, generally appealing 
to the public at large rather than to the state.  These claims are made on behalf of what 
Rainer Bauböck (2008: 3) refers to as "celebration multiculturalism" (see Selig 2008 
for a related analysis of the "cultural gifts" movement).  Members of the mainstream 
society are called upon to join members of a minority community in celebrating not 
only their particularities, but the very idea of living in a diverse society.  Ethnic and 
religious festivals are prime examples, which strikes some skeptics as contrived, 
commercial, or little more than "happy talk" (Hartmann and Bell 2007).  
The second subtype involves a call to expand the boundaries of solidarity, not 
by transforming those on the outside to clones of insiders, but by valorizing the 
diversity that they bring with them.  Rather than calling upon outsiders to transform 
themselves by getting rid of or confining to the private sphere their stigmatized 
qualities, a reframing of those qualities takes place, and insofar as that happens 
the circle of solidarity expands.  In the process, something happens to the insiders 
understanding of their own cultural values when such an expansion takes place (for 
influential recent explorations of ethnic boundaries, see Alba 2005 and Wimmer 
2013).  An attempt to redefine the religious identity of the nation in the aftermath 
of  World War II sought to redefine the place of its two largest religious minorities: 
Catholics and Jews.  The claim was made that the US was a Judeo-Christian nation, 
and not simply the “righteous empire” of Protestantism (Marty 1970).  To the extent 
that people embraced this idea, a shift took place from an earlier period when the 
relationship between the Protestant majority and the two minority faith communities 
revolved around whether or not the former would exhibit tolerance from its position 
of privilege.  Now it became a matter of whether or not the three faith traditions would 
be seen as equally valid expressions of religious conviction.  For this to happen, 
two interrelated things had to occur.  First, the previously stigmatized qualities of 
Catholics and Jews had to be seen in a positive light.  Their faiths would no longer 
merely be tolerated, but valorized (Alexander 2006).  Second, if these two traditions 
were to be so embraced, it would mean that the idea of Protestantism as the one true 
religion no longer held, but instead a more ecumenical sensibility was called for, one 
that was prepared to accept the prospect of rethinking how people understood their 
own tradition on the basis of an ongoing inter-religious dialogue.  
Some, such as sociologists of religion R. Stephen Warner (2010) and Rhys Williams 
(2011) have suggested that something similar may be developing today, albeit in 
embryonic form, with efforts by Muslims and their allies from the Judeo-Christian 
community suggesting a further expansion of the circle of solidarity by depicting 
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as part of a shared Abrahamic religious tradition or 
as religions of the book.  Needless to say, in the “age of terror,” this development 
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confronts serious challenges, but the earlier enlargement of the nation’s religious 
identity (which, too, continues to have those prepared to challenge its validity) in 
a way that relocated Catholicism and Judaism from the periphery to the center and 
in so doing changed the heretofore hegemonic status of Protestantism, constitutes 
an empirically-grounded rebuttal of Huntington’s central claim about the persistent 
hegemony of Anglo-Protestant culture, which, as Richard Alba (2010: 167) observes, 
“obliterates the contributions of Catholics and Jews to the mainstream cultural core.” 
Multiculturalism’s critics are numerous, accusing its proponents of undermining 
national unity by advocating for the balkanization of contemporary social life in which 
peoples’ identities are shaped solely by their ethnic attachments.  Some have gone so 
far as to suggest that terrorist violence is the inevitable outcome of such a philosophy 
(Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010).  Even world leaders have registered their opinions. 
David Cameron, Angela Merkel, and Nicholas Sarkozy may not agree on many things, 
including how to save the eurozone, but they are on the same page when it comes 
to assessing multiculturalism.  They deem it a failure that has produced alienation 
from national identity and thus has contributed to societal disunity.  For their part, 
proponents have tended to make their case on behalf of multiculturalism by arguments 
that are either explicitly normative or implicitly infused with normative content, and 
in fairness to the critics have sometimes given short shrift to considerations of the 
significance of shared values at the national level.  It is with this in mind that viewing 
multiculturalism as claims-making can help get past the polemics by offering a way 
of viewing the phenomenon sociologically—taking us beyond competing theoretical 
perspectives and ideologies. 
As is evident from some of the examples cited above, what I am calling 
multiculturalism refers to a phenomenon that claims-makers may or may not have 
dubbed multiculturalism.  They may have called it pluralism, or in some fashion 
made a case that what they were seeking involved what they understood to be fair 
terms of integration or, more simply, as an effort to protect something of value 
from one’s ethnic heritage.  Understood in this way, multiculturalism is not a new 
phenomenon, but rather can be found both in the past and the present—and, indeed, 
insofar as the Amish seem to factor into many discussions of multiculturalism, it 
can involve groups that arrived in the US prior to 1880.  Immigrant groups are not 
the only claims-making ethnic groups.  Indeed, countries where multiculturalism 
has become robust, with Canada being the leader in this regard, the drivers have 
been ethnonationalist groups such as the Quebecois and indigenes such as the First 
Nations peoples, with immigrants making less far-reaching claims (and, according to 
some politically-involved philosophers such as Will Kymlicka [1995], appropriately 
so).  While in the US, American Indians are a parallel force to the First Nations peoples 
in Canada, the nation lacks a significant ethnonational minority.  Instead, throughout 
its history, around 12 percent of its population has been composed of the offspring of 
slaves, the only non-voluntary migrant group in the nation.  I note this because the 
position of immigrants has been shaped in significant ways by their relationship to 
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these other two minority groups that have been far more marginalized, and who, as 
a consequence, have made more radical or far-reaching demands than immigrants 
and their offspring, such as demands for land, reparations, and affirmative action 
programs.  Put another way, the inclusion of immigrants, indigenous people, and 
national minorities is always intertwined, and since so much rides on the actions of 
the state, the particular dynamics of state/citizen and state/newcomer relations will 
also be influenced by the regime type of the state in question.  
2.2  Diversity and integration in the Nordic social democracies
Using Gøsta Esping-Andersen's (1990) well-known model of three different welfare 
regimes—liberal, corporatist-statist, and social democratic—the Nordic nations 
today are located very clearly in the social democratic camp.  Indeed, they are 
general viewed as the paradigmatic examples of this particular regime. Borrowing 
from language introduced in the middle of the past century by T.H. Marshall, social 
democracy is predicated on the idea of social rights—in addition, of course, to civic 
and political rights—as universal entitlements accruing to all citizens of the nation. 
Thus, a range of robust social protections and services have been put in place, 
including pensions, disability insurance, health care, public education, and so forth. 
Two features differentiate the social democratic model from the other two.  First, its 
proponents were willing to engage in social engineering in order to insure that the 
levels of inequality that inevitably arise in capitalist market economies did not rise 
too high.  Thus, social democratic societies valued social equality more highly than 
other regime-type countries (Kurunmäki 2010; Sørensen and Stråth 1997).  
Second, the Nordic countries were leaders in promoting gender equality.  This 
included legislation offering what to the rest of the world’s wealthy nations is seen 
as very generous parental leave plans, coupled with efforts to overcome patterns 
of gender discrimination in the labor market.  Beyond that, there has been a 
comparable commitment to insure that women and men are equally represented in 
political office. Despite the incursions of neoliberalism during the past two decades 
into the social democratic welfare state, there remains a broad consensus that 
the welfare state is worth preserving (Kivisto and Walhbeck 2013).  Suspicious of 
ideologies of the unfettered capitalist market, citizens of these countries are not 
drawn to, borrowing the language of Margaret Somers (2008: 211), “romancing the 
market or reviling the state.”  In this connection, Janoski (2010: 188) has made the 
following relevant observation about the general approach of social democratic 
nations to diversity, “The major difference between Nordic countries and the rest 
of Europe is the rise of Social Democratic Party power.  The role of left parties is 
well known in welfare state literature.  But left parties have also played a role in 
more open asylum and naturalization policies, and more intensive integration and 
multicultural programs.”  
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It is within the context of the Nordic social democratic welfare states that the 
state and civil societies address the cultural and economic challenges confronting 
minority groups.  This includes new manifestations of diversity arising because of the 
growing number of labor migrants and refugees arriving from a wide array of nations 
around the world.  For Finland, Norway, and Sweden it also involves the indigenous 
Sámi people.  Finally, it involves the persistent marginalization of the Roma who have 
lived in these countries since the sixteenth century (as opposed to the recently arrived 
Roma from Eastern Europe).  It is within the legal and cultural space created by this 
type of liberal democratic state that minority groups have and will in the future 
continue to make claims that are directed to the state, the court of public opinion, or 
both (Bay, Strömblad, and Bengtsson 2010).
The case studies that follow are intended to explore what is transpiring in these 
nations today. There is no attempt to offer a comprehensive portrait, for to do so 
would require a considerably longer volume or, to be more precise, volumes.  They 
do, however, offer evidence of the crucial issues surrounding any effort at achieving 
solidarity while valorizing diversity.  Despite the distinctive character of this group of 
nations predicated on a welfare state system that promotes an egalitarian capitalism 
instead of an unbridled neoliberal alternative, in many ways what is happening in 
these nations parallels what happens in other wealthy OECD countries.  In part, 
this may be because there are sufficient shared features of all liberal democracies, 
regardless of the type of welfare regime that one can expect states to respond to the 
claims of minority groups in remarkably similar ways.  In this regard, I noted that the 
discussion of claims-making earlier in this chapter was formulated with the United 
States specifically and the other settler nation, English-speaking democracies more 
broadly in mind.  Nonetheless, it is the assumption here that this template of types of 
claims is applicable elsewhere—in all other liberal democracies.  In these particular 
cases, it should be further noted that three of the four countries are members of the 
EU (the exception being Norway), with Finland being the only one that is also part of 
the Eurozone.  It can be said that all four countries—Norway included—are embedded 
in various ways in the EU project, and with it the attendant collective problems, 
such as those that have arisen in the wake of the debt crisis in Greece, Portugal, and 
elsewhere.
Peter Kraus' chapter responds to this situation insofar as it represents an effort to 
place these nations into a larger Western European framework.  He does so by exploring 
the complex character of peoplehood and national sovereignty, and the implications 
that competing images of peoplehood have on minorities old and new.  Bringing the 
framework down a level to that of the Nordic world itself, Sia Spiliopoulou Åkermark 
offers a comparative analysis of the laws and policies pertaining to minorities in 
the Nordic countries.  In doing so, she points to the tension existing between the 
egalitarian goals of the respective welfare states, which she contends were formulated 
with an at least implicit notion of a basically homogeneous population and current 
calls to respond to the protection of cultural diversity.  Or, in other words, the politics 
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of redistribution meets the politics of recognition.  A parallel chapter insofar as it 
operates at a Nordic comparative level is that written by Birte Siim, who is concerned 
with the relationship between multiculturalism and gender equality. As noted above, 
the commitment to gender equality is a central element in the Nordic welfare regime, 
and the question that is raised in this chapter is one that feminists elsewhere have 
raised, namely, as Susan Okin (1999) posed it, "is multiculturalism bad for women?"
It is at the same time true that each nation will respond in its own way to 
these issues based on unique aspects of its history.  This need not be seen as path 
dependence, but rather simply as an indication that the particularities of history 
and geography do matter.  Two chapters in the collection concentrate on local 
distinctiveness in examining the Roma in both cases and the Sámi in one.  Camilla 
Nordberg's chapter on the Nordic Roma has a primary focus on the Roma in Finland, 
but in so doing she offers as comparative references discussions of the Roma in both 
Norway and Sweden.  Her study is predicated on the assumption that successful 
incorporation into the society must address the issue of citizenship.  More specifically, 
it is intent on exploring whether or not the sort of citizenship on offer leaves the Roma 
existing as second class citizens, rather than as equals in a context where citizenship 
is conceived in a novel, multicultural way.  In interviews with Roma leaders, she offers 
a sense of the sorts of claims-making coming from spokespersons as well as some of 
the reactions from the larger society.  
Reetta Toivanen's complementary chapter is solely concerned with the Finnish 
case, but she investigates both the Roma and the Sámi.   She contends that efforts 
to articulate policies that will lead to inclusion while preserving diversity are 
particularly difficult to accomplish in the Finnish context, due in large part to the 
ways that a consensus culture works against such a goal. Specifically, in the case 
of the Sámi she stresses that despite the fact that Finland has signed on to various 
international mandates to protect the cultures and life-worlds of indigenous peoples, 
the actions on the ground to date have been disappointing, with the result being that 
the cultural future of the Sámi is in doubt.  The Roma, meanwhile, confront similar 
difficulties, but the situation regarding their culture, particularly their language, is 
made more complicated by the fact that it is a secret language and thus it may well 
be that the state can only play a minimal role responding to this specific claim for 
language preservation.  But Toivanen thinks the real issue for the Roma continues 
to be economic marginalization, and she concludes that despite various policy 
initiatives, they remain an underclass.  
Two chapters are concerned with the topic of immigration.  Niko Pyrhönen, Karin 
Creutz, and Marjukka Wiede have undertaken a content analysis of parliamentary 
debates on immigration legislation and the public discussions before, during, and 
afterwards, making use of editorials, letters to the editor, and discussion forums 
appearing under the auspices of the Helsingin Sanomat, Finland’s newspaper of 
record.  In part, the legislative actions leading to the passage of the Aliens Act of 
2004 was prompted by the necessity of harmonizing national laws with the general 
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framework mandated by the EU.  A recurring theme, particularly among the public 
at large, was an expression of concern about the future of national identity, with 
both explicit and implicit fears raised about the threat immigrants posed to national 
solidarity.  This would seem to be precisely the type of public attitude that contributes 
to anti-immigrant political posturing, but the authors note that over time—in part 
due to the role of the media in fostering more tolerant, cosmopolitan attitudes—
more accepting views were in evidence while there was a corresponding decline in 
xenophobia.  
Whereas this chapter looks at the context of reception, Niklas Wilhelmsson 
examines the immigrants themselves.  He is interested in knowing about their 
involvements in civil society and in the political system.  He appropriately locates 
his analysis in terms of the larger context in many liberal democracies, wherein some 
contend that there has been an appreciable decline in civic life by long-time citizens. 
Using a social capital approach, Wilhelmsson seeks to determine if social networks 
that immigrants belong to have a positive impact on political and civic engagement. 
His findings confirm an argument that goes back to the Chicago School of Sociology, 
which is that involvement in an ethnic community’s voluntary institutions, far from 
contributing to the isolation of newcomers from the societal mainstream, actually 
serves as a conduit for entry into that mainstream.   
If there is one thing that is certain it is that our current state of knowledge 
concerning the inclusion of minorities in these four countries is limited, and this 
despite the fact that considerable research has been done in all of them.  Moreover, 
events can quickly upset what might be thought of as trends.  The global recession of 
2008, which proved to be much deeper than was anticipated, the subsequent threat 
to the Euro, the growth in influence of various right-wing populist parties, and a level 
of uncertainty about the future of the EU were not on the table when scholars began 
to seriously think about these countries as potentially multicultural societies and as 
nations of immigrants.  The rosier prognostications of the turn of the century have 
given way to growing levels of unease, including unease about what minorities mean 
for national identity. Things can change very quickly.  Thomas Janoski (2010: 218), 
for example, looking only at one of these nations could write in a very recent book 
that, “The Finns do not have high immigration to protest against, so there is no need 
for an anti-immigrant party.”  Yet a year after the book appeared in print, the Finnish 
election on April 17, 2011 resulted in the anti-immigrant and anti-EU True Finns 
winning 19 percent of the vote, up from a mere 4 percent in the previous election.  
In terms of the old minorities, the dynamics of minority/majority relations have 
evolved over an extended period of time, and as the two articles in this collection 
detail, the picture for both groups is complex, and it is difficult to decide if the glass 
is half empty or half full.  In the case of the Sámi, the first elective assembly was 
created in Finland 1975 and shortly thereafter in both Norway and Sweden.  At both 
the national and international levels, legislation was passed near the end of the 
past century that permitted the Sámi language to be used as the official language of 
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government in a select number of municipalities.  And by 2002 a cross-border Sámi 
Parliamentary Assembly was in place.  However, conflict persists over competing 
ideas regarding economic development in Lapland, particularly over whether or not 
to expand extractive industries, which the Sámi quite rightly see as a threat to their 
livelihoods.  Meanwhile, as increasing numbers of young Sámi head to the urban 
centers in the southern parts of these countries, particularly the capital conurbations 
of Helsinki, Oslo, and Stockholm, it becomes an open question about whether or not 
the culture can survive into the future.
The Roma face a somewhat different challenge.  They constitute an example 
of what sociologist Georg Simmel (2011 [1908]: 119) called the stranger, which he 
characterized as the person “who comes today and stays tomorrow,” which is to say 
that they live among the majority population, but are perceived to be and are thus 
treated as perpetual outsiders.  Negative stereotypes, discrimination, and exclusion 
are deeply rooted throughout Europe, and though the situation of the Roma in the 
Nordic countries is without question considerably better than it is in Eastern Europe 
and many places in Western Europe, nonetheless it cannot be said that the Roma have 
achieved anything resembling full citizenship.  It should also be noted that relatively 
little research on the internal dynamics and social transformations within the Nordic 
Roma communities has been done, this lack of knowledge further contributing to 
viewing them as the stranger.  
Turning to the matter of refugees, according to the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Sweden not only takes in the largest number of refugees 
compared to its Nordic counterparts, but its refugee population as a percentage of the 
total national population is the highest.  There is one refugee in the country for every 
107 Swedes.  Norway is closest to Sweden, with a comparable figure of one refugee for 
every 119 Norwegians.  In contrast, there is only one refugee for every 582 Finns and 
one for every 5,504 Icelanders. Many refugees in these countries constitute what the 
Canadians refer to as “visible minorities,” people who are racially and/or religiously 
distinctive.  Thus, although their numbers are low, they are often the objects of various 
types of racist abuse and ostracism.  While the largest migrant groups often blend in 
quite readily, (such as Finns in Sweden and Estonians in Finland), the relatively small 
number of visible refugees comes to represent in the public’s mind the “immigrant 
problem.”  
Labor migration has recently become a topic of considerable concern in policy 
circles. From the 1970s, Sweden differed from its neighbors insofar as it received 
substantial numbers of labor migrants.  By far the largest component of that migration 
came from Finland, with over 400,000 Finns finding work, particularly in the 
construction and manufacturing sectors.  When their numbers proved insufficient, 
Sweden recruited workers from Greece, Italy, and Yugoslavia. The other three 
countries received only small numbers of labor migrants, with Finland standing out in 
particular for its low numbers since it remained until the 1990s a nation of emigration 
Brought to you by | SIIS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/21/16 11:51 AM
 Diversity and integration in the Nordic social democracies   33
rather than one of immigration. Immigration flows were primarily humanitarian 
rather than work-related (Friberg and Eldring 2013).
With the two waves of EU expansion eastward, in 2004 and 2007, and with the 
ability of new EU citizens to move freely in the member states, the number of Eastern 
Europeans entering the Nordic countries increased.  By far the largest sending nation 
is Poland, but it includes the three Baltic states as well as Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. The typical Eastern European migrant is a 
somewhat older male without university training, but often with vocational training. 
They have found employment in construction, manufacturing, agriculture, and 
the service sector—these trends being most pronounced in Norway.  It is estimated 
that more than 330,000 Eastern Europeans moved to one or another of the Nordic 
countries between 2004 and 2011, a figure that rises as high as 600,000 when 
factoring in temporary workers (Friberg and Eldring 2013; Friberg, Arnholtz, Eldring, 
Hansen, and Thorains 2014).  Given how recently this development has occurred, it is 
not surprising that policy initiatives are in a somewhat fluid state.  
The extent to which the Nordic countries will have to rely on migrant labor in 
the future is an open question. However, there is good reason to assume that the 
need will increase over time.  The birth rates in all of the Nordic countries are below 
zero population growth (2.1 is the standard figure used for population replacement 
at existing levels), though in all instances higher than the EU-28 average of 1.58. 
Denmark currently has the lowest rate of the four nations at 1.73, while Sweden has 
the highest at 1.91. These rates are not as problematic as they are in several other 
Western European nations, but there are economic implications that will need to 
be addressed. Though some quarters of the environmental movement might find 
a decrease in population salutatory because it would mean less pollution, less of 
a drain on natural resources, less crowding, and so forth, it would also mean that 
labor shortages would have to be met by economic constriction.  What about policies 
designed to increase the national birth rate as a way of addressing labor shortages? 
In instances where such efforts have been undertaken, they have been shaped by a 
rather unattractive ethnocentric nationalism, often with a heavy dose of racism.  And 
one only has to look eastward to Russia to be reminded that such efforts have seldom 
if ever been successful.  Reduced birth rates in the world’s wealthy nations have 
become by now a well-established pattern, and it is not likely to change anytime soon.
Pragmatic policy makers, for good reason, are concentrating on the idea of 
increasing immigration levels in at least a modest way as a means of addressing 
existing and impending labor shortages.  And in this regard, though opposition to 
increasing levels of immigration has increased since 2008, in general the Nordic 
publics are more open to the idea that immigration is necessary than is true in 
a number of other Western European nations. Though the success of right-wing 
populism is sometimes linked to fears about economic competition for scarce jobs 
between the native-born and immigrants, in fact recent research findings reveal that 
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cultural fears about national identity are a far more salient contributing factor to anti-
immigrant sentiment and support for right-wing parties (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). 
This is the context in which the politics of multiculturalism plays out.  Although 
the metrics used to determine the levels of commitment to multiculturalism vary, 
the virtue of Banting and Kymlicka’s MPI is that it provides measures for policies 
regarding immigrants, indigenous peoples, and national minorities.  For immigrants, 
8 policies are considered.  Sweden ranks highest among this quartet with 7 out of 8 
policies in place, followed closely by Finland with 6.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
Norway only has 3.5 and Denmark’ score, reflecting the impact of the anti-immigration 
platform of the People’s Party, is 0.  On the other hand, in terms of indigenous people, 
of the 9 policies that make up this category, Denmark ranks highest, with 7 out of 
9.  Norway is second with 5 of 9, followed by Finland with a score of 4, and Sweden 
is at the bottom with a score of 3.  In the case of national minorities, only Finland, 
with its Swedish-language minority, is represented.  With a potential score of 6—
which is earned by Canada, Spain, and the United Kingdom—Finland’s score is 4.5. 
How exactly these results ought to be interpreted is open to debate.  The case studies 
contained in the following chapters can assist in that interpretive task.  
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3  Democracy’s Challenge: Nordic Minority Politics in 
the European Context
3.1  Democracy, the people and the paradox of sovereignty
‘The people’ is a ubiquitous category both in modern constitutionalism and in the 
rhetoric of democratic politics. When it comes to defining what democracy is in a 
nutshell, the formula of ‘government by the people’ is recurrently used. At first sight, 
this sounds reasonable enough: In a polity that is supposed to meet democratic 
standards, the subjects of rule must also have a decisive voice in the process of ruling. 
Yet the apparent common sense may well hide one of the most intractable problems of 
democratic theory and practice, as Robert Dahl (1989: 116) would put it. The problem 
concerns the very identity of ‘the people’: Which are the specific features a given 
collectivity of persons must have to be able to claim that they constitute a people? If 
the people are supposed to be the ultimate source of democratic legitimacy, who can 
legitimately establish who the people are? By raising these questions we approach 
one of the big ‘black hole’ areas of political sociology and political science. Modern 
theories of democracy implicitly assume that ‘a people’ exists. In the language of 
modern constitutions, the assumption typically becomes a programmatic declaration. 
But what are the social and political realities underneath the constitutional claims of 
‘government by the people’?
I suspect that much of the concern many scholars and public intellectuals 
express when they are confronted with issues of identity politics may be caused 
by the uncomfortable feeling of getting close to the ‘black hole’. An argument that 
can frequently be heard in this context is that instead of looking at our navels and 
discussing who we are we should rather focus on ‘proper problems’, i.e. problems 
that relate to the allocation of scarce resources. In contrast with this view, I will hold 
that defending an interest presupposes identity. After all, one of the main lessons to 
be drawn from the debate on multiculturalism and democracy of the last decades – a 
debate that seems far from being closed yet – is that democratic politics involves, by 
definition, identity politics. To ignore this would simply imply to keep one of the core 
domains of democratic rule insulated against the very logic of democracy. Here, the 
point not only lies in acknowledging the importance of input-oriented mechanisms 
of legitimation for democratic decision-making, as most political scientists would do. 
Input legitimation (Scharpf 1999: 6) is based on strong collective ties between the 
members of a community. These ties translate into a general consent which makes 
the outcome of an open political process acceptable to all community members. What 
identity politics now typically puts to the test are the very foundations of democratic 
input. For in many cases, raising identity issues means to question the legitimacy 
 © 2015 Peter A. Kraus
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of the established ‘self’ that underlies the exercise of democratic self-determination. 
In more general terms, examining the link between identity and self-determination 
forces us to take on a theme that, despite its high relevance, has for a long time been 
neglected by mainstream social science, namely the study of the making, reproducing 
and transforming of political peoplehood (Smith 2003: 10).1
Jacobinism has obviously had a major impact on the modern political imagery 
when it comes to the notion of people-making. On the one hand, Jacobinism can be 
understood as the main ideological force sustaining the French Revolution and the 
republican legacy. In this regard, its principal characteristic is the implantation of a 
political culture of generality, where generality stands for the representation of the 
general will by public authorities in a way that creates an immediate link between 
the identity of the citizens and the ‘grand national whole’ epitomized by the state 
(Rosanvallon 2004: 13). On the other hand, the Jacobin phenomenon can be associated 
with the political dynamics of modernity in a broader sense, which makes the 
French experience comparable to other cases: From the angle adopted by Eisenstadt 
(1999: 72), Jacobinism is seen as a ‘fundamentalism of modernity’. Accordingly, the 
main dividing line in modern politics would run between those who follow Jacobin 
orientations (be it with reactionary or with progressive intentions) and those attached 
to pluralist conceptions. From both perspectives, the tension between generality and 
particularity constitutes one of the central antinomies of modern democracy. Thus, 
what is at stake in the realm of identity politics ultimately is the very definition of 
what – or who – underlies the ‘generality’ that is to be democratically represented. 
Which identities can legitimately claim to be more general – and thereby democratic 
– than others? Who is who in democratic politics?
One can reasonably hold that the influence of Jacobinism on modern political 
thinking, which is still graspable today, when, for example, the virtues of ‘thick’ 
civic unity are praised against the dangers of multicultural fragmentation, is closely 
connected to the quasi mythical status that the French Revolution attained in the 
history of democracy and democratization. However, if we look at things more 
systematically, we may also assume that Jacobin views of democracy owe much of 
their enduring prominence to the possibility they offer for evading the ‘black hole’ 
which may emerge once we want to determine the identity of the people. In other 
words, the Jacobin approach offers an escape from the problems associated with what 
political theorists have called the ‘paradox of sovereignty’ or ‘Rousseau’s paradox’. 
What is the paradox about?
The concept of democratic sovereignty presupposes that there is a collective 
identity sustaining the polity which is conceived of as sovereign. Such an identity, 
1 There is a huge body of work on nationalism. Yet political peoplehood does not necessarily requi-
re a national form, although in historical reality the making of peoples frequently overlapped with 
nation-building.
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however, can itself hardly be conceived of as an outcome of democratic decision-
making. Democratic political structures do not emerge out of a historical vacuum, 
and the tribute we have to pay to history simply is that there is no democracy before 
democracy. To paraphrase the compelling observation made by Ivor Jennings (1956: 
56), government by the people can only take place after somebody has decided who 
the people are. The roots of popular sovereignty are inextricably connected with a 
past which is pre-democratic, so that the people – the demos – appear on the political 
scene without genuine democratic credentials.
Thus, as Rousseau pointed out, those who want to establish a democratic polity 
ultimately have to rely on resources which themselves lack democratic legitimacy.2 
Processes of establishing democratic rule have always involved inheriting a legacy 
made of asymmetries in the distribution of power. This legacy can only be tackled 
after democratic procedures have been introduced. In the moment of constituting a 
sovereign collective will, the people are on political grounds which are external to 
democracy. Now the Jacobin way of dealing with this situation and of circumventing 
the paradox of sovereignty has been to conflate the identity of the people with the 
identity of the state, constructing the ‘grand national whole’ Rosanvallon refers to in 
the French case. To cut a long and complex story short, the Jacobin approach consists 
in assuming that democratic sovereignty is ultimately embodied in the nation-state. 
The state represents an indivisible source of sovereignty, which is built on the uniform 
collective identity of the citizens.
The paradox of sovereignty thereby disappears to the extent that the Jacobin 
understanding of democracy converges with monist views of state power and 
citizenship: The nation-state becomes the ultimate source of political authority and 
the guarantor of uniform citizens’ rights within a discrete territory, while state-based 
patterns of identification constitute the fabric of legitimate political rule. Against 
this background, one can indeed argue that the French model of linking peoplehood 
and statehood served well into the twentieth century as the standard pattern for 
envisaging political integration under conditions of modernity (Kymlicka 2007: 42). 
The idea of national sovereignty made for a strong and unique bond between ‘the’ 
people and ‘their’ state. Nonetheless, the fusion of Jacobin and monist principles 
never remained uncontested, not even in France. On the one hand, the specific 
way peoples are to be linked to states, so that criteria of democracy and justice are 
sufficiently met, has been a persistent matter of intense political conflicts. Since the 
French Revolution, the problems that derive from the paradox of sovereignty have 
been reverberating in still ongoing controversies on how the collectivities entitled to 
self-determination should be appropriately defined and redefined. Symptomatically, 
2 The assessment can be found in Book II of The Social Contract (Section 7, ‘The Legislator’). The 
paradox may seem even more paradoxical if we take into account that it was laid out by a philosopher 
who was bound to become a major source of inspiration for the Jacobins.
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up to now the quest for democracy can be associated with a continuous proliferation 
of potentially and factually eligible ‘selves’. In the context of political development in 
Europe, it seems no coincidence that historical moments standing for a push towards 
democracy paved the way for the break-up of old, and the founding of new states. The 
wave of democratization at the end of World War I led to a significant increase of the 
number of European states. While one could count 28 of them around 1920, the figure 
had gone up to 39 around 1990, after the collapse of communism in the East. The more 
democracy, the higher the number of collective subjects who claim to have a right to 
self-determination, one may conclude. On the other hand, the basis of democratic 
sovereignty in a given political unit can be interpreted in pluralist ways, fostering the 
dispersion of power among groups and territories. 
However, the imagery of the one and indivisible generality encapsulated 
within clear-cut borders remains quite powerful, as becomes evident if we look at 
political maps of the world, whose single components, each with its specific colour, 
are ultimately meant to represent the blending of peoplehood and statehood in an 
environment of ‘United Nations’. The power visualized on these maps does not only 
have a symbolic character, but largely reflects the unequal access to resources used 
for defining collective identities in the politics of people-making. The dynamics of 
constructing the peoples who are to secure their claim on the political map thereby 
implies multiple forms of hegemonic categorization, as well as multiple attempts at 
overcoming its effects by articulating alternative identities. The political architecture 
of the people as the ‘grand national whole’ must rely on considerable institutional 
capacities to name collectivities, interpret histories and standardize languages. 
Power is required to strengthen the role of some collectivity, privilege its history and 
standardize its language at the expense of others. The application of the logic of 
Jacobinism to political integration entailed that the other was assimilated into the one 
and indivisible people under unequal terms. Thus, in the republican order established 
by Ataturk after the end of Ottoman rule, Kurds officially ceased to exist and were 
considered ‘mountain Turks’. Following the same kind of pattern seven decades later, 
the constitution of post-communist Bulgaria banned ethnic and confessional parties, 
trying to put a political veil on the presence of a substantial portion of Turks among 
its population. So there were officially no Kurds in Turkey, as there should officially 
be no Turks in Bulgaria, to make sure that the picture of the one uniform people is not 
threatened by those who it does not represent. In more extreme cases, the attempts at 
imposing a hegemonic pattern of peoplehood against diverse identities entailed the 
massive use of physical violence and led to the expulsion or even elimination of entire 
segments of a state’s original population. To depict the history of high modernity as 
a history of ethnic cleansing can therefore hardly be regarded as an exaggeration. 
That democracy has not always been a reliable safeguard against the prosecution of 
minorities in the name of the titular nations of modernizing states (Mann 2005) makes 
for a somewhat uncomfortable conclusion.
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Yet, it can't be denied that the fusion of national and democratic principles that 
both old and new states were eager to accomplish created a recurrent threat to the 
survival of minorities. The consolidation of nation-state sovereignty often led to the 
oppression of minorities for the sake of hegemonic integration. From the perspective 
of Europe's minorities, the legacy of the twentieth century is appalling. Even where 
state constitutions were supposed to guarantee minority protection, there was little 
official commitment to effectively implement the rights of minorities. In many cases, 
the de facto norm was anyway not to protect, but to get rid of minority groups, be it by 
assimilating them or by prompting their exodus. Accordingly, minorities can be seen 
both as the key witnesses and as the principal victims of the problematic character of 
the hegemonic link between democratic sovereignty and nation-state construction. 
As has been argued thus far, this is especially relevant if we wish to understand the 
manifold grievances members of ‘old’ minorities raise vis-à-vis the majority state. 
The labelling of groups such as the South Tyrolese, the Sámi or the Catalans as ‘old’ 
follows the intention of emphasizing their long and continuous presence in the areas 
they inhabit. Frequently, the groups in question were incorporated into the majority 
territory without their consent, and on that basis they often have a long historical 
record of struggles for attaining a sovereign or semi-sovereign status on their own 
grounds. Minority activism has certainly contributed to the erosion of the Jacobin 
paradigm of integration, which seems to have lost much of its former normative 
appeal all over Europe, as successive agreements on securing minority rights at the 
international level indicate. If we look at recent tendencies in international law and 
politics, what used to be the ‘French model’ nowadays rather looks like the ‘French 
exception’. Nevertheless, we should be cautious before announcing the decline of the 
once hegemonic approach to people-making.
While we may have witnessed some progress regarding the situation of minority 
groups of ‘endogenous’ origin in Western democracies, it is more difficult to make 
a general assessment concerning ‘new’ minorities, that is minorities constituted 
by groups with an immigrant background, who at present make for a substantial 
portion of Europe’s population. Concerning their status, it may be too hasty a move 
to maintain that there has been a general retreat from multiculturalism and a return 
to assimilation as the dominant approach in the liberal democracies of the West, as 
some observers have done (Brubaker 2003). However, over the last few years several 
Western European countries have indeed emphasized their intention to uphold well-
established majority identities before the cultural changes brought by immigration. 
Thus, admission to citizenship is made contingent upon passing tests which ultimately 
scrutinize the affinities an applicant has developed towards what one might call the 
host society’s ‘official image’. The controversies stirred by such measures are not 
caused because of their declared intention to foster the dynamics of civic integration 
in contexts marked by an increasing cultural heterogeneity, but by the re-affirmation 
of hegemonic patterns of people-making they apparently intend.
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3.2  The challenge of minorities
The concept of minority typically refers to groups who find themselves in a position of 
relative subordination in a given societal context, as they lack the structural capacity 
for generalizing key features of their group identity with regard to the dominant group. 
Sheer numerical inferiority may be the main reason for such a situation, but numbers 
tend to connect to other factors in manifold ways. At the same time, these other 
factors point to a cultural profile, based on ethnicity, religion or language, which is 
distinctive of the minority. Hence, in contrast to political minority options, which can 
potentially be adopted by an ever growing number of people and ultimately become 
majoritarian, attachments to a particular cultural identity tend to be of a more sticky 
kind, and less susceptible to deliberate choices. While all kinds of human civilization 
seem to have produced their minorities, the minority status gains particular salience 
with the formation of modern nation-states. This is so because of the great weight 
a shared cultural identity attains for political integration in the age of nationalism 
(Gellner 1997). By setting the standards that defined the identity of its citizens, the 
modern state tended to discard those identity patterns that were peripheral or even 
undesirable to the officialized self-understanding of the nation: Minorities are the 
product of institutional cultural politics. As I have argued previously, the logic of 
minority conflicts is inherent to the architecture of the nation-state. However, the 
conflicts and their outcome still reflect the contingency of politics. Accordingly, 
one must keep in mind that ‘minority’ and ‘majority’ are relational categories. The 
parameters characterizing this relation reflect the use of power, as well as the unequal 
access to power resources that different actors have (Kraus 1996: 370). How minorities 
interact with dominant groups, and how their position worsens or improves in this 
interaction, depends on political contexts which are subject to change. 
Notwithstanding the importance of contextual factors, there are a few general 
aspects that we may take into account to attain a better understanding of majority-
minority relations. One first aspect has already been mentioned: It is the distinction 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ minorities. Old minorities are often also categorized as 
national minorities, in contrast with the ethnic minorities formed by immigrant 
groups (Kymlicka 1995: 11–15). In many respects, the central implication of drawing 
this distinction is to assign the claims of the respective type of minority a different 
normative status. National minorities want to maintain their specific group identity 
within a historical homeland, which they see as the basis for articulating claims for 
autonomy and justifying the objective of setting up solid institutional structures 
conducive to their collective empowerment. Ethnic minorities obviously lack such 
a homeland in the host country. In general, their claims do not primarily focus on 
preserving or re-establishing a particular institutional status, but rather aim at 
achieving their incorporation in the receiving society under conditions of equality.
The second aspect overlaps to some extent with the first one, as national minorities 
are in most cases territorially concentrated minorities. Territorial concentration works 
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in favour of minority mobilization and makes it easier to introduce provisions that 
give minorities extensive rights to self-government. On the other hand, it also has to 
be noted that disposing of an ‘own’ territory is a crucial asset for collectivities who 
want to accentuate their potential for institutional completeness before the majority 
state, thereby moving from autonomy towards independence. It is this constellation 
which can dramatically exacerbate the implications of the paradox of sovereignty by 
leading to a conflict over a minority’s right to secede.
A third aspect which may play a role in structuring the frame of ethno-national 
politics is whether a minority can rely on some type of external protection (Offe 1994: 
145). This is especially relevant in those cases where the protection comes from a 
neighbouring state that identifies ethnic kin-groups abroad as part of a larger national 
community, thereby fuelling conflicts over the legitimacy of territorial settlements in 
ethno-nationally mixed areas. The intertwining of intra-state and inter-state conflict 
dimensions may further complicate dealing with minority issues, as sovereignty has 
to be negotiated both between groups and between states. For a long time, and up to 
the present, dealing with the national question in Eastern Europe has been marked 
by this syndrome.
External protection, territoriality and nationality are variables delineating 
potentials that minority groups may use for their mobilization. Assessing such 
potentials will possibly help us to get a better understanding of the relatively strong 
position a group such as the already mentioned South Tyrolese has for putting 
forward its demands if we compare it to, say, members of the Kurdish diaspora 
spread across Western Europe. In one case, we have the typical example of a national 
minority concentrated in a borderland area. The support it received from the Austrian 
side after World War II was clearly functional for achieving ample autonomy rights 
vis-à-vis the Italian state. In the other case, the resources for exerting strong political 
pressure are basically lacking: Thus, activists trying to mobilize for the Kurdish cause 
in German cities, for example, do not receive any institutional support from the side of 
Turkey, where the bulk of Kurdish immigration to Germany stems from. As the Kurds 
in Germany lack political control over a homeland ‘of their own', German authorities 
are generally reluctant to classify them as an independent ethnic group, let alone to 
recognize them as a nationality.
However, to what extent potentials are activated follows no automatic logic, but is, 
again, a question of political contingency, as is exemplified by the case of the Swedish 
speaking Finns, who may well be considered a ‘strong' minority, although — if we leave 
aside the case of Åland — they lack both external protection and a clear-cut territorial 
basis. Neither have they been assigned nationality status. Hence, an assessment of 
the impact of ‘objective' resource potentials will not render an analysis of the deeper 
context of minority politics superfluous. It is this very context that we need to look at 
if we want to grasp the manifold ways power frames majority-minority relations. Still, 
regardless of the ultimately crucial significance of contextual factors, there are two 
major challenges of a general character involved in any attempt at tackling minority 
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issues under democratic conditions. They are intrinsically connected to our point of 
departure, namely the ‘black hole' in which sovereignty has to be constituted. Hence, 
both challenges relate to the problem of giving a satisfactory answer to the question 
of who the (legitimate) people are, although the question has to be confronted from 
different perspectives in each case.
The first challenge refers to the threat minority demands may represent for 
holding together nation-states as the key units for collective decision-making in the 
modern world. It can be called an ‘external’ challenge, since it results from the lack 
of legitimacy minorities attribute to the majority state for dealing with their affairs. 
As I have argued, most states have tried to prevent having to take up this challenge 
by striving for the cultural homogenization of their population, turning it into one 
people. From a present-day perspective, it seems out of question that the normative 
cost of linking the goal of democratic integration to assimilationist policies is 
excessively high, and that majority states have the obligation to respect the identity 
of minority cultures. It must also be acknowledged, however, that the problems the 
paradox of sovereignty bears when it comes to constituting a legitimate type of demos 
will hardly be addressed in appropriate ways by advocating an endless multiplication 
of minority-controlled political units. To put it in more figurative terms: We will not 
evade the darkness of the one black hole of sovereignty by simply creating a great 
many black holes. Thus, the external challenge ultimately begs the question of how to 
define a proper balance between unity and diversity. As has been argued here, neither 
negation nor homogenization is a justifiable response to diversity. Diversity requires 
accommodation. At the same time, accommodation will be difficult to achieve if 
the foundations of a common polity are persistently and vehemently questioned by 
minority groups. It also has to be said, though, that majorities are often inclined to 
conceive of accommodation as a one-sided exercise. The ‘other’ represented by the 
minority is then only recognized as some kind of appendix to the still dominant 
‘grand national whole’. Otherness is only tolerated as long as it can be kept outside 
the core areas of sovereignty, so that being a minority ultimately remains linked to 
a status of subordination, be it only in the literal sense of remaining exposed to the 
categorical authority of a superior unit. Accordingly, the standard approach to dealing 
with minority issues adopted in institutional contexts determined by nation-state 
prerogatives is based on a politics of unequal recognition, which assigns minorities a 
‘special status’, while it takes the majority identity for granted.
The second challenge concerns the way minorities represent and articulate 
themselves. In this sense, we might speak of an ‘internal’ challenge, which points at 
the very foundations of minority identities. The paradoxical character of the political 
dynamics of people-making becomes patent here as well, as the institutionalization 
of a minority identity often entails an ‘isomorphic’ reproduction of hegemonic 
standards. The spaces which are opened to enable minorities to develop a counter-
hegemonic discourse and challenge patterns of domination remain thereby subject to 
the very logic they supposedly question. At any rate, this is a criticism that minorities 
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in control of autonomous institutional realms are often exposed to: While pretending 
to defy the dominant group’s power of categorization, they would apply all too 
rigid categorization strategies when determining their own ‘self’. In a similar vein, 
minority institutions – political bodies, educational organs, cultural academies or 
minority-run media – are often portrayed in parodist ways, as if they were obsessively 
devoted to reproducing the dominant patterns of identity attribution on a minor 
scale. In consequence, minorities are often accused of being unable to transcend the 
essentialist politics they once had been themselves victims of. Minority groups are 
thus confronted with an expectation that representatives of dominant cultures rarely 
had to care about: to articulate their identities in a reflective and non-essentialist 
way.3 It is certainly justified to judge contemporary identity politics by other normative 
standards than those that were in place during the high time of nationalism. Yet, 
by doing so, one should also be careful not to incur in an unequal blaming, which 
is only the reverse side of unequal recognition. The practices of categorization we 
may find problematic in minority discourses respond to imperatives that continue 
occupying a central place in the language of modern politics and thereby push those 
involved in minority politics towards conceiving of identities as having an essential 
quality. Ultimately, the ‘nationalizing’ and ‘essentializing’ elements detectable in 
the mobilization rhetoric of an indigenous minority such as the Sámi must not be 
disconnected from the massive impact of Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish and Russian 
state policies when it comes to setting the terms of discursive exchange in majority-
minority relations in Europe’s far North.
Both the external and the internal challenge are inherent features of minority 
politics and have to be tackled in some form by disentangling the puzzles of sovereignty 
and disaggregating ‘the’ people into different yet complementary collectivities. Let 
me stress once again, however, how critically significant contextual factors are for 
getting an appropriate understanding of what is at stake in any specific minority 
mobilization. Only the sound analysis of context will allow us to grasp whether 
the identity claims of ethnic groups and nationalities work against or reinforce the 
hegemonic logic in the politics of people-making.
3.3  Minority politics in the Nordic context
Nordic countries are frequently described as being remarkably homogeneous by 
comparative European standards. This homogeneity is generally understood as an 
absence of pronounced cultural or religious differentiation. From such an angle, 
cultural homogeneity is considered a key background element for understanding the 
3 The critique of the essentializing view has been of central concern in the debate on the formation of 
social and cultural identities triggered by post-structuralism; see, for instance, Kristeva 1991.
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situation of minority groups in Northern Europe (Allardt 1981). In addition, the high 
level of cultural homogeneity would explain the low intensity of ethnic conflicts in 
contrast with other areas of Europe in the age of nationalism.
Moreover, cultural homogeneity can be interpreted as a factor which fostered the 
development of strong and wide-ranging welfare state structures in the Scandinavian 
region. Such a view is based on the observation that ethno-linguistic differentiation 
tends to have negative effects on the level of organisation of labour in a country. Low 
levels of labour organization in turn, tend to be negatively correlated with the volume 
of social spending (Stephens 1979). Against this background, the controversial 
assumption that cultural diversity is bad for social equality has been voiced in an 
upcoming and intensifying debate on the relationship between multiculturalism 
policies and the welfare state.4
The concept of homogeneity – of a historically entrenched homogeneity, one 
might want to add – seems to be a good starting point for assessing minority politics 
and the impact of immigration on established identities in the North. In this respect, 
I think that there are two aspects that are highly relevant for a critical reflection on 
the dominant approach to minority issues in the area. In the first place, we should 
be careful not to take homogeneity as something given, as the self-evident basis 
for the processes of social and political integration that sustained the blending of 
peoplehood in statehood in countries such as Sweden or Finland. We can certainly 
accept the argument that the early amalgamation of religious and political power 
structures brought about by the establishment of state churches made for a less 
arduous path to nation-building in the North than in the Continent’s South, marked 
by a long-lasting division of religious and secular authorities (Rokkan 1999). However, 
such an argument does not necessarily imply that Nordic diversity patterns smoothly 
dissolved in the process of nation-state construction. To use the powerful image 
of the folkhem, coined by Sweden’s Social Democrats: We should not assume that 
the people to be given their home were in the political picture from the beginning, 
happily waiting to get what they deserved as good citizens. Rather, these very 
people have to be conceived of to a substantial extent as a collectivity tailored by 
state institutions. Accordingly, what we perceive today as a strikingly high level of 
homogeneity would have to be seen as the product of a successful homogenization. 
To be sure, the historical rationale of homogenization varies from case to case. In 
Sweden, it may be linked to deliberate attempts by reformist state elites to create a 
thick bond between the citizens and ‘their’ polity, in a way that has some resemblance 
with the patterns of the French republican model. In Finland, it may rather be related 
to a particular combination of internal and external pressures in the political context 
of a young state in which social and political structures of a Nordic type overlapped 
4 The volume edited by Banting and Kymlicka (2006) contains a first critical assessment of this de-
bate.
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with an East European path to national revival (Alapuro 1988). I am clearly not 
pretending to offer any conclusive view of the dynamics of people-making in the 
North here. Nor is it my intention to replace the story of the folkhem with a narrative 
that focuses exclusively on the homogenizing thrust of integration. I simply want to 
emphasize that homogeneity should not be taken for granted as a historical given, 
but be related to shifting political constellations that make it more or less effective. 
One could look at the city of Helsinki, for instance, that some 100 years ago was a 
much more diverse place, characterized by minority experiences and intercultural 
exchanges of multiple kinds, than it is today.
The second aspect I would like to bring into focus when sketching out an 
approach to minority politics in the North is the thorny relationship between 
equality and homogeneity. The Nordic welfare state tradition has created robust 
links between national identity and social citizenship, links that found a compact 
expression in the Swedish concept of folkhemmet. Now, the key question in the 
context of our discussion here is to what extent the construction of the people’s 
home went hand in hand with the tendency to conceive of social equality in terms 
of cultural homogeneity. At the core of the idea of social citizenship is the notion 
that a minimum of protection and well-being is required to guarantee individual 
autonomy and enable men and women to make meaningful use of their civil and 
political rights. Since the comparative analysis of welfare regimes presented by 
Esping-Andersen (1990), it has become all but a commonplace in the social sciences 
that universalism is one of the most characteristic features of welfare policies in 
Scandinavia. At its most elementary level, this universalism implies that basic 
social entitlements have to be guaranteed to all citizens regardless of their status 
or class. I have certainly no intention to question this noble perspective and the 
emphasis it places on the egalitarian dimension of citizenship. What we perhaps 
have to scrutinize more thoroughly, however, are the patterns of collective identity 
underneath the claims for universalism of the folkhem: Which kind of who is 
constitutive of the Scandinavian welfare universe? The Nordic welfare architecture 
is based on a strong commitment to achieving the social inclusion of all citizens. 
Such a commitment may involve a relatively hesitant public attitude towards 
admitting newcomers, as welfare states are still nation-states and as the universal 
entitlements they guarantee are controlled by national authorities, and meant to 
benefit nationals in the first place. For this reason, Jytte Klausen (1995: 246) takes 
a sceptical stance towards the ethos of universalism that is supposed to sustain 
social citizenship in Scandinavia: ‘It can in fact be argued that the Scandinavian 
welfare states are as much examples of closure and exclusion as they are examples 
of welfare state inclusion. Which feature predominates depends upon one’s vantage 
point, particularly whether one is a citizen or an alien.’
Klausen opens up an interesting angle of analysis, which deserves further 
elaboration. In this context, my assumption is that the limitation of universalism 
to those inside the folkhem may only be one part of the story, an important one, 
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to be sure. However, what seems even more relevant for the argumentation I have 
been sketching out on these pages is the possible trade-off between inclusion in 
the people’s home and the recognition of diversity. To what extent have universalist 
intentions been conflated with homogenizing practices? This is obviously a topic of 
crucial concern whenever we talk about minority politics. What ultimately is at stake 
in tackling it is whether cultural assimilation is the price we have to be prepared to 
pay to avoid social exclusion. For decades, the rhetoric of inclusion has been used 
to force indigenous peoples and minority groups to acquire a cognitive repertoire 
that conformed to the majority identity. Accordingly, the degree of inclusion of a 
citizen of Sámi or Roma origin in, say, Swedish society largely depended on his 
or her disposition to leave behind his or her culture of origin and become part of 
the presumedly universal community of industrial workers, small farmers and 
civil servants represented by the welfare state. In a similar way, the predominant 
approach to (political and social) citizenship — kansalaisuus – in Finland appears 
to be inextricably intermingled with an understanding of nationality – kansallisuus 
– with thick cultural connotations that makes it difficult to accept immigrants as 
equal as long as they remain different (Lepola 2000). Yet, if democratic citizenship 
is about equality as a means to empowerment and freedom, be it at the individual or 
at the collective level, there is no justifiable reason to interpret the concept of social 
inclusion in assimilationist terms. 
Thus, the many positive attributes that the nation-state has attained in the 
North as a guarantor of social cohesion might appear in a somewhat darker light 
due to a long-running tendency to conflate inclusion and assimilation. In Northern 
Europe, the civic republicanism of the French model was apparently enriched 
with important social elements, but this did not imply a rupture with the Jacobin 
approach to integration. Simplifying things, we could say that in the North the 
black hole of sovereignty was filled with the discourse on social welfare, but that 
addressing the paradox of sovereignty in this way did not substantially improve the 
fate of minorities exposed to the hegemonic logic of nation-state construction.
Let me end with an observation that brings together the two aspects which I have 
highlighted for the purpose of contextualizing minority politics and ethnic relations 
in the Nordic countries. The central role played by nation-state institutions in the 
field of securing social cohesion becomes patent even in those spaces that have 
successively been opened up during the last decades to recognize the existence 
of diverse identities under a common political roof. On the one hand, provisions 
that shall give different minority groups varying degrees of cultural autonomy 
are typically introduced and implemented following a top-down approach. The 
legitimacy that Sámi identity claims may have in Finland, to mention one concrete 
example, seems to depend by and large on how these claims adjust to the operation 
rules of Finnish public authorities. In a similar way, when looking at how public 
boards that shall promote the effective integration of immigrant groups in their 
local environments have been established in Nordic democracies, one may wonder 
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what the main priority is: Is it the due representation of newcomers, or is it possibly 
rather the preventive co-optation of minorities before they begin mobilizing 
themselves? If we want to take the challenge of minorities seriously, we need to 
develop criteria that allow us to distinguish between paternalizing and emancipatory 
forms of recognition. Furthermore, we have to be aware of the great risk that a politics 
of recognition orchestrated from above, regardless of all good intentions, just keeps 
applying the homogenizing logic, that structured the dominant national identity, to 
minority groups so that they conform to definitive standards that may be convenient 
to state bureaucracies, yet fail to meet the challenge of reconciling equality and 
diversity.
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4  Divergence and Convergence in Minority Law and 
Policies in the Nordic Countries 
4.1  Introduction
While the differences between the Nordic countries when dealing with migration, 
minorities, refugees and otherness are considerable, as revealed in the materials 
examined concerning minorities—including indigenous people, long-term minorities, 
and more recent immigrants and refugees—in four Nordic countries analysed in this 
chapter, I argue that the core scientific as well as political and legal problems today 
are found in a state of tension between two seemingly contradictory logics. One is the 
logic of the egalitarianism of generalised welfare systems and human rights created 
after the Second World War coupled with the pre-existing myth of homogenous Nordic 
societies. The other logic is that of the recent enhanced assertion of cultural diversity 
under the pressure of increasing migration and mobility coupled with the force of 
cultural identity as part of a human rights discourse. 
In this article the core legal and societal identity discourses in the Nordic countries are 
examined focussing on minority issues in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. I argue 
that multiculturalism policies in any of these northern countries need to be examined not 
only in isolation but also in their Nordic context. Apart from the common background of 
strong welfare states based on egalitarianism in the access of social services we can recall 
the existence of cross border indigenous and minority groups, including the Sámi and 
Roma; the common experience of outward migration, most notably at the end of the 19th 
and beginning of the 20th centuries; and finally the development of centrally introduced 
and controlled educational systems which made education accessible for all while 
reinforcing the consolidation of a unified national identity in each country. The creation 
of Nordic identities in the 19th century coincides with the movement of literary Nordism 
in the 18th century and the movement of Scandinavianism in the 19th century; movements 
linked to a wider effort to enhance peace between former enemies in the region. So, a 
portion of Finnish, Swedish, Danish, or Norwegian identity, has from the outset placed 
an emphasis on the Nordic dimension of that identity. 
The historical experiences of the Nordic countries vary considerably and 
that has often been underestimated in studies of Nordic comparative politics and 
law which generally emphasise homogeneity and similarity within and between 
the Nordic countries.1 Denmark and Sweden are old nation states with a shared 
1 Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Sia, et als. (eds.), 2006,,’Introduction’, Pp. 13 – 38., International Obligations 
and National Debates: Minorities around the Baltic Sea, Mariehamn: The Åland Islands Peace Institute.
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historical experience of being great powers in the North of Europe. Norway and 
Finland are relatively new states, with Norway breaking peacefully out of its Union 
with Sweden in 1905, and Finland becoming independent in 1917 at the time of 
the Russian revolution, after being a part of Sweden for several centuries and then 
an autonomous part of the Russian empire between 1809 and 1917.2 Norway had 
adopted its own constitution in 1814 during the Union period with Sweden. This 
event was made necessary since that the Danish-Norwegian king was forced to 
cede Norway to the king of Sweden with full rights of property and sovereignty as 
a result of the Napoleonic Wars and the Treaty of Kiel in 1814. Also in other crucial 
respects there are diverging historical experiences. Finland and Norway have both 
gone through intensive language debates, primarily in the 19th century, and Finland 
emerged as an officially bilingual state in 1917. 
The primary material to be used in the present examination is, however, not of 
a historical character. The argument concerning the diversity of Nordic identities 
and the differences of Nordic attitudes to identity diversity is empirically based 
on the documentation and discussions concerning the implementation of the 
Framework Convention on the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) of the 
Council of Europe in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden in the early period 
of the ratification and entry into force of the Convention (i.e. approximately 1998-
2003). This is then a snapshot of the situation during a particular period of time, 
but as it shall be shown, it reveals a great deal concerning perceptions and policies 
in the countries concerned. I shall not make any deeper explorations of domestic 
parliamentary documents and debates covering these issues during the period of 
concern. In the present text, emphasis is at state level and the three autonomous 
regions of the North, namely the Åland Islands, the Faroe Islands and Greenland are 
not examined in any great detail.3  
Iceland has not ratified the convention, but did however sign it when it was 
originally adopted in 1995.4 It is, however, interesting to note that the population 
of Iceland has shown great demographic change in recent decades, at a pace far 
higher than in the other Nordic countries. In 1980 the population of Iceland, a total 
2 Archer, Clive & Pertti Joenniemi (eds), 2003, The Nordic Peace, Aldershot: Ashgate.
3 Some would argue that today there is extensive self-government also for the Sámi in the North 
of Norway, especially since the entry into force of the Finnmarksloven in 2006. This Norwegi-
an piece of legislation introduced a system of co-management in the Finnmark region, giving a 
strong role to the Sámi. There are, however, also critical assessments of the system. See e.g. com-
ments by Vars, Laila Susanne, 2009, The Sàmi People’s Right to Self-Determination, ph.d. disserta-
tion, Faculty of Law, Tromsø University,. Basic information regarding this legislation is available 
at: http://finnmarksloven.web4.acos.no/artikkel.aspx?AId=181&back=1&MId1=4 (retrieved May 
27, 2010).  
4 See a chart of the signatures and ratifications of the Convention at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/mo-
nitoring/minorities/6_Resources/PDF_Chart_Monitoring_en.pdf (retrieved May 5, 2010).
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of 228,785 people, had Icelandic citizenship at the rate of 98.6 per cent while 1.4 per 
cent of the population had a different citizenship.5 These percentages from 1980 
were more or less at the same levels as in 1950. In January 2009 the percentage of 
inhabitants with citizenship other than Icelandic had risen to 7.6 per cent. Most of 
this increase originates from various European countries, in particular Poland, but 
there are also considerable numbers of citizens from Thailand and the Philippines. 
So even in the remote corners of the Nordic region and what are sometimes believed 
to be the most homogenous countries and regions in the North, demographics are 
undergoing considerable change.    
The core issue to be examined in the present inquiry is that of the 
conceptualisation of the notion of ‘minority’ in the four Nordic countries. This 
permits us to also indirectly address the issue of so called ‘new minorities’. 
4.2  The Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities and its ratification by the Nordic countries
The Framework Convention on the Protection of Persons belonging to National 
Minorities was adopted by the Council of Europe in 1995 after several decades of 
debates concerning whether or not there was a need for a specific minority instrument 
at the Council of Europe. It can be noted that at an early stage Danish representatives 
were most active in the preparatory work and negotiations on minority issues, in 
particular the lawyer and politician Hermod Lannung since the 1950s who has been 
critical of the neglect of minority issues in the context of the European Convention for 
Human Rights.6 The other Danish representative in the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe at that time, the conservative Ole Bjørn Kraft, supported Lannung 
but was focussing his attention entirely on the Schleswig situation rather than on a 
generalised, human rights oriented system.7 As we shall see later on, this bipolarity in 
Danish understandings on minorities still exists.       
As of 2011, the Framework Convention has been ratified by a total of 39 states, 
out of the 47 member states of the Council of Europe. It is therefore seen by doctrine 
as well as by practitioners very much as a pan-European instrument serving as a 
baseline for minority protection, even though countries such as Belgium, France, 
5 Iceland in Figures 2009-2010, Published by Statistics Iceland, January 2010. Available at 
http://www.statice.is/lisalib/getfile.aspx?ItemID=10653 (retrieved May 15, 2010) at p. 7.
6 Lannung, Hermod, ‘The Rights of Minorities’, 1968, Pp. 181-195, in Mélanges offerts à Polys Modinos: 
Problèmes des droits de l’homme et de l’unification européenne, Paris: Pedone.
7 Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Athanasia, 1997, Justifications of Minority Protection in International Law, 
p. 201.
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Greece and Turkey have yet to ratify the Convention.8 Since it is a framework 
convention of a human rights character, the convention introduces the minimum 
level standards of protection for persons belonging to minorities; it does not represent 
any ideal vision of minority protection.  Examining the formal documents and the 
products of examination and commenting upon State reports under the convention 
does not reveal the full spectrum of societal understandings concerning minority 
issues, nor can it unravel the full impact of a particular international instrument 
on domestic political debates and legal outcomes. Examining the discourse around 
the Framework Convention is one way of capturing in a comparable manner, the 
positions, interpretations, and shifts in such positions and understandings, within 
the countries concerned. 
The Council of Europe and its Committee of Ministers have developed a 
comprehensive system to monitor the implementation of the Framework Convention. 
The Convention itself (Articles 24-26) and its complementary Resolution (97) 10 of the 
Committee of Ministers, specify the core modalities of this work. A crucial element in 
this regime is the work done by the Advisory Committee of the Framework Convention, 
an expert body of eighteen independent experts, nominated by the states’ parties, and 
elected following a system of rotation among the 39 ratifying countries. The details 
of this system have been worked out in the interplay of practice of individual states 
parties, the Advisory Committee and its secretariat and the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe. States have to submit regular comprehensive reports under all 
provisions of the Convention. The Advisory Committee has the potential to not only 
visit the country and meet with the government and state institutions, but also to 
meet with minority representatives, academics and non-governmental organisations. 
After the visit it issues an Opinion, which becomes public usually together with the 
comments and response of the country concerned. The final word is formally in the 
hands of the Committee of Ministers, which issues a legally binding resolution: a 
document highlighting the core concerns of the Council of Europe with regard to the 
implementation of the state’s obligations under the FCNM. However, the importance 
of the monitoring procedure of the FCNM, in the Nordic countries as in all other states 
parties, lies primarily in the influence it has on domestic societal debates, as well as 
in the redefining of the minority issue from a security issue of domestic concern only, 
to a human rights issue of an internationalised character.  
8 Several contributions in Verstichel, Annelies et al. (eds.), 2008, The Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities: A Useful Pan-European Instrument, Antwerpen: Intersentia. France 
is the only of these countries that has not even signed the convention. The normal procedure for the 
implementation of an international treaty is a two step-procedure whereby a preliminary signature of 
the treaty is followed by its ratification. Usually there is domestic treatment of the document within 
the legislative and the executive branches. 
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A particular advantage in using the FCNM is the fact that this convention lacks 
a narrow definition of what is a ‘national minority’, and focus is placed on the 
construction of identities in relevant domestic discourses within various fields, 
including legislative and administrative practices as well as in media debates. Each 
state party to the Convention is left room to identify the persons and groups to be 
covered by the safeguards included in the Convention. However, this does not entail 
that countries are left to full discretion in this matter. First of all, the Convention 
identifies the core elements or aspects of identity of relevance for the protection, 
maintenance and development of national minorities, namely religion, language, 
traditions and cultural heritage.9    
Secondly, the Convention provides that every person belonging to a national 
minority shall have the right to freely choose to be treated or not as such. The exercise 
of any rights under the convention can be done individually or in community with 
others, thereby transgressing the classic division between individual and collective 
human rights.10 In the work of the Advisory Committee for the FCNM, a standard 
approach and phraseology has developed at an early stage, according to which the 
margin of appreciation of states is to be examined by the Advisory Committee under 
general principles of international law and the provisions of Article 3 of the FCNM. 
The Advisory Committee emphasises that such interpretations by states should not 
result in ‘arbitrary or unjustified distinctions’. This discussion was most extensive in 
particular with regard to the first state report of Denmark and the Opinion adopted by 
the Advisory Committee.     
Originally, many western countries in Europe saw minority treaties developed in 
the 1990s mainly as a tool for real or potential conflict management needed in the 
political turbulence at the end of the Cold War, with the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia and more generally the fall of communism in Eastern Europe. 
Such treaties were in the minds of many governments mainly for ‘the others’, not a 
tool for consolidating or reshaping identity politics and policies in their own country, 
or in the Nordic region. As we shall see below, this view has slowly been changing over 
time, mainly as a consequence of domestic debates where international obligations 
such as the Framework Convention on National Minorities are but one of many 
adjacent argumentative tools.
At the Nordic level, the enhancing of a Nordic identity has been made not only 
through the creation of Nordic institutions, such as the Nordic Council and the Nordic 
Council of Ministers, but also through agreements in the cultural and educational 
field. In this regard, of particular importance is the Nordic Language Convention 
9 Article 5, para. 1 of the FCNM. The full text of the Convention and its explanatory report is availa-
ble at: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/minorities/1_AtGlance/FCNM_Texts_en.asp in all the 
major languages of Europe.
10 Article 3 FCNM.
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which entered into force in 1987 and which regulates the right of Nordic citizens 
to use their ‘mother tongue’ in contacts with the authorities in another Nordic 
country.11 In this case the languages covered are not only the more or less mutually 
intelligible Swedish, Danish and Norwegian, but also Icelandic and even Finnish. 
Thus, the project of a Nordic identity does not coincide with any single linguistic 
group. However, at the time when this Convention was adopted in the early 1980s, 
the idea of multicultural and multilingual Nordic societies was still completely 
absent in this formal reflection of Nordic cooperation. It was not until 2006 that 
the Nordic Council of Ministers adopted a Declaration on a Nordic Language Policy 
in which a chapter addresses issues of multilingualism in the Nordic region and 
affirms, not only for citizens but in this case for all Nordic residents, the following 
‘mother tongues’:
Sámi, the Kven language, Meänkieli (the Tornedalian language), Romani, Yiddish and Finnish (in 
Sweden) and German (in Denmark), all of which are official minority languages in one or more of 
the Nordic countries.12  
In terms of visions, the Declaration identifies four areas in need of more attention 
in the future. Those areas are: language comprehension and language skills, the 
parallel use of languages, multilingualism and the Nordic countries as a linguistic 
pioneering region. Regarding the parallel use of languages, the Ministers that signed 
the Declaration and their governments emphasise that such parallel use of languages 
requires at the same time a thorough instruction in the country’s language and the 
opportunity to use and develop their ‘own mother tongue’. The Declaration ensures 
further that ‘there is a will to preserve the Nordic language community’ but also to 
‘strengthen the position of the Nordic countries as a pioneering region in language 
issues’. The pioneering element seems to refer to the efforts made to understand and 
respect the Nordic languages in the other Nordic countries. 
So, we see that not only at a country level but also at a Nordic level, there is 
at the moment a consolidation and shift in describing and conceptualising Nordic 
identities. They are Nordic and thereby linked, but at the same time these identities 
are multilingual, as well as open to the use of English and the parallel use of multiple 
languages. In other words, we are witnessing the simultaneous strengthening of 
regional as well as globalised identities in the Nordic countries. Minorities are trying 
to find a space within the framework of this new understanding of Nordic identities 
and the international legal obligations are used as a tool in this configuration.   
11 The text of the Convention is available at the website of the Nordic Council: http://www.norden.org/
en/about-nordic-co-operation/agreements/treaties-and-agreements/spraak/spraakkonventionen
12 The text of the Declaration is available at: http://www.norden.org/da/publikationer/publikatio-
ner/2007-746/at_download/publicationfile.
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4.3  The concept of ‘minority’ in the four countries examined
a) Denmark
Denmark ratified the FCNM in 1997 and it entered into force in 1998. In its instrument 
of ratification, Denmark applied the following declaration handed to the Secretary 
General at the time of deposit of the instrument of ratification, on September 22nd, 1997:
In connection with the deposit of the instrument of ratification by Denmark of the Framework Con-
vention for the Protection of National Minorities, it is hereby declared that the Framework Conven-
tion shall apply to the German minority in South Jutland of the Kingdom of Denmark.
The government of Denmark started off with a very closed, minimal understanding 
of the minority concerns in the country. The ratification had been preceded by a 
proposal for a parliamentary resolution by the Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs in 
November 1996. On April 22nd, 1997 the Folketing gave its approval for ratification.13 
The Danish government explained in its declaration referring to: 
The fact that the border between the Kingdom of Denmark and the Federal Republic of Germany 
actually does not delimit the areas inhabited by the two peoples. In the regions north and south of 
the border (which has been fixed since the referendums in 1920) - i.e. South Jutland in Denmark and 
Schleswig in Germany - Danes and Germans live together in traditional residential areas. 
The declaration is interesting in at least two respects. First of all it emphasises 
the bilateral nature of legal obligations with regard to minorities. The logic seems 
to be that the Germans in Denmark are entitled to protection due to the bilateral 
agreements and regime along the Danish-German border, explained at length in 
the Danish state report. Secondly, the Danish report makes clear that there is to be 
protection afforded to the German minority, but only in the territorial area originally 
defined in the referendums of 1920 and later enhanced in the Copenhagen – Bonn 
Declarations of 1955, i.e. in South Jutland. This has been termed as the territoriality 
principle and it has been discussed and questioned with regards to various countries 
and contexts.14,15   
13 First State Report of Denmark, ACFC/SR(1999)009, introduction. All relevant documents of the 
monitoring procedure are also available electronically: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/mino-
rities/3_FCNMdocs/Table_en.asp (retrieved  May 17, 2010).
14 For a most interesting account of the political and philosophical origins of this principle see Cle-
ment, Jan ‘Territoriality versus Personality’, in Verstichel, 2008, loc. cit., Pp. 51-68.
15 Kühl, Jörgen & Pedersen, Karin Margrethe, 2006, ‘The German Minority in Denmark’, pp. 39-107, 
in Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Sia et al. (eds.), International Obligations and National Debates: Minorities 
around the Baltic Sea.
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The Advisory Committee did indeed engage quite extensively with this subject 
in its Opinion.16 The Committee noted that the Danish Government takes the view 
that because territorial home rule arrangements exist for Greenland and the Faroe 
Islands, the population of these territories, who, like persons belonging to the German 
minority, have deep historic ties with the Kingdom of Denmark, do not fall within the 
scope of application of the Framework Convention. Second, the Advisory Committee 
argued that the fact that a group of persons may be entitled to a form of protection, 
other than minority protection strictu senso, cannot by itself justify their exclusion 
from other forms of protection. The second problem in this reasoning, according to 
the Advisory Committee, concerns the territorial aspect. If the reasoning of the Danish 
Government is to be followed, the result is that the Greenlanders and Faroese persons 
enjoy an effective protection of their identity (language, education, culture etc.) 
within the respective home rule areas, but no such protection outside these areas, 
notably in mainland Denmark. The Committee concludes: 
Although the Framework Convention attaches importance in a number of its provisions to the cri-
terion of traditional inhabitation of certain areas for protection, the majority of its provisions are 
designed to apply throughout the territory of the state concerned, of course taking into account all 
relevant circumstances. 
Even though the first impression of the Danish position indicates a rather narrow 
understanding of the notion of ‘national minority’ in the Danish context, a closer 
examination of the first state report indicates that there is information and 
consideration of migrant integration, discrimination as well as of broader issues 
of cultural diversity. The government enclosed with its report lists of the largest 
groups of immigrants, and of the recognised religious communities outside the 
Danish National Evangelical Lutheran Church. The Advisory Committee expressed 
concern about discrimination against foreigners and naturalised Danes in the labour 
market and housing sector and urged the Danish Government in rather vague terms 
to ‘maintain continuous vigilance’ in discrimination matters. The comment by the 
Danish Government to these remarks was quite sharp in linking the notion of a person 
belonging to a minority to the requirement of citizenship. In this respect, the Danish 
government applies a restrictive interpretation of the requirements necessary to be 
considered a ‘national minority’ and deviates from the position of most commentators 
in this field.17  
16 ACFC, First Opinion on Denmark, adopted in 2000, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)005, paras. 12-24.
17 For a summary of citizenship debates see Verstichel, Annelies, 2008, Pp. 127-158, ‘Personal Scope 
of Application: An Open, Inclusive and Dynamic Approach – The FCNM as a living instrument’, in 
Verstichel et al. (eds.), loc. cit.
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While it may be argued that issues of religion seldom occupy any important 
role in the Opinions of the Advisory Committee, in the case of Denmark there was a 
directly critical remark. The Advisory Committee had found that for the registration 
of the names at birth, the state church, under the authority of the state, is exclusively 
competent, in all areas of Denmark, except Southern Jutland where a names 
register exists. Thus, all persons, regardless of their religion, are obliged to address 
the authorities of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in order to have the names of 
their children registered. The Advisory Committee considered therefore that this 
requirement raises problems of conscience for those who do not belong to the state 
church and was therefore of the opinion that modifications should be introduced in 
order to allow persons who so wish, to register the names of their children directly 
with the state authorities, without having to involve the authorities of the state 
church.18 So, while noting that a state church system is not in itself in contradiction 
with the Framework Convention and that the latter does not entail an obligation to 
fund religious activities per se, the Advisory Committee considered that Denmark 
should review, in the light of the right to equality before the law and equal protection 
of the law, the privileged funding of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Furthermore, 
it considered that persons not belonging to the Evangelical Lutheran Church should 
not be obliged to have the names of children born to them registered through the state 
church.19 Finally it can be noted that the Advisory Committee found that given the 
historic presence of Roma in Denmark, persons belonging to the Roma community 
‘cannot be a priori excluded from the personal scope of protection of the Framework 
Convention’. We shall return to this issue of the Roma in the four Nordic countries in 
the final section of the present paper. 
b) Finland
Finland ratified the FCNM in 1997 and the treaty entered into force with regard to 
Finland in 1998. Finland attached an explanatory note to the Act on the Ratification 
of the Framework Convention, dated September 5th, 1997, in which the Government 
concluded that it is likely that the question of to whom the Framework Convention 
should be applied will, ultimately, be determined through the monitoring process.20 
In the first state report, submitted in 1999, it is explained that when Finland ratified 
the Framework Convention, it did not provide a list of national minorities falling within 
the scope of the Convention.21 The basic idea was, according to the Finnish government, 
that ‘it is not for the Government to define those minorities, because the existence of 
minorities does not depend on a declaration by the Government but on the factual 
18 ACFC, First Opinion on Denmark, adopted in 2000, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)005,., para. 32.
19 Ibid., para 40.
20 First Opinion on Finland, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)002, para. 12.
21 First report of Finland, ACFC/SR(1999)003.
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situation in the country.’ However, in practice it has been considered in Finland that the 
Framework Convention would cover the Sámi people, the Roma, the Jews, the Tatars, 
the so-called Old Russians and de facto also the Swedish-speaking Finns.22 
The concept ‘national minority’ is not used in Finnish law. Section 144, subsection 
3 of the Constitution Act of Finland guarantees the right of different ‘groups’ to 
maintain and develop their own languages and cultures. The Constitution Act does not 
define more closely these ‘groups’. According to the relevant Government Bill which 
concerned the revision of the Constitution, the ‘groups’ referred to in the Constitution 
Act include the Sámi people, the Roma and other national and ethnic minorities, such 
as the Jews and the Tatars. The relevant explanatory note reads as follows: 
On the one hand the proposal is not limited to traditional minorities in Finland. On the other hand 
the groups referred to in [section 14, subsection 3] cannot include groups that only temporarily 
reside in Finland, but a certain stability and permanency is required from the group to be covered 
by it. [...] The provision would not only guarantee the language rights of minorities but would 
extend the protection to minority cultures. [...] [T]he provision would impose an obligation upon 
the Government to allow and support the development of the languages and cultures of the groups 
referred to in it. The provision also provides a constitutional basis for developing the living condi-
tions of those groups with full respect for their cultural traditions.23
Indeed in 1999 a revised constitution entered into force in Finland. The relevant 
provision has the following wording:
Section 17 - Right to one’s language and culture
The national languages of Finland are Finnish and Swedish. 
The right of everyone to use his or her own language, either Finnish or Swedish, before courts of law 
and other authorities, and to receive official documents in that language, shall be guaranteed by an 
Act. The public authorities shall provide for the cultural and societal needs of the Finnish-speaking 
and Swedish-speaking populations of the country on an equal basis.
The Sámi, as an indigenous people, as well as the Roma and other groups, have the right to main-
tain and develop their own language and culture. Provisions on the right of the Sámi to use the Sámi 
language before the authorities are laid down by an Act. The rights of persons using sign language 
and of persons in need of interpretation or translation aid owing to disability shall be guaranteed 
by an Act.24
22 Myntti, Kristian & Nuolijärvi, Pirkko, 2006, , Pp. 171-225, ‘The Case of Finland’, in Spiliopoulou 
Åkermark et al (eds.), loc. cit.
23 Government Bill 309/1993. Regeringens proposition till riksdagen med förslag till ändring av 
grundlagarnas stadganden om de grundläggande fri- och rättigheterna. The present translation origi-
nates in the first Finnish state report under the FCNM.
24 The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999, Parliament Act 731/1999. The full text of the Finnish 
Constitution is available via the website of the Finnish parliament: http://web.eduskunta.fi/Resource.
phx/parliament/relatedinformation/constitution.htx
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In its first report under the FCNM and under the heading ‘minority within minority’, 
the Government of Finland reported also that ‘it can be said that the Finnish-
speaking people living in the Province of Åland and the Inari Sámi and the Skolt 
Sámi constitute minorities within a minority’. As explained in the report from 1999, 
on Åland there were some 1,200 Finnish-speaking people, which is less than 5 per 
cent of the population in the islands, whereas there are in total some 6,400 Sámi 
living in Finland, but Inari Sámi and Skolt Sámi are spoken by some 200 people, 
respectively.25 
In contrast to the Danish approach, Finland has a more open-ended understanding 
in at least three respects. The existence, or not, of a minority is looked at as a matter of 
fact rather than a matter of constitutive recognition through legislation. In the Finnish 
understanding the law does not ‘create’ minorities. It simply attaches consequences 
to their factual existence. Secondly, the Finnish approach in the new Constitution 
seems to be more open, in not having a fully closed list of minorities, recognised once 
and for all, and still speaks of ‘other groups’. Finally, the explanations given in the 
1993 Government Bill concerning citizenship, were reproduced in the First report 
of Finland under the FCNM, and seem to indicate that Finland requires continuity 
in the connection between groups and the country, but not necessarily ‘traditional’ 
settlement or citizenship.  
In dealing with the First Report of Finland, the Advisory Committee raised three 
distinct points.26 First of all the distinction between ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Russians. The 
Government had made a distinction between the so-called ‘Old Russians’, a group 
it considers to be covered by the Framework Convention, and other Russians, who, 
in the Government’s view, are not covered by the Framework Convention. However, 
again according to the Government, this distinction has no practical consequences 
whatsoever. Moreover, a number of representatives of both the so-called ‘Old Russians’ 
and other Russians had expressed reservations before the Advisory Committee about 
the said distinction. In view of the foregoing, the Advisory Committee concluded that 
the advisability of maintaining this theoretical distinction should be examined ‘in 
consultation with those concerned’. When considering the matter, the consistency of 
the Government’s approach vis-à-vis various minorities should be ensured, argued 
the Advisory Committee.
The second point discussed by the Advisory Committee was that of the personal 
scope of application of the Framework Convention with regard to the Swedish-
speaking Finns. The Government in its Report considered that the Swedish-
speaking Finns were de facto covered by the Framework Convention. The Advisory 
Committee concluded that Swedish-speaking Finns may indeed rely on the 
protection provided by the provisions of the Framework Convention. At the same 
25 First report of Finland, ACFC/SR(1999)003, para. 6.
26 First Opinion on Finland, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)002, paras. 15-18.
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time, the Advisory Committee stressed that, in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 
1, of the Framework Convention, every person concerned may decide whether or 
not he/she wishes to come under the protection flowing from the principles of 
the Framework Convention. This reminder was necessary in view of the position 
of representatives of the Swedish Assembly of Finland that the Swedish-speaking 
Finns do not constitute a minority but rather one of the two official languages of the 
country, according to the Constitution.   
Finally the Advisory Committee commented on the situation of Finnish-speakers 
in Åland and argued that taking into account the level of autonomy enjoyed and/or 
the nature of the powers exercised by the Province of Åland, the Finnish-speaking 
population there could also be given the possibility to rely on the protection provided 
by the Framework Convention as far as the issues concerned are within the competence 
of the Province of Åland. The Advisory Committee was of the opinion that Finland 
should consider this issue ‘in consultation with those concerned’, a phrase which has 
become part of the standard phraseology of the Committee.
c) Norway 
Norway ratified the Convention in March 1999 and the convention entered into force 
in Norway in July of that same year. There was no formal declaration concerning the 
personal scope of application of the convention in connection with the ratification 
process. The term ‘national minority’ was not used at the time in Norwegian legislation. 
Thus there was no formal legal definition of the term, nor any list of the groups 
that were considered to be national minorities in Norwegian legislation. However, 
according to the first report by the Government of Norway, which made reference 
also to the domestic parliamentary debates, ‘the groups of persons considered to 
be national minorities in Norway are Jews, Kven (people of Finnish descent living 
in northern Norway), Roma/Gypsies, the Romani people/Travellers and Skogfinn 
(people of Finnish descent living in southern Norway)’.27 
Regarding the Sámi people in Norway, the government found that they ‘are also 
a national minority in the terms of international law’. However, the government 
reported that the Sámediggi (the Sámi Assembly) had declared that it did not 
consider the Framework Convention to be applicable to the Sámi people, since as an 
indigenous people the Sámi have legal and political rights that exceed those covered 
by the provisions of the convention. In keeping with the wish of the Sámediggi, 
therefore, the Sámi people were not discussed in any detail by the government in 
its first report. Instead, Norway’s reports on the implementation of ILO Convention 
27 Report No. 15 (2000-2001) to the Storting on National Minorities in Norway - On Central Govern-
ment Policy in respect of Jews, Kven, Roma/Gypsies, the Romani people/Travellers and Skogfinn 
(available only in Norwegian: St.meld. nr. 15 (2000-2001), Nasjonale minoritetar i Noreg - Om statleg 
politikk overfor jødar, kvener, rom, romanifolket og skogfinnar).
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No.169 Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries were 
appended to the state report under the FCNM.28  
The state report includes brief historical accounts of the groups mentioned 
above but very limited information regarding the Sámi. In Norway, the term ‘national 
minorities’ is understood to mean minorities with a long-term connection with the 
country.29 According to the lengthy explanations by the government in its report, 
minority groups must be in the minority and must hold a non-dominant position 
in society. Furthermore, they must have distinctive ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/
or religious characteristics that make them substantially different from the rest of 
the population of Norway. The persons concerned must also have a common will to 
maintain and develop their own identity. The term ‘long-term connection’ has not 
been defined, but the Norwegian authorities have taken into consideration a criterion 
suggested internationally, to the effect that groups must be able to claim a minimum 
of 100 years of connection with the state in question. Thus, more recent immigrant 
groups are not deemed to be national minorities in Norway.30 However, as explained 
by the government, the situation is more nuanced in the case of immigrants to Norway 
with backgrounds from the same groups that have been granted the status of national 
minorities in Norway. These immigrants will be eligible for measures designed for the 
national minority (such as language training) even if the individual immigrant does 
not have a long-term connection with Norway. This would seem to be of particular 
importance for Finnish-speakers, and persons who identify with the Jewish and Roma 
identities, even though it is not expressly mentioned in the state report.    
Turning to the issue of citizenship as a potential requirement for minority status, 
it was reported by the government that in order for a minority group to be deemed to 
be a national minority in Norway, it is ‘normally also required that all or most of the 
members of the minority group are Norwegian nationals. However, the requirement 
regarding nationality does not preclude a national minority from comprising 
individuals who have been granted a residence permit in Norway, but who are not yet 
Norwegian nationals.’31 
In its Opinion on the situation in Norway, the ACFC dealt with the protection 
of the Sámi minority without using the term ‘national minority’ to describe the 
population concerned. This approach of the Advisory Committee was said to 
reflect the applicability of the Framework Convention for indigenous peoples while 
taking into account the views expressed by the Sámi Parliament with respect to the 
28 First report by Norway, ACFC/SR(2001)001, page 4.
29 The fluidity in the construction of long term connection in Norwegian public debates is empha-
sised by Niemi, Einar, , 2006, Pp. 397-451, ‘National Minorities and Minority Policy in Norway’, in 
Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Sia et al. (eds.), loc. cit.
30 First report by Norway, ACFC/SR(2001)001, page 18.
31 First report by Norway, ACFC/SR(2001)001, page 18.
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applicability of the Norwegian policy for national minorities to the persons belonging 
to this indigenous people.32 From the outset, the most difficult issue in Norway, for 
the government as well as for the Advisory Committee, has been that of the Kven as a 
group, their language, and the relationship between Kven and Finnish as well as Kven 
and Sámi. In its Opinion the Advisory Committee indicated that it was conscious of 
the debate as to whether the language of the Kven minority should be Kven or Finnish 
in the educational system and in other contexts. The Advisory Committee indicated 
that it shares the view of the Norwegian Government, that in principle the users of the 
language themselves are entitled to clarify whether their language is to be regarded as 
a separate language or a dialect. On the basis of this position, the Advisory Committee 
therefore simply encouraged the Government to further pursue their dialogue with a 
wide range of parties concerned, with a view to finding a pragmatic way forward and 
avoiding artificially imposed solutions.33 With regard to the Roma, it may be worth 
pointing out that the Norwegian government makes a distinction between the Roma 
and the Romani/Travellers, something that seems to be endorsed by the persons 
concerned themselves and consequently also by the Advisory Committee.34    
With regard to the issue of whether the Sámi in Norway fall within the personal scope 
of application of the FCNM, the Advisory Committee underlined that the applicability 
of the Framework Convention does not necessarily mean that the authorities should 
in their domestic legislation and practice use the term ‘national minority’ to describe 
the group concerned. Against this background, the Advisory Committee argued that 
the protection of the Framework Convention remains available to the Sámi should 
persons belonging to this indigenous people wish to rely on the protection provided 
therein. Again, the Advisory Committee encouraged the authorities to continue their 
dialogue with the Sámi Parliament and others concerned with this issue, with a view 
to ensuring that the Framework Convention and the treaties designed for indigenous 
peoples ‘are not construed as mutually exclusive regimes and that the Sámi can 
continue to rely on a wide range of international norms’.35
Concerning non-citizens, the Advisory Committee was quite pro-active in its 
position in the Opinion on Norway. It found that it would be possible to consider the 
inclusion of persons belonging to ethnic and linguistic groups, not considered by 
the government as national minorities and including non-citizens ‘as appropriate’, 
in the application of the Framework Convention on an ‘article-by-article basis’. In 
this connection, the Advisory Committee noted ‘with satisfaction’ that the Norwegian 
government considers that non-citizens belonging to the national minorities listed 
in the report can benefit from the general measures aimed at the protection of 
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national minorities. As we saw in the Opinion on Denmark, the ACFC found it to be 
problematic that the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway enjoys a number of 
benefits not available to other religious communities, even though ‘a state church 
system is not in itself in contradiction with the Framework Convention’. There was 
also considerable controversy in Norway, around the introduction of the subject 
‘Knowledge on Christianity, including religious and ethical education’ in the public 
schools curriculum, and the ACFC argued that such a system needs to be coupled 
with particular attention to the situation of other religions and the principles of 
Article 8 in the Convention, which provide that persons belonging to minorities have 
a right to ‘manifest his or her religion or belief and to establish religious institutions, 
organisations and associations’.36  
d) Sweden 
Sweden was the last of the Nordic countries examined to ratify the Framework 
Convention, when doing so in February 2000. Interestingly, the then government of 
Sweden was the only one of the four examined that made an effort from the very 
outset to identify the goals of its minority policies. Those are defined as ‘to provide 
protection for the national minorities and promote their opportunities for influence 
and also to support their historic minority languages so that they are kept alive’.37 
What is meant by ‘providing protection’ is not defined in the report, but it is coupled 
with notions of language maintenance and participatory inclusion.38 
Early in the report, the government describes Sweden as a country with a strong 
presence of persons born outside Sweden, indicating that in the beginning of the year 
2000 more than 10 per cent of the population was born abroad.39 This is emphasised 
further in the text when it is said that Sweden ‘is today a country characterised by 
ethnic and cultural diversity, where every fourth inhabitant was born in another 
country or has parents who were born abroad’. The ethnic groups who in recent 
times have immigrated to Sweden are, however, according to the position of Sweden, 
not regarded as national minorities ‘as they do not satisfy the criteria for national 
minorities established by the Government, concerning among other things, a long 
historic bond with Sweden’.
36 ACFC Opinion on Norway, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003)003, para. 84.
37 First report by Sweden, ACFC/SR(2001)003, p. 5.
38 For a discussion of the limits of Swedish experiences with regard to participatory arrangements, 
see Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Sia & Leena Huss, 2006, Pp. 545-587, ‘Ten Years of Minority Discourse in 
Sweden’, in Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Sia et al. (eds.), loc. cit.
39 First report by Sweden, ACFC/SR(2001)003, p. 6. Today the percentage of persons born abroad in 
the Swedish population has risen to 14,3per cent and has been steadily increasing since the 1960ies. 
See the official population statistics, http://www.scb.se/Pages/TableAndChart____26040.aspx (as of 
May 4th, 2010).
Brought to you by | SIIS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/21/16 11:51 AM
 The concept of ‘minority’ in the four countries examined   67
While the concept of ‘national minority’ was not defined in Swedish legislation, 
the government referred extensively to the preparatory work done for the Government 
Bill 1998/99:143 National Minorities in Sweden, where it is stated that the following 
criteria should be satisfied for a group to be regarded as a national minority:
 – Groups with a pronounced affinity who, numerically in relation to the remainder 
of the population, have a non-dominating position in society. The determination 
of the group cannot only be made according to the numeric number of persons 
within the group but importance must be attached here to the structure and unity 
of the group.
 – Religious, linguistic, traditional and/or cultural belonging. Only one of the listed 
characteristic features need exist, but those characteristic features that the group 
demonstrates must in some essential respect distinguish it from the majority.
 – Self-identification. The individual and also the group should have a desire and 
ambition to retain their identity.
 – Historical or long bonds with Sweden. The Government does not consider that it 
is possible to draw an absolute limit measured in years. Minority groups whose 
minority culture existed in Sweden prior to the 20th century may be said to satisfy 
the requirement for a historic or long bond.
On the basis of these criteria, the minority policy decisions of the Government and 
the Swedish parliament entailed the acknowledgement of five groups as national 
minorities in Sweden. These were the Sámi, who were also regarded as an indigenous 
people, Swedish Finns, Tornedalers, Roma and Jews.40 There are clear parallels to 
the approach adopted in Norway, both regarding the issue of citizenship and long 
bond as well as pertaining to the construction of the recognition pattern of the various 
groups. The Swedish Finns and the Tornedalers are looked at as separate groups and 
languages (in a way similar to the Kven, Finns and Skogsfinns in Norway). The Sámi 
are dealt with as a unitary entity, even though with relation to language issues the 
various Sámi languages are seen in their respective particularities. In the Swedish 
report, the North, Lule and South Sámi language varieties are mentioned separately. 
As we earlier saw, Finland makes specific reference to the Inari and Skolt Sámi, 
possibly because of the importance of specific legislative provisions for them, and in 
particular the Skolt Sámi. In contrast the Norwegian report deals with the Sámi in a 
completely unitary way. 
Longstanding bonds are required in Sweden for qualifying as a minority, but 
citizenship is not an absolute requirement, as newly arrived persons belonging to 
an already existing minority are looked at as merging into this group. In the case 
of Sweden this was of particular importance for the Finns who had migrated to 
Sweden in significant numbers after World War II, but where there has also been a 
40 Ibid., p. 9.
Brought to you by | SIIS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/21/16 11:51 AM
68   Divergence and Convergence in Minority Law and Policies in the Nordic Countries 
longstanding presence for centuries, due to the common united history that Sweden 
and Finland share, dating back more than 600 years prior to 1809.    
In its first Opinion on Sweden, the ACFC raised this issue of citizenship in an 
appreciative manner.41 The Committee noted that in its dialogue with the Swedish 
authorities they have confirmed that ‘the provisions of the Framework Convention 
are to be implemented in the same way for all persons belonging to these particular 
minorities regardless of whether or not they are Swedish citizens’. This approach 
was strongly welcomed by the Advisory Committee, who noted that bearing in mind 
that a large number of persons concerned are not Swedish citizens, this inclusive 
approach contributes to the impact of the Framework Convention and helps to avoid 
any arbitrary or unjustified distinctions within these minorities.42
4.4  Concluding reflections
From the examination conducted in this chapter it is apparent that there are some 
common elements recurring in all the Nordic countries. First of all, it is easy to assert 
that in none of the countries analysed is there a priori a ‘self-evident’ and definitive 
list of national minorities. The categorisation of a group as a group and as a minority 
falling within the scope of application of the Framework Convention is a decision 
taken by each government against the political dynamics in that country, including 
the mobilisation of the relevant groups themselves, the bulk of scientific evidence 
selected and gathered in each specific case and the comments and dialogue with 
the institutions supervising and implementing the Convention at the national and 
international levels. However, as shown in the Norwegian case where Kven was 
recognised in 2005 as a language in its own right by the Norwegian government, the 
categorisations and definitions made at a certain point of time are not definitive and 
permanent but subject to revision and amendation. 
The difficulty in this negotiability is the potential risk it implies in terms of 
increasing competition and possibly even hostility between groups both in majority 
– minority and minority – minority situations. This risk is evident if minority and 
diversity regimes are perceived and managed as zero sum games where one group 
loses if another gains in terms of resources and power. Are there any ways to avoid 
such risks or at least minimise them? In my view a crucial factor is the decision 
making traditions and cultures prevailing in the states and societies concerned. In 
many cases in the Nordic countries, discussions between the state and a certain group 
are only bilateral, i.e. minority – state. In such discussions the views of other minority 
41 First Opinion on Sweden, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2003)006, para. 16.
42 Ibid.
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groups are not heard and the totality of issues, interests and claims is never revealed 
for all interest holders.       
The process of categorisation and hierarchisation can in itself be more or less 
participatory. In some cases, certain groups said by the state to constitute a minority 
refuse themselves such categorisation, such as is the case with the Sámi in Norway or 
the Swedish-speakers in Finland. In my understanding this does not indicate that they 
categorically refuse the relevance of the Framework Convention for their empirical 
situation. It rather indicates a preference for a different ‘tag’ or legal category to 
which there is attached a different conceptual package. So, when the Sámi prefer the 
‘indigenous’ tag, this is an argumentative move in order to underline that the issue of 
land rights and natural resources is at the center of indigenous self-identification. In 
a similar vein, when the Swedish-speakers in Finland prefer to be addressed as ‘one of 
the two official languages’ in Finland and not ‘simply’ as a minority, this is to say that 
in this case there is a strong constitutional basis and tradition and practice with regard 
to the position of Swedish as one of the two official languages in Finland which goes 
far beyond the minimum rules encompassed in the Framework Convention. However, 
from a legal perspective while this is true, it does not exclude the possibility that the 
Framework Convention can function as an interpretative background and tool for 
the authorities as well as for the groups concerned; or, as a minimum standard with 
regard to the rights and obligations regarding such cases as well.        
There are several important differences in the way issues of identity and minority 
rights are dealt with in the four Nordic countries examined. These differences are 
of course established in this text at the level of formal discursive practices and 
exchanges of positions at the official as well as internationalised level. So, for any 
robust conclusions to be drawn one would need to refine them with an examination 
over longer time periods and in domestic debates as well. 
The justificatory patterns of minority protection in international law follow 
four main paths: peace and security; individually oriented human dignity; group 
oriented protection and promotion of culture and cultural diversity; and democratic 
participation and pluralism.43 Following such a theoretical categorisation of minority 
protection regimes, it is possible to look at the Nordic countries as representing more 
or less one or the other of these models. 
Denmark has the most restrictive understandings and policies in a number of 
respects, including the views regarding citizenship as a requirement for minority 
protection, the position of persons from Greenland and the Faroe Islands on mainland 
Denmark, as well as the reciprocal basis of minority obligations, focussing entirely on 
the position of the Germans in the South of Denmark. In these respects, it represents 
perhaps more strongly the ‘peace and security’ justificatory understanding of minority 
43 Spiliopoulou Åkermark, Sia, ‘Shifts in the Multiple Justifications of Minority Protection’, 2010, in 
European Yearbook of Minority Issues, Vol. 7, 2007/08 (2010), 5-18.
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protection. While it is less clear in the examined materials, Sweden seems from the 
above to be arguing mainly along the path of democratic participation and pluralism. 
Finland and Norway are more traditional in terms of the human dignity and cultural 
protection goals of their policies. Norway and Sweden share the basic constructions of 
identities of the groups in their respective societies, while all four countries give very 
limited accounts of their struggles in managing the evolving identities of the Roma and 
Traveller groups. Sweden and Norway share the somewhat ambivalent relationship 
with their Finnish language populations, while Finland, similarly as with Denmark 
in relation to Greenland and the Faroe Islands, seems unable to find an appropriate 
model for describing and accommodating minority issues in its autonomous region, 
Åland. While Denmark has essentially a hands-off policy with regard to its autonomous 
regions, the situation seems to be more complicated with regard to Åland. 
All the countries seem to run into trouble with regard to their systems of privileges 
of the state churches. This is quite remarkable in a part of the world that sees itself as 
secularised and unaffected by various kinds of religious discussions and disagreements. 
In Finland public financing is provided automatically to two faiths, the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church and to the Russian Orthodox Church, while there is only one such 
privileged faith in the other three countries. For this reason it is not entirely a surprise 
that there are multiple debates surfacing around the Nordic countries at the moment, 
not least with regard to the position of the Lutheran faith in education and the role of 
religion in the education system. From the legal point of view this covers issues of the 
modes for teaching religion and theology at school, the conditions for establishment of 
private or independent religious schools, the observance of religious holidays of various 
faiths, as well as the issue of religious symbols in classrooms and schools.    
As in many other countries, diversity and multiculturalism present considerable 
challenges of a theoretical as well as practical nature. In the Nordic countries the 
combination of egalitarian welfare systems with the required sensitivity towards 
minority identities has meant the need to rethink the way things such as day care 
facilities, schools, elderly homes and the health system are able and prepared to meet 
legitimate expectations and the needs of minorities, without however overloading 
the systems with unrealistic requirements and costs. In many cases the response has 
been that of using and adapting the resources already existing, for instance in Sámi 
speaking areas in Norway or in the Finnish speaking areas of Sweden. However, there 
is still a lot more discussion to be expected in years to come with regard to what should 
be seen as legitimate expectations and normatively guaranteed rights for minorities 
in the region. 
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5  Migration, Multiculturalism and Gender – a Nordic 
Perspective 
Migration and multiculturalism represent new challenges for the Nordic countries 
in terms of welfare, democracy and citizenship. The countries are often believed 
to belong to the same welfare and gender systems with a strong tradition for social 
rights and gender equality and a relatively weak tradition of diversity. However, 
the countries have different histories and institutions and have recently developed 
different approaches and policies towards migration and integration of ethnic 
minorities. Sweden has adopted the most multicultural policies, while Denmark since 
2001 has adopted relatively restrictive policies (see Hedetoft et al 2006), with Norway 
and Finland positioned somewhere in between in terms of regulation and discursive 
framings of migration and integration policies. Nordic research suggests that in spite 
of these differences the countries face similar challenges in attempting to include 
immigrants and minorities as equal citizens in the labour market, in democracy and 
society (Brochmann and Hagelund 2005). 
Power is multidimensional and includes the power to (re)define what democracy, 
social justice and gender equality should be under the present conditions of 
globalisation and migration. Gender equality has today become a widely accepted 
principle, and the growth of many types of feminisms – post-structural, post-modern 
and post-colonial feminism – have made visible that there is no longer consensus 
about what is best for women or about strategies to empower women (Mulinari 
et al. 2009). The ‘turn to diversity’ in research is similar to the strong emphasis in 
gender theory and research on intersectionality, which is to say, studying how gender 
intersects with ethnicity/race and other kinds of inequality creating complex social 
categories (Yuval-Davis 2006; Squires 2007). 
Migration and multiculturalism have become highly politicised. Research 
has demonstrated that gender equality in many European countries, is being 
instrumentalised by political anti-migration forces on the Left and the Right, to, 
for example, argue against a patriarchal and oppressive Muslim culture (Kilic et al. 
2008; Lombardo and Verloo 2009). This is also the case in the Nordic countries where 
scholars have noticed that the dominant ‘victimisation discourse’, which contrasts 
gender equality in the (white) majority with the oppression of women in the Muslim 
minority, resonates especially well with the Nordic gender system (Gullestad 2006; 
Christensen and Siim 2009).  
This paper first briefly revisits the academic debate about gender equality and 
multiculturalism. Multiculturalism has been accused of being gender-blind, and the 
debates have illuminated the tensions between multiculturalism and gender equality 
(Okin 1999). Multicultural approaches have focussed on the accommodation of 
diversity as the key concept (Modood 2007), while feminist approaches have focussed 
 © 2015 Birte Siim
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on gender (in)equality as the key concept (Phillips 2008). The two bodies of thought 
have thus addressed different problems but there is a growing interest on both sides 
in exploring complex diversities (Kraus 2009) and multidimensional inequalities, i.e. 
the intersections of different kinds of differences and inequalities (Yuval-Davis 2007; 
Lombardo, Meier and Verloo 2009). Arguably, perceptions of diversity and gender 
equality/women’s rights are contextual and dynamic, and intersecting diversities and 
inequalities are embedded within national histories, institutions and policies (Lister 
et al. 2007; Yuval-Davis 2007; Lombardo, Meier and Verloo 2009).
Secondly, this paper explores ‘the multicultural dilemma’ from a Nordic 
perspective focussing on the intersections of gender with ethnicity/race and religion. 
It looks at the criticism of the Nordic welfare state, in particular its integration and 
gender equality policies from the perspective of immigrant women. During the last 
30 years, the discourse surrounding women’s rights and gender equality has become 
an intrinsic part of Nordic national identities and belongings (Gullestad 2006; Melby 
et al. 2008). The welfare states have been labelled ‘women-friendly’ due to the high 
level of women participating in the labour market, education and politics, the system 
of public childcare and parental leave, as well as extended gender equality legislation 
in these countries (Borchorst and Siim 2008). The women-friendly social policies 
and practices were linked to a strong Nordic state feminism, which has empowered 
women as workers, citizens and mothers. However, the Nordic welfare states have 
been criticised by feminist scholars for being blind to the cultural diversities among 
women (los Reyos, Mulino and Mulinari 2003; Borchorst and Siim 2008). 
On this basis the third section gives a more detailed account of how the principle 
of gender equality is balanced with ethnic and religious diversity by looking at 
the headscarf debates and regulations in the three Scandinavian countries. It first 
compares the difference in the regulation and framings of arguments on the Danish 
and Norwegian labour market sites which involved a conflict between two liberal 
principles: the freedom of religion versus employers’ power to determine the dress-
code of employees. In spite of similarities the reasoning and rulings in the two cases 
turned out to be different (see Siim and Skjeie 2008). In the Danish case the power 
of employers overrode arguments for freedom of religion, while it was the other way 
round in the Norwegian case. The Swedish case is different, because it concerned 
conflicts around the prohibition of veiling in public institutions between educational 
institutions, which wanted to prohibit the burka/niqab and the Swedish board of 
Education. Here the ‘freedom of religion’ argument also prevailed (see Lanefelt 2010). 
This section discusses the meanings and implications of these differences for gender 
equality and accommodation of diversity.
The final section sums up the dilemma between multiculturalism/diversity and 
gender equality from a theoretical perspective as well as from the Nordic context. 
It argues that demands for gender equality and for accommodation of religious 
and cultural diversity are not deep value conflicts but contextual conflicts which 
represent equally valid principles that need to be balanced against each other in 
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liberal democracies. From the perspective of deliberative democracy women in 
minority groups should participate in negotiations concerning different claims to 
social justice. 
How are claims for diversity and gender equality balanced in the Nordic countries? 
In this political-institutional and discursive context, claims about gender equality 
and women’s rights have traditionally been more powerful principles than claims for 
accommodation of immigrant and minority groups. The present marginalisation of 
immigrant groups in the labour market and their relative powerlessness in democratic 
politics represent problems for the welfare states, which need to be addressed by 
innovative ‘diversity politics’. Immigrant women present specific challenges to the 
Nordic welfare states that often praise themselves for being a model for gender 
equality. It is a common challenge for Nordic welfare states to develop more inclusive 
integration strategies that are able to overcome the inequalities in power and resources 
between the native majority and immigrant groups, which include seeking to locate 
ethnic minority groups on an equal par with the native majority.  
5.1  Rethinking citizenship and diversity
Immigration and mobility across and within national borders has challenged the 
nation state and raised critical questions about citizenship, national communities and 
belongings. Migration has been followed by growing concerns about the integration 
of immigrants and refugees in the national communities where they have settled and 
about cultural conflicts between old majorities and new minorities. Questions related 
to citizenship, migration and the politics of belonging have become crucial political 
issues across Europe. The citizenship approach has illuminated the tensions in liberal 
democracies between concerns for equality/gender equality on the one hand and 
accommodation of religious and cultural diversity on the other hand (Lister et al 2007; 
Modood et al 2007; Siim and Squires 2008).   
The citizenship frame has addressed issues of exclusion and inclusion of 
individuals and social groups in society. Key questions are: who is included and 
who is excluded – who is defined as being ‘inside’ national communities and who is 
defined as being ‘outside’. In T.H. Marshall’s classical citizenship model equal civil, 
political and social rights for all people legally living in the country were attached 
to the nation state (Marshall 1950). Within this citizenship tradition scholars often 
distinguish between three dimensions: a) equal status, rights and obligations; b) 
political participation and citizens’ voices and c) political identities and belongings 
(Bellamy et al. 2003). The focus in the classical model on the inclusion of the working 
class in society has been criticized from a gender and diversity perspective, and the 
citizenship approach has subsequently been redesigned to address the inclusion/
exclusion of women and marginalised social groups in society (Kymlicka 1995; Lister 
1997).  
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Globalisation, Europeanisation and increased migration and mobility across and 
within borders have challenged the classical citizenship model attached to the nation 
state. Claims for the recognition of diversity has raised new issues about the state’s 
obligation to respect ethno-national and ethno-cultural rights of minorities (Kymlicka 
1995; Eisenberg et. al 2005). One position, held by for example Will Kymlicka (1995), 
has criticised the primary focus on equal rights and has proposed new multicultural 
models, which recognise the ethno-cultural and ethno-national rights of minorities. 
Meanwhile, Soysal (1994) for example, has criticised the nation state bias of the 
citizenship approach and has proposed new post-national citizenship models. 
Comparative research has explored the contextual nature and routes to citizenship 
and has identified citizenship regimes with different political opportunity structures 
and discursive framings of equality and diversity (e.g. Koopmans and Statham 
2000; Bellamy et. al. 2003). Research has explored the historical roots, institutional 
variations and cultural meanings of gender, race/ethnicity and class (in)equalities 
according to processes of inclusion and exclusion cross-nationally. A key issue is how 
policies and discourses affect citizens’ individual and collective identities/belongings 
as well as their practice. In this context citizenship concerns more than rights and 
obligations, since the notion of ‘lived citizenship’ refers to ‘a set of social and political 
relationships, practice and identities that together can be described as a sense of 
belonging’ (Lister et al. 2007:9). 
The idea of the nation/nation state as an ‘imagined community’ was introduced 
by the American scholar Benedict Anderson, who defined the nation as imagined 
‘because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives 
the image of their communion’ (Anderson 1983:15). Nira Yuval-Davis has redefined 
the linkage between citizenship and national belongings from a gender perspective. 
The influential book Gender and Nation (Yuval-Davis 1997) offers examples of how 
the creation of identity politics has been used to exclude specific groups while 
showing how gender has helped define the nation as an imagined community, for 
example via arguments of origin, kinship, culture and religion. Yuval Davis has also 
recently explored the notion of belonging as a way to enrich and clarify discussions 
of contemporary citizenship and has proposed a ‘multi-layered citizenship’ model 
(2007). The main argument is that people are no longer connected primarily to the 
nation state but are simultaneously citizens in more than one political community. 
Yuval-Davis’ approach is based upon an analytical separation of ‘belonging’ 
and ‘the politics of belonging’. ‘Belonging’ refers to  emotional attachment and 
about feeling at home and feeling safe, whereas  ‘politics of belonging’ refers to 
‘specific political projects aimed at constructing belonging in particular ways to 
particular collectives that are, at the same time, themselves being constructed 
by these projects in very particular ways’ (Yuval-Davis 2006a:197). In other words, 
‘politics of belonging’ is basically about demarcations of who is ‘in’ and who is ‘out’ 
of communities. According to Yuval-Davis, analyses of ‘belonging’ must be founded 
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on an intersectionality perspective, which analyses how gender intersects with other 
kinds of inequalities and diversities. Yuval-Davis emphasises that:
There is no meaning to the notion of ‘black’, for instance, which is not gendered and classed, no 
meaning for the notion of ‘women’, which is not ethnocided and classed, etc. This is a very impor-
tant point when we discuss issues of citizenship and belonging, because so much of the discussion 
on these issues, inspired by identity politics, attempts to homogenize the differential meanings of 
such identity notions such as blacks or women, etc. (Yuval-Davis 2007:565-66).
I find that the intersectional approach to citizenship is a methodological approach 
for studying gender and diversity, because it addresses the interrelations between 
inclusion and exclusion of gender and marginalised groups. National histories, 
political institutions and belongings affect both the meanings and interactions of the 
social categories, e.g. gender, race/ethnicity and class, but national models often fail 
to overcome the nation state bias of the citizenship approach. One of the challenges 
for the citizenship approach is therefore to move ‘beyond the nation state’ both in 
terms of a conceptual move (Beck 2002) and in terms of exploring citizenship at the 
transnational level, e.g. EU-citizenship (Faist 2007). 
5.2  Multicultural citizenship and gender equality
This section looks at the challenge of ‘the turn to diversity’ for gender theory and 
research and discusses feminist approaches to overcome the unitary bias in social 
and political theories (Squires 2007). It is inspired by Ange-Marie Hancock’s (2007) 
distinction between unitary, multiple and intersectionality approaches to difference 
and diversity, which is used to categorise the different models. Unitary approaches 
address one primary category, for example gender, race/ethnicity or class, and tend 
to neglect other kinds of diversities and inequalities. Multiple and intersectional 
approaches both address more than one category and the categories matter equally; 
but in the multiple approach the categories have a predetermined relationship to each 
other, whereas the relationship between categories is an open empirical question in 
the intersectional approach (2007:64).   
The debate about multiculturalism was particularly sparked by Will Kymlicka’s 
influential book Multicultural Citizenship (1995). The book presented one of the 
most comprehensive multicultural approaches, and introduced a strong defense 
for the accommodation of the cultural diversity of minority groups. Kymlicka’s 
concept of multicultural citizenship (1995) distinguished between three forms of 
group-differentiated rights: a) self-governing rights for national minorities, b) poly-
ethnic rights for ethnic minorities, and c) special representation rights for historically 
disadvantaged groups. The later notion of ‘diverse citizenship’ (Kymlicka and Norman 
eds. 2000) proposes a comprehensive model for accommodating different types of 
minorities. Kymlicka’s model was criticised for defending group rights and for not 
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addressing diversities and inequalities related to gender (Okin 1999) and religion 
(Modood 2007).
Tariq Modood (2007) has criticised Kymlicka’s approach for a liberal bias and for 
the dominant focus on national minorities. He has introduced an alternative conception 
of political multiculturalism based on the ideas of ‘difference’, ‘multi’, ‘equal dignity’ 
and ‘equal respect’. Modood’s is interested in the accommodation of religious groups. 
He emphasises the novelty of the ethno-religious mix in European democracies and 
the need to include Muslims in contemporary conceptions of democratic citizenship 
at the level of ‘identities, associations, belonging, including diasporic connexions, 
behaviour, culture, religious practice etc., and political mobilization’ (p.50). It is the 
focus on religious groups, which makes Modood’s approach unique, whereas the 
argument that accommodation policies must recognise groups, not just individuals, 
is similar to Kymlicka’s approach. 
Kymlicka’s multicultural paradigm was criticised by feminists because it neglects 
gender differences. Susan Moller Okin claimed in an influential article titled: ‘Is 
multiculturalism bad for women?’ (1999) that there is a contradiction between 
multiculturalism, defined as protection of the cultural rights of minorities, and 
women’s rights. The article provoked an intense debate in the US (see Cohen 1999), 
which later spread to Europe (Eisenberg 2005). Her main point was that minority 
groups often have patriarchal religious and family structures, and therefore should 
not be defended as a strategy to achieve gender equality and improve women’s rights. 
The claim is that group rights, exemplified by forced marriages and polygamy, are 
potentially, and in many cases also in practice, anti-feminist and harmful for women. 
First, group rights strengthen men’s patriarchal control over women in minority 
cultures, and secondly it is the most powerful men who formulate the interests, values 
and practices of the group. 
Okin’s approach was read by many as a ‘liberal defense’ of universal gender 
equality against cultural diversity. The attack on the multicultural paradigm was 
criticised as being premised upon an essentialist perception of ‘culture’ which would 
force minority women to choose between ‘my rights and my culture’. Okin later 
clarified her position explaining that she is not against collective rights per se and 
that the main point had been to give women a voice in all negotiations about groups 
rights (2005:88-89). The debate inspired a growing emphasis on both ‘the paradox 
of multicultural vulnerability’, i.e. the idea that vulnerable social groups’ needs 
and interests can be undermined by group rights (Shachar 2000:200), and on giving 
women and other vulnerable groups a voice in both minority cultures and in society 
(see for example Eisenberg et al. 2005; Modood et al. 2006). 
In a response to this criticism, Kymlicka stressed that states should only protect 
the collective rights of minorities through external restrictions on the majority, for 
example through representation rights and language rights, but states should not 
defend collective rights that impose internal restrictions of individual rights/autonomy 
within the group (1999:31-34).  He argued that feminism and multiculturalism are 
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potential allies in a struggle for a more inclusive concept of justice which combines 
individual and collective rights and takes account of both gender-based and ethnic 
diversity.
Anne Phillips (2007) has also argued that egalitarians should be committed to 
both sex equality and at least some version of multiculturalism and has introduced 
a deliberative ‘diversity model’ without culture and without groups. The argument is 
that rights should be attached primarily to individuals and thus the main problems 
concern discrimination: ‘the multicultural question is – whether existing legislation 
is biased towards the cultural identities or religious beliefs of particular groups. Laws 
and rules that enjoy majority support may reflect a cultural bias’ (2007:166).  This is 
a controversial model premised upon individual rights and aims to abolish collective 
rights of cultural groups. 
Thus, multiculturalist and feminist approaches present competing equality 
claims, but conflicts between claims for gender equality and recognition of religious 
diversity, around veiling for example, should not be regarded as deep values. They 
are contextual dilemmas, which may be resolved through democratic negotiations 
with the participation of women from minority groups. Okin’s approach to women’s 
rights can be categorised as a unitary approach, because gender is the main category. 
Will Kymlicka and Anne Phillip’s approaches to accommodate national minorities, 
immigrant groups and gender are multiple approaches, which focus on at least two 
categories. Only Yuval-Davis’ citizenship model is explicitly intersectional, and the 
relationship between the categories gender, ethnicity and nationality, is an open 
empirical question dependent on time and space. The next section addresses the 
multicultural challenge to gender equality from a Nordic perspective and discusses in 
more detail how gender intersects with ethno-cultural and ethno-religious diversity 
in headscarf debates.
5.3  The multicultural challenge1 to the Nordic welfare states 
In comparative research the Nordic countries are often considered to belong to the 
same welfare and gender model characterised by a large and generous public sector, a 
high level of universalism and many tax financed benefits. In spite of these similarities 
the Nordic countries have different histories and experiences with immigration and 
have adopted different approaches and policies towards migration and integration. 
1 The multicultural challenge refers to the accommodation of diversity at the structural, institutional 
and individual level. Ulrich Beck (2002) has explored the multicultural dilemma at the individual 
level where multiculturalism ‘fosters an individual who remains dependent on his/her original cultu-
ral space’. He has analysed the ‘local-global dilemma and Beck’s notion of ‘internal globalization’ is 
presented as a way to connect the dilemmas associated with globalization and migration.
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Sweden has a history of work-related immigration since the 1960s, while Finland was 
a country of emigration (especially to Sweden) until the 1980s, and has had restrictive 
migration and refugee policies even in the 1990s and 2000s.2 Denmark’s immigration 
was also work-related in the 1960s but the country adopted a stop for immigration 
in 1973; Norway experienced immigration from Third-world countries at the end of 
the 1960s but imposed an immigration ban in 1975. A study on the challenges to the 
Nordic welfare regimes from migration, for the Nordic Council, indicates that in spite 
of these differences in governments’ policies and discourses towards immigration, 
there are similar problems with discrimination and failed integration of immigrants 
in the labour market and in society (Brochmann and Hagelund 2005).
The three Scandinavian countries have been interpreted as one welfare model 
with three exceptions (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010). Comparative research from 
the three Scandinavian countries has started to explore the different policy responses 
to the challenge from migration and diversity: The multicultural Swedish model 
represents a relatively accommodating response towards diversity, which is often 
contrasted with the restrictive Danish response; while the pragmatic Norwegian 
response is positioned somewhere in between (Hagelund 2009). Recent Danish-
Swedish comparisons of policies and discourses indicate that the framing of the 
issues, i.e. whether public and political discourse label diversity as a threat or an 
asset and whether the political majority manages to frame ethnic minority groups 
as some of ‘them’ or as part of ‘us’, instead of perceiving diversity as an asset, is one 
of the key factors in shaping public policies (Hedetoft, Pettersson and Sturfelt 2006). 
The studies conclude that while the integration discourses and policies are divergent 
there may be an actual convergence in the practical effects of integration policies 
(Hedetoft 2006:406). The Nordic Report on the welfare political consequences of 
immigration has demonstrated that there is a growing emphasis on labour market 
participation as the route to integration in all the Nordic countries (Brochmann and 
Hagelund 2005:2010). 
There are, however, still important differences. The Swedish activation 
programmes tend to be general and voluntary based upon ‘an individual rights model' 
(Borevi 2010), whereas the Danish integration programmes since 2002 have been 
premised upon ‘an individual obligation model' with economic sanctions that target 
immigrant groups (Emerek and Bak Jørgensen 2009). One example is the Danish 
introduction benefit ‘starthjælpen', which is targeted towards new immigrants and 
is lower than the social benefit ‘kontanthjælpen' directed towards Danish citizens. 
2 In 2005 Finland’s foreign population from countries outside the EU, the Nordic countries and 
North-America, were only 3.4 per cent of the total population, while Sweden’s foreign population 
ratio was 12.4. Denmark and Norway were in between with a medium-size foreign born population 
ratio of 6.5 and 7.8 respectively. The largest immigrant groups in Denmark, Norway and Sweden come 
from Turkey, Pakistan and Ex-Yugoslavia (Brochmann & Hagelund 2005).
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This differentiation with regard to nationality is a break with the key principle in the 
universal welfare state which treats all individuals equally. Another example is the 
so-called ‘300 hour rule' which is targeted towards married couples and providers 
above the age of 25 who have received social benefits during the last 2 years. They 
will lose the right to social benefits if they have not been employed at least 300 hours 
(later raised to 450 hours) during the last 24 months. This rule has been heavily 
criticised for targeting the most vulnerable groups, especially immigrant women, but 
the Government insists that it is a necessary economic sanction/inducement in order 
to integrate migrants within the labour market. What have been the effects of these 
policies is highly contested, whether they have been a success or a failure in terms of 
integration of migrants into the labour market (Jønsson and Petersen 2010:200-209).
In the comparative book The Limits to Welfare (2010) Brochmann and Hagelund 
argue that the founding and evolution of the Nordic welfare states can be interpreted 
as a ‘welfare nationalism’ based upon integration with three central elements: 
democracy, citizenship and modernisation. The book studies differences and 
similarities in the interactions between the welfare state and the new immigrants 
to Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. The focus is on both the policy shifts towards 
immigrants from WWII until 2010, and on intended as well as unintended effects 
of the interactions between policy changes in the three countries. One example is 
the unintended consequences of the adoption of restrictive immigration policies by 
the newly elected Danish government in 2001 which greatly increased the number of 
immigrants to Norway and Sweden. 
Karen Borevi (2010) has analysed whether Sweden is an exception to the 
general retreat from multiculturalism with an emphasis on national cohesion and 
belonging rather than the accommodation of cultural and ethnic subgroups. She 
argues that there is a trend towards a greater emphasis on individual obligations in 
welfare policies. In spite of this, Swedish integration policies still tend to be based 
on individual ‘rights’ rather than obligations. Three examples may illustrate how 
Swedish integration policies differ from the general Nordic (and European) trend: 
a) Swedish politicians have rejected citizenship tests, i.e. the obligation for 
immigrants to learn the Swedish language and history as a condition for citizenship; 
b) the Swedish introduction programmes are still voluntary and not mandatory; and 
c) immigrants have the freedom to chose where to live (Borevi 2010:116-130).
Brochmann and Hagelund conclude that the most fundamental similarity in 
the integration approach of the three Scandinavian countries is the emphasis on 
labour market integration and activation, where the obligation to participate in 
the labour market has been strengthened. In general all three countries conform 
to the ideal of civic integration, but the countries are clearly distinguished in terms 
of their official requirements for immigrants. Only in the case of Sweden do rights 
clearly come before duties, as in Marshall’s theory, the most explicit differences 
can be found at the political-ideological level: Sweden has the clearest redefinition 
of a demos-based nation-state, with, for example, the right to dual citizenship. 
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This contrasts with Denmark, which between 2001 and 2005 has experienced 
a shift towards ethnos, with 9 years residence as a condition for citizenship, for 
example. Norway has an unclear middle-position in terms of official requirements 
for immigrants (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010: 356-357). It is however, not evident 
what the implications of these political-ideological differences are in practice. 
Accommodative cultural policies do not always lead to successful integration in 
the labour market. Research indicates that there may be unexpected consequences 
of both the individual rights based Swedish policies, which may be ineffective in 
terms of economic and social integration, and the restrictive Danish policies based 
upon individual obligations, which may prove to be effective. The three countries 
are today de facto multicultural countries, which are presently forced to re-define 
the national welfare projects faced with global mobility and a growing demand for 
labour power. The comparative analysis demonstrates that traditional welfare state 
policies have not been successful in developing equality based policies towards 
new immigrant groups (Brochmann and Hagelund 2010:367).  
There is clearly a basis for more comparative Nordic research, which explores the 
interconnections between discourses, policies and the implications for the daily lives 
of immigrant groups. The following section focuses on the meanings and possible 
implications of the challenge from migration/multiculturalism for the intersections 
between gender equality and ethnic diversity. 
5.4  The Nordic gender equality paradox 
Feminist scholars usually agree that the Nordic countries, in spite of their differences, 
share basic characteristics that make it meaningful to include them in the same 
gender model. Comparative research often emphasises that the countries share 
basic characteristics: 1) a dual breadwinner model combined with a system of public 
childcare services and generous maternity- and parental leave, 2) a relative high 
number of women in the national political elite, and 3) a strong discourse about 
gender equality as both part of public policies and the private lives of citizens (see 
Bergqvist et al. 1999). Increased migration has raised concerns about new forms of 
inequalities between native born and foreign born women and has questioned the 
Nordic gender model’s ability to accommodate diversity among women.
Immigrant women are often said to present a special challenge for Nordic 
governments because of their low labour market participation compared to women 
in the ethnic majorities, which for several decades have had record high employment 
rates within the OECD area. As an example, in Denmark the present Liberal-
Conservative government has gradually tightened immigration laws using gendered 
issues like forced marriages to legitimise a stricter immigration control in relation to 
family members (Emerek and Bak Jørgensen 2009). Gender equality has thus come to 
play a key role in the dominant discourse about integration, and the perceived gender 
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equality in ‘ethnic Danish families' is increasingly contrasted with the supposed 
patriarchal oppression of women in ‘migrant families' (Siim 2007; Siim and Skjeie 
2008). 
Feminist scholars have criticised women-friendly welfare policies for being 
premised upon women's common social positions and interests (Borchorst and Siim 
2002; 2008). Gender equality policies have been criticised for neglecting diversities 
between women from the white majority and the ethnic minorities, thus making 
alternative perspectives on gender and family relations invisible (los Reyes, Molino 
and Mulinari 2003; Langvasbråten 2008). Post-colonial theory has criticised the 
hegemonic trend in Nordic gender and ethnicity research, especially the (colonial) 
desire to know the ‘other' (Mulinari, Kaskinen, Irni and Tuori 2009) and produce a 
hegemonic picture of gender and femininity that makes power inequalities between 
the ‘white' majority and immigrant women invisible (de los Reyes, Molino and 
Mulinari 2003:31; Andreassen 2005). Postcolonial feminism has recently labelled 
Nordic nationalism ‘welfare state nationalism'. 
Feminist research has started to analyse inequalities between majority and ethnic 
minority groups in terms of power and influence. One central issue concerns the 
powers to define gender equality and feminism (Pristed and Thun 2010). The perceived 
conflicts between the dominant norms about gender equality and the cultural norms 
of immigrant families, including the diversity of family norms has recently become 
a central issue in feminist research (Bredal 2006; Siim 2008). Scholars have started 
to analyse the meanings and implications of the diverse Nordic welfare, migration/
integration and gender equality policies for immigrant and refugee women's lived 
citizenship. How should we assess and compare the national difference in gender 
equality policies towards immigrant women? For example, what about the differences 
between Swedish equality policies, which have generally been directed towards 
all women independent of their ethno-cultural background (Langvasbråten 2008), 
and Danish gender equality policies, which are targeted towards immigrant women, 
who are perceived to be oppressed by their culture and their religion? (Siim 2007) 
What strategy is more effective for empowering ethnic minority women in relation to 
employment and education?
To sum up, immigration has increased inequalities among native and foreign 
born women and has challenged the Nordic welfare states’ self-understanding as 
the normative models for gender equality. Instead of Helga Hernes’ grand vision of a 
society ‘Where injustice on the basis of gender would be largely eliminated without 
an increase in other forms of inequality, such as among groups of women’ (1987:15) 
research has pointed towards the new inequalities among women. Siim and Skjeie 
(2008) propose that the new forms of inequalities among women represent a Nordic 
gender equality paradox between the white majority who are included in politics and 
society and ethnic minorities who are marginalised both in the labour market and in 
politics.
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5.5  Framings and regulations regarding headscarves in Nordic 
nations
The purpose of this section is to look at framings and regulations of Muslim headscarves 
in the private and public arenas in more detail within the three Scandinavian countries.3 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden have many similarities in terms of citizenship and 
none of them fit any of the classical citizenship models: the ethno-cultural model, the 
civic-assimilationist or republican model, and the multicultural model (Kilic, Saharso 
and Sauer 2008).  One clear indication of differences in the countries’ migration 
policies is that Sweden is the only country that has adopted dual citizenship (in 2003) 
in order to strengthen integration. The countries also have different state-church 
relations since Sweden decided to separate state and Church (in 2001), while both 
Denmark and Norway have retained their state churches. In spite of these differences 
in citizenship policies, research has pointed out that all three countries have retained 
relatively accommodating approaches to political regulation of veiling in the public 
arena compared to other European countries (Kilic, Sauer and Saharso 2008). 
The first Danish and Norwegian headscarf-cases addressed the right of Muslim 
women to wear the hijab to work in private companies.4 They illustrate that there 
are important differences in the political and discursive opportunity structures of 
the two countries which have implications for Muslim women. In the Danish Føtex 
case the conflict was between an employee, Najla Ainuz, who was working as a full-
time bakery manager and had demanded the right to wear the headscarf to work for 
religious reasons, and Føtex, which is part of the concern, Dansk Supermarked, who 
dismissed her. The trade union, HK, argued on behalf of the employee that dismissal 
of the employee made her the victim of religious discrimination. The employer 
argued that they had the power to dismiss an employee who did not live up to the 
general dress code of the supermarket, which demanded that employees had to be 
‘professionally and nicely dressed'. 
HK took the case to court twice. In 2003 the High Court ruled hat the company's 
dismissal of veiled employees was legal if the supermarket, in this case Føtex, had 
adopted a universal dress-code for all employees. The High Court reasoned that 
3 Unfortunately I have not been able to find research about veiling in Finland.
4 There have been several legal court cases in Denmark. The first case was the MAGASIN case, where 
the department store was sentenced a fine of 10.000 Dkr for dismissing an employee with hijab. The 
second case was about TOM’s Chocolate Factory and this ended in reconciliation. The Danish trade 
union, HK, in Danish, Handel og Kontor, has led two cases, the ALDI-case, which also ended with 
reconciliation in 2003 where the employee AC was awarded 30.000 Dkr according to the Danish discri-
mination Law, and the FØTEX-case, which HK lost. The analysis of the Danish court cases is based 
upon empirical material and research findings from the VEIL-project (see Andreassen & Siim 2007; 
Andreassen, Lund & Siim 2009) and the Norwegian case is based on empirical material and research 
findings provided by Hege Skjeie (see Siim &d Skjeie 2008).
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the ban on headscarves must be formulated as part of a general ban on all visible 
political, religious and cultural symbols and must not be directed towards a specific 
religious group. Dansk Supermarked, which owns the chains Føtex, Netto and Bilka, 
had introduced clothing regulations in August 2000. These regulations prohibited 
veiling for employees who are in contact with costumers, i.e. employees working in 
the store room can be veiled. The clothing regulations also prohibited caps, including 
Jewish skullcaps (kippas); large Christian crosses; as well as visible piercings or 
unnatural hair colors. These clothing regulations had been written down and 
distributed among all Dansk Supermarked’s staff during the autumn of 2000, and 
from August 2000 onwards all new employees had been equipped with a pamphlet 
describing the clothing regulations. The judges therefore ruled that Føtex’s veil 
prohibition was not a question of discrimination but rather a question of clothing 
uniform. According to Najla Ainouz’s contract from March 1, 2001 (where she was 
hired fulltime in the bakery) she had signed an agreement with the stipulation that 
her employment included ‘the rules and duties described in the staff regulations’. 
This meant that, when signing her contract, Najla Ainouz also had accepted that she 
would observe the requirements proscribed in the staff regulations. In the clothing 
regulations from August 2000 it says: ‘In all areas where there is not a demand for a 
certain head covering, it is a part of our uniform [that] demands that employees do 
not wear headgear.’ This decision was appealed by the trade union who on behalf of 
the employee argued that the dismissal on religious grounds was a violation of the 
Danish Anti-discrimination Law. The verdict was appealed and the case was taken to 
the Supreme Court, which confirmed the decision in January 2005 (Andreassen and 
Siim 2007). 
The Norwegian cases had many similarities but the reasoning and outcome 
was different. Here individual cases of veil discrimination were brought before the 
Norwegian Equality Ombud but were not tried until 2004. The complaint by a number 
of employees that they were not allowed to wear a headscarf to work resulted in a 
decision by the Ombud that prohibitions of the veil in work places were in violation 
of the prohibition against religious discrimination. She added that it would also be 
an indirect form of gender discrimination, which violated the Gender Equality Act. 
In determining this, the Ombud compared such restrictions of Muslim headscarves 
to the contrary accommodating, uniform regulations within the military services (i.e. 
turbans). She reasoned that many Muslim women wear the veil because of religious 
reasons and situations could occur where they could not accept to work if they could 
not use the headscarf. A prohibition would thus entail a significant disadvantage for 
these women. In more recent decisions the Ombud has upheld this general line of 
reasoning. A ban of the veil was later tried both according to the Gender Equality 
Act and a new Act against Ethnic and Religious Discrimination, and found to be a 
violation on both prohibition grounds (Siim and Skjeie 2008). 
In the Danish case the main conflict was formulated as a conflict between 
two principles: Religious discrimination against the liberal principle that private 
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employers' should have the power to decide without interference from the state. In 
the Føtex case the concern for religious rights founded in the Danish Constitution 
and European Human Rights Convention lost out, probably because the Danish 
Supermarket chain had adopted new clothing regulations which also forbade caps, 
including the Jewish kippa and large Christian crosses (in 2003). In the comparison 
of the two cases, Siim and Skjeie suggest that the Norwegian Ombud's argument is 
an example of an inclusionary framing, which takes the intersecting of gender with 
religion and culture into account in support of women’s right to wear the Muslim 
Headscarf to work by acknowledging that it is women who wear the veil (see Skjeie 
2007; Siim and Skjeie 2008). It is inclusive, because it recognises the intersections of 
different inequality creating categories, and the potential negative consequences of 
these inequalities for creating equality, in diversity. 
What can explain the differences in the reasoning? The comparative analysis 
suggests that three factors may contribute to explain the different results: a) the 
pluralist religious tradition in Norway, which does not exist in Denmark, b) the 
difference between the Equality Ombud which is more sensitive to the arguments 
from political actors than the legal Court system, and finally c) the mobilisation of 
social and political actors in Norway, an example being the Muslim women organised 
in the MIRA-centre (Siim and Skjeie 2008:329-34). 
The third case is somewhat different because it addresses the Swedish approach 
to veiling in public educational institutions and includes conflicts over the burka/
niqab (see Lanefelt 2010). It refers to four different cases:5 1) The Burgården high-
school case, where two  female pupils wanted to attend classes dressed in a burka, 
2) The Minerva elementary school where the school ordered a pupil to take off her 
veil on the school premises, 3) the third case concerns two students in the Swedish 
Institute of Education who wanted to attend classes dressed in niqab, and 4) the 
Västerort Adult High School case where a women who was not allowed  to wear a 
niqab reported the school for discrimination.  
The Swedish Board of Education had the power to decide in the first two cases 
whereas the third university case was decided internally at Stockholm University. In 
the Burgården case the Board did sustain the school's decision to forbid wearing the 
burka for several reasons including pedagogical arguments, practical arguments and 
a freedom of religion argument. In the Minerva case the Board of Education went 
against the school's argument for a ban of the veil to allow the wearing of the veil 
in the specific school. The Board mentioned several justifications but according to 
Lanefelt the main reason is one of freedom of religion (Lanefelt 2010:6). The third 
5 The description of the Swedish cases is based upon PhD Lily Lanefelt’s PhD-project, especially 
the arguments in the paper “Regulating the veil in Swedish Style: Tolerance and the Absence of In-
tersectionality in Public Reasoning on the Issue of Veil”, that was presented at the Second DEMDI 
conference, Oslo, 28-29, 2010.
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case, which was decided in the two students' favour, is the only instance where 
freedom of religion is not given as the reason for allowing the veiled girls to attend 
classes. Instead the justification refers to equal treatment and to discrimination, 
which should not occur in the University of Stockholm (SU). The last case is that 
of Västerort Adult High, where there was no official decision as of January 2010. A 
preliminary conclusion by the present DO6 was published on the official website of 
Swedish communities and county councils. This refers to two arguments: a) freedom 
of religion and b) equality of opportunity. 
The Swedish cases are different from the Danish and Norwegian cases since: a) 
they address demands to wear the burka and the niqab which are perceived to be 
more difficult to accommodate than the demand to wear the hijab, b) they concern 
public educational institutions and not private companies, and c) they were decided 
by different public authorities. Scholars have debated whether the Swedish policy 
on veiling should be characterised as ‘non-restrictive' or as ‘selective prohibition'? 
Lily Lanefelt takes issue with Kilic, Saharso and Sauer (2008) who have defined the 
Swedish policy towards the veil as belonging to the selective prohibition based on the 
decision of the Swedish board of education to support the decision to ban the burka 
in the Burgården high-school case. According to Lanefelt the Swedish policy on the 
veil should be categorised as a non-restrictive approach, because the Burgården case 
is an isolated case and demands for wearing the veil in educational institutions have 
not been rejected in the other three cases (Lanefelt 2009:4).  
Lanefelt argues that there is a primacy of freedom of religion argument in the 
Swedish cases and that this may have negative consequences for moral reasoning. 
It is a problem that this policy runs the risk of labelling women wearing the veil as 
being unreasonable since ‘a policy of the veil that bases the rational of non-exclusion 
of female veiling practices from education to the right of freedom of religion can 
tend to embrace the negative connotations that religion is assigned when contrasted 
with reason’ (Lanefelt 2010:14). This means that female veiling is assigned only one 
meaning as a religious symbol and thus the policy neglects the intersectionality of 
meanings that veiling represents both for women wearing the veil but also the different 
interpretations that second parties make of veiling traditions. Lanefelt’s analysis of 
the Swedish approach to veiling is interesting, because it focuses on the negative 
implications and unintended consequences of the de-politicisation of veiling, which 
fails to address veiling as a controversial normative issue for all parties involved. She 
suggests that an alternative reasoning would be to acknowledge the intersectional 
aspects of veiling practices.
To sum up, I agree with Lanefelt that Sweden, like Denmark and Norway, can be 
categorised as having a relatively accommodating approach to veiling in the public 
arena. Differences in the political power structures characterised by strong anti-
6 DO: Diskrimineringsombudsmannen”,  i.e. state representative in issues of discrimination
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Muslim political parties with big electoral support in Norway and Denmark has not 
(yet) changed this. In the future the accommodating Nordic approaches to veiling in 
the public arena may be changing, since there have recently been intense debates 
about prohibiting the veil for police officers (in Norway), about prohibiting the burka 
in the public arena (in Denmark) and a government decision to ban all political and 
religious symbols for legal judges (in Denmark) (Andreassen, Lund and Siim 2008).
The analysis has shown that the variations in the reasoning in the three cases 
have different implications for veiled women as well as for third parties. In Denmark 
the liberal argument, which referred to the employer's right to determine clothing 
regulations, won against employees' religious freedom in the Føtex case, and it 
follows that the employers have the power to decide whether to accommodate 
demands for veiling by employees. This does not mean that employers use this right. 
There are indications that in practice the debate may have contributed positively to 
raise awareness of the issue among employers and employees and to stimulate new 
clothing regulations which can accommodate veiling. In Sweden the argument for 
religious freedom won, but the relatively depoliticised debate may have negative 
implications in practice because of the normative dilemmas that it does not talk about. 
The Norwegian Ombud institution was found to be the only example of intersectional 
reasoning, which formulated a link between direct religious discrimination with 
indirect gender discrimination explicitly addressing the fact that it is women wearing 
the veil who are discriminated against  
5.6  Conclusion: Multiculturalism and gender equality - issues and 
strategies 
In the theoretical portion of this chapter, I have argued that the ‘turn to diversity’ 
opens new opportunities to rethink theories, concepts and models and address 
multiple inequalities and diversities, specifically in relation to gender, ethnicity and 
religion. Multicultural claims for accommodation of cultural and religious diversity 
and feminist claims to overcome gender inequality are often presented as competing 
equality principles, which need to be balanced. The growing feminist emphasis 
on intersectionality as a perspective on diversity is a response to this challenge to 
overcome unitary approaches. Arguably, political and social theory need to address 
multiple diversities and multiple inequalities and study how social categories, 
including gender, ethnicity and religion, intersect within and across nation states.   
Yuval-Davis’ approach to citizenship and politics of belonging is a promising 
model, which addresses intersecting inequalities at both the individual, structural 
and organisational levels and overcomes the nation state bias of  previous citizenship 
models. Intersectionality has been used as a sophisticated analytical tool to 
understand how significant categories, notably gender and religion, are articulated 
in political and legal debates and also affect underlying notions of nationality. This 
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approach concerns structural, institutional and discursive power relations and 
resources between the dominant majority and minority groups, and it may therefore 
be used and abused in political debates in ways that stigmatise and marginalise 
minority groups. 
Immigration represents new challenges for the Nordic welfare states and one 
of the central issues is connected to integration and accommodation of new forms 
of cultural and religious diversity in society. Immigration raises new research 
questions about the commonality and differences in the Nordic welfare, immigration 
and gender regimes. In spite of different approaches to migration, the integration 
and marginalisation of immigrant groups is perceived as a political problem in all 
the Nordic countries. Inequalities between native born and foreign born groups are 
growing and immigrant groups are not included on par with native citizens in the 
labour market, in politics and in society in general. The Scandinavian countries 
still fare comparatively well in relation to redistribution and gender equality, but 
immigration has increased social and political inequalities between native citizens 
and foreign born nationals, including inequalities among women. 
Feminist scholarship has analysed the tensions between the Nordic welfare 
and gender equality regime and immigration, and have identified similar problems 
connected to marginalisation and discrimination of immigrant women and to a lack 
of respect for cultural diversity. The studies indicate that there are limits to the Nordic 
approach to welfare and illustrate that the women-friendly social policies do not 
always include ethnic minority women. They have thus raised critical questions about 
the abilities of the Scandinavian welfare and gender regime to integrate immigrant 
groups and live up to their own promises of social and gender equality. Welfare, 
immigration and gender research need to study the tensions in social, integration 
and gender equality policies from the perspective of immigrant women.  
In spite of the differences in multicultural policies, each of the Nordic countries 
we have examined has problems with the integration of immigrant women into the 
labour market and into society more broadly conceived. None of these Scandinavian 
welfare states can therefore claim to live up to Helga Hernes’ vision of a society ‘where 
injustice on the basis of gender would be eliminated without an increase in other 
forms of inequalities, such as among groups of women’. The increased diversity and 
inequalities among women in Scandinavia represent a challenge to feminist research 
to be more self-reflexive in terms of who speaks for whom and who has the right to 
define what women-friendly social policies are or should be. Arguably, Scandinavian 
welfare and gender research needs to rethink the foundations of the welfare state and 
gender equality from the perspective of migration and diversity. 
The analysis of the Danish, Norwegian and Swedish headscarf debates 
and regulations was inspired by empirical findings from the VEIL-project. They 
demonstrate the balancing of different arguments for and against women’s demand 
for veiling in the private and public arena and indicate that the different reasoning 
may have unintended meanings and effects. The comparison between Denmark and 
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Norway illustrates the different framings and regulations of Muslim headscarves in 
relation to the labour market. In this arena, the public rulings balanced arguments for 
religious freedom against employers’ authority to decide the dress-code of employees. 
In the Danish case the employer’s power to determine the dress-code won the case 
against the argument for religious freedom. In the Norwegian case the Equality Ombud 
argued that a ban on an employee’s demand for veiling would violate two intersecting 
principles: direct religious discrimination and indirect gender discrimination. 
The analysis of headscarf debates and regulations in the three Scandinavian 
countries thus illustrates the importance of the power to decide on the specific domain 
as well as the power to balance between conflicting principles, reasoning and interests 
of social and political actors. The Danish case represents a high degree of politisation 
around the headscarf issue and even when the employers won the legal argument 
the court cases may have contributed to raising awareness about the issue for Muslim 
women and employers. The Swedish case indicates that there may be unintended 
negative implications of a de-politicisation of the Muslim headscarf, if it is articulated 
solely as a religious issue and not as an intersectional issue. The Norwegian case 
suggests that there are positive implications of an intersectional approach to Muslim 
headscarves that is able to recognise the interrelations between gender and religious 
diversity. This articulation is premised on a multidimensional approach to equality, 
which interprets relations between gender, ethnicity/race, religion and nationality 
as multiple intersecting forms of discrimination, not as contradictory or competing 
equality claims, and is a promising democratic strategy.
This chapter has suggested that it is a democratic challenge to negotiate the 
principles of equality with recognition of diversity and to develop strategies able to 
include religious and cultural minorities in Nordic societies on an equal par with 
the national majorities. Future research should compare potential barriers that need 
to be addressed by political institutions, discourses and gender equality policies in 
order to empower immigrant and minority women as equal citizens in the Nordic 
countries. Power relations are transformative and dynamic and migration research 
should discuss strategies and best practices for accommodating cultural and religious 
diversity, including the diversity of family values and gender equality norms. 
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6  Dynamics of Recognition: Minority Ethnic Access 
to Transformative Power in the Nordic Welfare State
6.1  Introduction
Groups facing social injustice have rather successfully addressed issues of access 
to public institutions and policy-making, as well as to various welfare services. 
Hegemonic cultures and institutional practices themselves have, nevertheless, 
remained relatively uncontested. Newman and Clarke (2009) call for an increasing 
acknowledgment of the distinction between citizenship as expansive and citizenship 
as transformative, where the latter is concerned with challenging the social, political 
and cultural orders and the larger architectures of inequality and subordination.  
In this article I turn to the notion of citizenship as being closely linked to its 
political-institutional context and to human agency. I assume that we need to open 
up for topological analyses of the various ways in which minority ethnic agency is 
enacted in particular localities in order to explore the contestation and challenging of 
hegemonic power structures in contemporary societies. I am particularly concerned 
with the ways in which the political-institutional framework enables or constrains 
citizenship agency and, subsequently, access to transformative power. The research 
draws on the social category of Northern European Roma and Travellers, faced by 
a long history of oppression. It aims at highlighting the ways in which a legacy of 
misrecognition interlinks with certain patterns of participation in a certain cultural 
and political-institutional context. Empirically, it uses interview data from a study on 
Finnish Roma activists, contextualised with a discussion on politics targeted to Roma 
and Travellers in Sweden and Norway.  
The theoretical point of departure is the redistribution-recognition divide in 
citizenship, most notably Nancy Fraser’s two-dimensional conceptualisation of 
justice and her more recent emphasis on political representation as an additional 
dimension to those of cultural and economic disadvantage (Fraser 2008). Whereas 
the welfare state has been reasonably successful in reducing poverty and socio-
economic injustice at the level of social class, it is increasingly being debated 
whether minority ethnic groups are equally included in an ethos of egalitarianism 
(Brochmann and Hagelund 2012; Kivisto and Wahlbeck 2013; Kvist, Fritzell, Hvinden 
and Kangas 2012). This paper argues that a strengthening of the recognition 
paradigm of citizenship in the mature Nordic Welfare States is precondition for an 
all-citizens-encompassing, participatory egalitarianism. Firstly, I will outline the 
(mis)recognition paradigm of social justice and its transformative potential, that 
is, its relation to acts of citizenship by individuals and groups in their efforts to 
make change. Secondly, drawing on in-depth qualitative Roma activist interviews, 
 © 2015 Camilla Nordberg
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I emphasise the value of researching the lived citizenship of people when we want 
to understand of the complex nature of agency and subordination in contemporary 
welfare states. Finally, exploring policy-making targeted to Roma and Travellers in 
Finland, Sweden and Norway, I discuss the ways different trajectories of nation-
state building have shaped differentiated political claims-making practices and 
outcomes for misrecognised groups. 
6.2  Recognition of social injustice
Nancy Fraser has, for two decades, worked on the development of a normative 
theory of justice. She initially departed from a dualist framework which allowed for 
analysing the position of subordinated groups with regard to the redistribution of 
material resources, as well as the recognition of difference. Her argument was that 
we need to acknowledge the intersection of recognition and redistribution in our 
analyses of social injustice (Fraser 1995). To focus on the counteraction of stigma is, 
for example, not enough as long as publicly raised stereotypes about unemployed 
ethnic minorities reflect an actual structural disadvantage. Ruth Lister has showed 
how the recognition paradigm is helpful for understanding the contemporary politics 
of poverty, usually associated with redistribution (Lister 2004; also Parekh 2004). 
Nevertheless, starting in the 1990s, there was a strong tendency towards a cultural 
turn in politics as well as in theoretical debates (Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995). The 
shift from a socio-economic to a cultural paradigm of justice has given rise to critique 
against a politics of recognition which sees group-specific justice claims primarily as 
self-realisation. 
Fraser was also critical to the ways in which the recognition paradigm was linked 
to identity politics. She subsequently suggested a distinction between affirmative 
and transformative approaches to a politics of recognition. While affirmative 
approaches seek to valorise devalued identities, transformative approaches seek to 
transform the symbolic order (Fraser 1995; see also Newman and Clarke 2009). Later 
Fraser more explicitly conceptualised her view as a ‘status’ model of recognition 
(Fraser 2000) and elaborated her thinking in exchanges with Axel Honneth, Iris 
Marion Young and Judith Butler (Fraser 1997; Young 1997; Butler 1998; Fraser and 
Honneth 2003).
According to Fraser, recognition is to be understood as a normative concept 
referring to respect, social status and the absence of cultural domination. The 
lack of recognition is subsequently a systematic and institutionalised form of 
status subordination, constituting a form of oppression. Fraser calls for a ‘parity 
of participation’, recognising all social actors as full partners in social interaction, 
able to participate ‘as peers’ (Fraser 2003: 28). Fraser is very clear in her view that 
recognition is a response to social injustice and not to a generic human need. 
Nevertheless, different contexts and cases of subordination require different remedies 
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to promote status equality and participatory parity. Some forms of misrecognition, 
related to denying the common humanity of social actors, require a universalist form 
of recognition, that people are ‘unburdened of excessive ascribed or constructed 
differences’. When misrecognition is about denying the distinctiveness of certain 
social actors, they may indeed need recognition of their unacknowledged differences. 
Social actors may also request a deconstruction of ‘the very terms in which attributed 
differences are currently elaborated’ (Fraser 2003: 45-47). 
Whereas a plurality of approaches needs to be developed and implemented in 
a politics of recognition, a focus on structural subordination will arguably always 
require an analytical gaze which acknowledges the importance of power and agency. 
Absence of cultural domination is essential for transformative citizenship, yet remains 
a passive rather than active commitment to power redistribution in the polity. The 
normative demand for absence of cultural domination thus needs to be accompanied 
by an active commitment to redistribution not solely of socio-economic goods but 
also of power relations.
6.3  Institutional and cultural constraints to agency 
The ways in which people effectively can participate in claims-making practices 
subsequently become fundamental for enhancing social change. Minority ethnic 
groups are not to be understood as objects of oppressive practices and structures, 
but as potentially active subjects engaging in an array of encounters with other social 
actors (Isin and Nielsen 2008). The focus on agency is arguably manifold. Critical 
welfare state researchers have brought attention to the current shift in welfare policy 
from a normative emphasis on structural equality to the objects or subjects of policies 
themselves. This shift has featured a stronger emphasis on notions of exclusion, 
inclusion, empowerment and social cohesion, i.e. to the individual (Kettunen 2011). 
As was discussed in the previous section, a politics of recognition should be seen as 
a response to systematic and institutionalised forms of inequality and injustice to 
be considered legitimate; agency and participation should then also be discussed in 
relation to inequalities of representation and voice rather than as an independent 
welfare policy aim per se.     
Iris Marion Young (2000) makes a normative argument about the democratic 
inclusion of people from a broad range of social positions in decision-making. 
She is critical to the fact that some proponents of deliberative democracy tend to 
privilege argumentative forms of communication, assuming order and consensus 
(Young 2000). In developing a democratic society, there is a need to attend to 
socially differentiated positions and perspectives in decision-making. Individuals 
have ‘particular knowledge that arises from experience in their social positions’. The 
inclusion and recognition of such knowledge is important ‘not only as a means of 
demonstrating equal respect and to ensure that all legitimate interests in the polity 
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receive expression’, but also to motivate participants to transform their claims from 
expressions of self-interest to appeals to justice, as well as to maximise the ‘social 
knowledge available to a democratic public, such that citizens are more likely to make 
just and wise decisions’ (Young 2004: 25-26).
Nevertheless, hegemonic cultures and institutions structure people’s 
possibilities to act as citizens. Young distinguishes exclusion from decision-making 
as external and/or internal exclusion. By external exclusion she refers to the lacking 
access to fora for decision-making, including political domination by the socially 
and economically powerful. By internal exclusion she refers to instances whereby 
others ignore, dismiss or patronise ones statements and expressions. Internal 
exclusion demonstrates how people ‘lack effective opportunity to influence the 
thinking of others even when they have access to fora and procedures of decision-
making’ (Young 2000: 55). 
James Tully (2005) has also made a useful contribution to the understanding of 
different forms of exclusion from the public sphere. He shows how political exclusion 
and political assimilation work together to block processes of citizenisation in 
which citizens can deliberate freely over different shared and contested rules of 
recognition and distribution. With relations of exclusion Tully refers to ‘the various 
ways citizens are excluded from initiating and entering into practices of democratic 
negotiation…’ (Tully 2005: 214-215). With relations of assimilation Tully refers to 
subjects being ‘encouraged to participate in democratic practices of deliberation 
yet are constrained to deliberate in a particular way’ (Tully 2005: 213-214). If citizens 
wish to have their voice heard, they must act in compliance with the dominant 
practice of reasoning. That is, the emphasis on formal socio-political citizenship 
rights does not account for instances of internal exclusion from decision-making 
(Young 2000) or political assimilation (Tully 2005).
Returning to Nancy Fraser, she initially saw her dual perspective on recognition 
and redistribution as also embodying the political dimension of social justice, asserting 
that the very aim of recognition claims is to ‘deinstitutionalise patterns of cultural 
value that impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that 
foster it’ (Fraser 2003: 30). In her later work, she started to ask herself about whether 
relations of representation in themselves can be unjust, outside the influence from 
misrecognition and maldistribution. Her concern is first and foremost the meta-level 
of political decision-making, the (nationally) bounded frames of decision-making 
structures, which leave certain poor and pariah groups outside of the possibilities to 
confront, usually, transnational injustices (Fraser 2005; 2008). The Roma constitute 
a visible example of an ethno-cultural minority with universal, global, experiences of 
oppression and persecution, yet with a strongly heterogeneous position as claimants 
in their respective localities.
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6.4  The local context of agency: The ‘universalist’ welfare state 
and its ethno-cultural others
Notwithstanding the normative ambition of challenging the hegemony of the 
nation-state and its exclusionary decision-making practices, there is still a de facto 
reality of imperative nation-state institutions, which makes the state an important 
category of analysis (Bloemraad 2006; Favell 2010). The materialisation of social 
rights and the redistribution of resources are still predominantly enacted within 
this bounded unit. At the level of every-day life, a ‘re-nationalisation’ of politics is 
occurring in a Europe where populist political voices currently draw on primordial 
rhetoric of morality and the boundedness of national cultures. Simultaneously, 
global transfers of money, people and ideas, bring about new demands for analytical 
reinterpretations of social reality. Rather than using predefined understandings of 
the tenets of re-nationalisation, globalisation and trans-national agency, there is a 
call for a critical assessment of the actual transformation of the political-institutional 
framework the local level.
In Northern Europe, the scholarly debate on a politics of recognition has been 
marked by its contextualisation within a ‘welfare state’ framework. The welfare states 
of this region have typically been portrayed as egalitarian, redistributive, universal 
and solidarity driven (Kildal and Kuhnle 2005; Greve 2007). However, researchers have 
begun to question whether the Nordic welfare states actually can fulfil their egalitarian 
ambitions and respond to the needs and rights of an increasingly diverse population 
(Kvist, Fritzell, Hvinden and Kangas 2012; Lister 2009; Siim 2013). Empirical studies of 
the link between a particular welfare regime, or particular welfare arrangements, and 
their actual implications for people with a migrant and minority ethnic background 
are, nevertheless, quite unusual. The very conceptualisation of the welfare state has 
also often been overlooked in the analyses of obstacles to equality and social justice 
for people with a migrant and minority ethnic background. Each welfare state has its 
own language and legacy of nation-building which impinges upon the ways in which 
migrants and minorities are structurally subordinated.
We know that the migration issue has been a dividing policy line in the Nordic 
countries. Sweden and Denmark have, in particular, drifted in different directions, 
in spite of their similar welfare political structures (Brochmann and Hagelund 
2012). Increasing fine-grained analyses of the lived citizenship and local practices of 
people are needed when we want to understand the complexity and consequences of 
ethno-cultural subordination in contemporary welfare states. While not supporting 
David Miller’s hierarchy of solidarities, that we have primary ethical obligations to 
co-nationals, it is a valid argument that: ‘Rather than dismissing nationality out of 
hand once we discover that national identities contain elements of myth, we should 
ask what part these myths play in building and sustaining nations. For it may not be 
rational to discard beliefs, even if they are, strictly speaking, false’ (Miller 1997: 36).
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6.5  Dynamics of Roma activist participatory encounters in Finnish 
society
The second part of this contribution is based on empirical research on Roma activism 
in the Nordic welfare state, with a predominant focus on Finland. My normative 
argument is that transformative approaches to citizenship are fundamental if we 
want to move beyond an affirmative politics of recognition and enhance effective 
claims-making by systematically subordinated groups. In their efforts to challenge 
the hegemonic order the Roma risk facing different modes of political assimilation 
or exclusion from the public sphere (Young 2000; Tully 2005). The dynamics of such 
mechanisms will be discussed below. 
Drawing on in-depth qualitative interviews with Roma activists, this contribution 
explores contemporary constraints of the political-institutional framework to 
transformative power for a minority ethnic group marked by a strong and continuous 
legacy of social injustice. The Finnish data is contextualised through a discussion on 
Roma and Traveller activism and state policy in Sweden and Norway. The analysis 
focuses on the ways in which Roma activists make sense of and account for their 
agency and participation in the Finnish public sphere. The data constitutes 17 
in-depth interviews. Ten Roma activists were interviewed in 2003 and 2004, seven of 
which were re-interviewed in 2009. The participants are men and women of different 
ages and regional backgrounds. ‘Political activist’ is used in a broad sense referring 
to individuals engaged for example in various advisory boards, NGOs as well as in 
the mainstream or minority media. Due to the very small number of activist Roma 
in Finland, I have not included any descriptive information in the quotes (for more 
details, see Nordberg 2006a; 2007).1
Despite an increasingly active trans-national Roma movement, Finnish Roma 
activism has traditionally been featured by a seemingly tame civil society, strongly 
intertwined with state bureaucracy. Notwithstanding a continuous marginalisation 
and oppression of Roma, more radical claims for justice have rarely occurred in the 
public debate (Nordberg 2006a, 2006b). The Roma arrived in Finland via Sweden and 
from the east in the late 16th century. Since that time their position has been marked by 
disengagement, persecution and oppression - not different from the situation in most 
other countries (Hancock 1987; Fraser 1995). The late 19th Century era of nation-state 
building was preoccupied by the shaping of a moral and decent citizenry. The Roma 
were placed in work camps and their culture and language were generally the targets 
of strong assimilationist policies (Vehmas 1961; Grönfors 1977; Pulma 2006). National 
bard Zacharias Topelius included within the Finnish citizenry the Swedish-speakers, 
1 Within a larger research project, studies were also conducted from a top-down perspective, analy-
sing parliamentary and media debates on boundary-drawing related to Roma citizenship (Nordberg 
2007; 2006b). 
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Karelians, Lapps, Russians, Germans and the Norwegians, while explicitly excluding 
the Jews and the Roma (Häkkinen and Tervonen 2005: 8).
Not until the 1960s with the general radicalisation of politics, did the harsh 
policies gradually begin to change. The housing situation was still alarming, 
authorities routinely took Roma children into custody and the Roma ‘lifestyle’ was 
still conceived as problematic. In society at large the Roma were typically seen as 
non-working and non-contributory, although they occupied significant positions 
in various ’dirty’ segments of the labour market (Nordberg 2010). The Roma 
nevertheless got their own representation in the Advisory Board for Gypsy Affairs 
(later: the Advisory Board for Romani Affairs), a result of increasing activism within 
the young Roma movement. The Advisory Board was established as an institution 
with members representing different Ministries and Roma NGOs. Over the years there 
has been an increasing share of Roma members and today they constitute half of 
the Board. Notwithstanding a comparatively large number of Roma NGOs, they have 
been organised around specific issues, such as the elderly, children and religion and 
none of them have been very successful in mobilising members more broadly. Roma 
NGOs are not particularly political nor have they to a large extent engaged with non-
Roma political and welfare institutions or the dominant media. The Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health launched a new National Policy Programme on Roma in 2009 with 
the specific ambition of targeting participation and agency. 
The next section of the article uses interviews with Roma activists to highlight the 
ways in which activists acknowledge the hegemonic political-institutional framework 
in their claims for justice. I want to draw particular attention to the micro-level of 
Roma claims-making as articulated in research interviews and to the specific claims 
made by contemporary Roma Activists.
6.5.1  The rationales of political agency
The interviewed Roma activists articulate demands for social justice within a 
redistributive paradigm, hyphenating issues of poverty, unemployment and 
interrupted educational paths. These concrete markers of a subordinated citizenship 
have been acknowledged by public authorities and policy-makers since the birth of 
the welfare state, in various initiatives to improve the position of Roma in Finnish 
society and to prevent social exclusion and marginalisation. Furthermore, and to a 
larger degree, the Roma bring attention to a paradigm of respect and recognition, 
and to a justice rationale.2 According to Roma activists, experiences of second class 
2 A comparatively less accentuated focus on socio-economic claims-making in the interviews is not 
necessarily due to a lacking concern for redistributive issues. It can be interpreted as a desire to coun-
teract earlier social problems based connotations to Roma identity (Nordberg 2006a).
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citizenship among the Roma people and a subsequent low self-esteem are seen as 
detrimental not only to the capacity to participate in the culture and the institutions 
of the dominant society, but also to the motivation to do so: 
The Roma really have that strong basic belief, like they do not really believe that they actually 
could have an impact on anything. It is like a kind of - and that is largely due to our history - dist-
rust in others, in other than our own people. It lives on and is still effective. While today, starting 
in the 1990s, we see a breaking point, there is very little that actually has changed.
Parekh, in his argument for integrating a politics of redistribution with a politics 
of recognition, concludes that long-oppressed groups needs confidence, a sense of 
self-worth, to make change and escape their economic predicament  (Parekh 2004: 
206). Axel Honneth (1995; 2003) in particular, has brought attention to group-specific 
recognition as creating a basis for self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem, a 
dimension which is less strongly emphasised in Fraser’s (2003) work. The participants 
in the interview study are particularly concerned with the effects of a subordinated 
citizenship status on the agency of the group of young Roma who are not participating 
in the dominant society, neither in the Roma community.
Some of our young people are really badly marginalised, involved in drug abuse and those things. 
And it is no longer about a sound Roma culture but they relate to some really ancient traditions 
and customs and confront the majority in a very aggressive and arrogant way. It seems to have 
increased during the last decade or so, like ‘this is the school of the gadje, it is not our school’. 
In that group where those bad things are happening, that is where they look for recognition. 
If one is not accepted in the dominant society… 
People who do not have access, or do not prefer, to participate in established institutions 
or political fora usually find other ways to resist their subordination. Particularly 
socially excluded and ‘non-Finnishised’ Roma with weak access to dominant cultural 
codes have been closed out from participation. While many Roma would not even 
choose to participate in the different decision-making structures available, such as 
the Advisory Board, the consensualist institutional culture nevertheless narrows 
the potential scope of differentiated positions and perspectives (Young 2000), and, 
has become an obstacle to transformative power. A particular feature of Finnish 
civil society has been its close connection to public elite institutions (Stenius 1983). 
Previous research has identified a strong similarity in the language of claims used by 
Roma activists and that used by the majority background policy makers when making 
claims for social justice (Nordberg 2006b, 2007), even though the majority elite, 
substantially, has been almost exclusively concerned with issues of redistribution 
and not with recognition, belonging and emotional notions of citizenship.
Potentially more radical, often young, grass-root activists are excluded from 
arenas of public negotiation. Some of the more critical activists also ask themselves 
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whether the Roma NGOs are democratic and open enough to take young non-
established Roma onboard:
Can Roma organisations really attract the young? Very easily the middle-aged keep all the strings 
to themselves. On the other hand, this access to power, to all of us it is still quite new/.../ we 
have acquired a position /…/ Easily one thinks of oneself as more important than what would be 
necessary. Well, maybe we are not good enough in providing space for the young ones. But for 
us it is somehow easier as we have been around these circles and we speak the same language…
As the quote suggests, the institutionalised collaboration between Roma NGOs and 
authority actors has made it difficult to access power for people who do not ‘speak this 
same language’, subsequently increasing the hierarchy between elite activists and 
those who have not transgressed the ‘cultural and communicative codes’ (Armstrong 
1982). Although Finnish rather than Romani is the mother tongue of Finnish Roma, 
the Finnish used by the Roma in every-day life differs from that of the majority grass-
root activists. While similar linguistic barriers are familiar from political mobilisation 
more broadly, the language constitutes an additional challenge for the Roma. The 
Finnish spoken by the Roma differs from the majority Finnish in terms of phraseology, 
as well as sentence structure (e.g. Borin and Vuorela 1998):
Well, I do think that while many Roma have lots of needs /…/ they do not necessarily bother to 
bring them up, because a so called ordinary Rom does not have the skills to justify things, to 
make a proper case about what it is all about, and the Roma identity is still really stigmatised.
The experience of not having access to an efficient voice with which to express 
one’s claims, has arguably been constraining for what Fraser (1997) calls a parity 
of participation. The group of activists are increasingly middle-class Roma with 
comparatively weaker connections to the every-day life of the most subordinated 
Roma citizens (see also Trehan 2009)3. The narrow political representation constitutes 
an escalating problem of legitimacy. One of the activists who has been working closely 
with Roma families at the grass-root level concludes that the remoteness of the elite 
activists from the grass-roots makes it less likely that they will identify ‘real issues’ 
and bring them forward in different political bodies:
It really is a problem, like I know for instance how much racism and other form of abuse people 
experience here at the grass-root level, in their every-day lives. And then, when nobody does 
anything, takes things forward, they may never change.
3 Nidi Trehan (2009) has analysed the ways in which an ‘NGOization’ of rights discourses in Europe 
can act to silence grass-root voices in preference for elite voices.
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The Roma activists draw attention to the ways in which misrecognition in the form 
of status subordination has contributed to a three-fold mode of inefficient agency, 
with an elite being assimilated into the dominant structures of Finnish society, with 
the mass remaining outside public policy-making and with a growing sector resisting 
in a non-tolerated way. All these obstacles to transformative power relate, in various 
ways, to limits of the public sphere, something which will be further elaborated in the 
subsequent section.
6.5.2  The limits of the public sphere in Finland
Institutional cultures and practices are constantly transforming, but the strong 
legacy of consensualism seems to be continuously effective within Finnish political 
institutions, not the least in majority-minority collaborations (Kettunen 2008).4 
Finnish Roma activists in general valorise their close companionship with authorities, 
arguing that it is the only way to take things forward and to substantially get access 
to power and decision-making. When explicitly asked, activists strongly object to the 
idea of a more autonomous civil society: 
There is really no point in messing around on our own. When authority actors waken and we do 
things together, then it starts happening, then we can actually have an influence.
Suvi Keskinen (2009) has raised concern about the exclusive mechanisms of the 
welfare state, suggesting that a strong commitment to universality, similarity and 
an ‘implicit’ majority perspective, together with a consensual ethos, result in little 
space for discussion and questioning of nation-building in the Nordic countries. The 
mobilisation of nation-building rhetoric has been particularly evident in Finland 
due to the legacy of a young and vulnerable nation-state with a rather recent history 
of violent internal political conflict (Stenius 1983). In such rhetoric also the Roma 
minority has created its own space. 
We should not forget that the Finnish state /…/ has taken exceptionally good care of the Roma 
people. Regardless of all the prejudice and attitudes, we have created this independent country 
together. Strong values are coming from that and those values have always had an impact on 
decision-makers in their decisions. Finnish decision-makers have really had a positive attitude 
towards the Roma.
4 Pauli Kettunen (2008) has argued that compared to the other Nordic countries, it has been less 
legitimate in Finland to see the state as being ‘shaped and used as instrument according to changing 
political power relations’ (p. 5). Rather, politics in Finland has been assumed to put into force the 
agency of the state – ‘the instance defining and meeting national necessities’ (p. 6-7).
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Rogers Brubaker (2001) in his study of changing rhetoric on assimilation in France, 
Germany and the U.S, has argued that assimilation has been transformed from seeing 
immigrant populations as moldable, meltable objects to active subjects. Assimilation 
is then not something ‘done to persons, but rather something accomplished by them, 
not intentionally, but as an unintended consequence of myriad individual actions 
and choices in particular social, cultural, economic and political contexts’ (Brubaker 
2001: 543). The case of the Roma in Finland illustrates how less than two decades of 
formal recognition has contributed to a fear of losing these newly broken grounds, 
limiting the scope of more radical struggle and negotiation. Contemporary Roma 
activists are generally the first generation to collaborate with public authorities and it 
has mostly been a beneficial partnership. During the last decades the position of the 
Roma has significantly improved, in a comparative perspective.
Activists have, using Tully’s (2005) conceptualisation, been assimilated into a 
public sphere shaped by institutional consensualism and a broader communitarianist 
framework emphasising the common history and the values attached to the Finnish 
nation-building project.
6.6  State policy and Roma and Traveller mobilisation in Sweden 
and Norway
With the emphasis of this contribution being on the social category of ‘Roma’, it 
is understood as encompassing the various groups identified and/or identifying 
themselves as Roma, Romani and Travellers in English. There are groups with different 
historical legacies and contemporary political trajectories in the different countries. 
Nonetheless, a common denominator has been the stigmatised and subordinated 
position within society at large. Social policies, and later the emerging welfare state, 
have strongly influenced policies and legislation on Roma and Travellers in all Nordic 
countries. 
In Finland, as well as in Sweden and Norway, the state set about its aim of 
exterminating Roma and/or Traveller culture, conceived as a threat to the social 
and moral order. In Sweden and Norway, policies have more clearly been targeted at 
vagrancy and poverty, due to the presence of ‘Travellers’. Policy-makers in Sweden 
and Norway have been preoccupied with placing different groups of Roma and 
Travellers in different social categories. Authority measures and policies have been 
adapted to these categorisations. ‘Swedish Gypsies’ arrived in Sweden around the 
turn of the 19th Century, During the 1940s they were divided into zigenare (Gypsies) 
and tattare (Tatars, Travellers), the latter being considered a social group formed 
by individuals who did different kinds of stigmatised and ‘dirty’ work (Montesino 
Parra, 2010). Travellers are also a distinctive group in Norway, organised as the 
Romani people (Halvorsen 2002), whereas a Travelling population has not been as 
visible in Finland. Another element of social categorisation policies implies the post 
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World War II, differentiation of ‘foreign Gypsies’ from ‘national Gypsies’ in Sweden. 
(Montesino Parra, 2010). The final section of the paper shows that, in spite of the 
different histories and the different social categories of Roma and Travellers, the logic 
of assimilation has been similar in Finland, Sweden and Norway. Roma and Traveller 
policy has been part of a larger social policy project aiming at creating order, stability 
and homogeneisation through controlling vagrant and socio-culturally ‘deviant’ 
groups.
6.6.1  Social policy, education and subordinated agency in Sweden
In Sweden, the Travelling population was the main target group of such socio-
political inventions during the first half of the 20th Century. The aggressive politics 
culminated between the 1920s to 1940s when Travellers and other vagrant groups 
became the objects of harsh racial and sterilisation policy initiatives (Hazell 2002; 
Pulma 2006). Two decades later, after the Second World War, there was a shift in 
focus from the category of Travellers to Roma/Gypsies, which generated a specific 
and restricted field of state intervention. There was also a shift in policy emphasis 
from exclusion to inclusion, which was to be advanced through strategic assimilation 
targeted to the education of children and the young (Montesino Parra 2010). The 
majority driven Stiftelsen svensk zigenarmission (the ‘Gypsy Mission’) was a dominant 
actor, actively engaged in the maintenance of ‘camp schools’ for the Roma. The poor 
conditions in the Roma camps were a key incentive to the activation of Swedish 
Roma mobilisation (Montesino Parra 2002: 120-122). In the early 1950s, a government 
committee concluded that education and improved (settled) housing conditions had 
to be the main targets of Roma policy; there was a clear objective to assist the Roma in 
their transformation into decent working citizens who could adapt to modern life. Not 
until the 1960s did the housing conditions improve and the Roma moved from camp 
sites to city apartments. At this time a social welfare apparatus emerged, maintained 
by consultants and social workers working with individuals and families (Pulma 
2006: 133, 224).
Eventually, the Roma family Taikon gained increasing influence in promoting the 
rights of the Roma in Swedish society. As in Finland, with the leftist radicalisation 
of politics, Roma activists were increasingly involved in a movement aiming to 
improve their own situation. An important breaking point was the 1962 publication 
of the biographic novel Zigenerska (‘Gypsy woman’) by writer and activist Katarina 
Taikon. She and her sister Rosa managed to give a public voice and a face to the Roma. 
They nevertheless collaborated closely with majority Swedish activists through the 
Zigenarsamfundet (the ‘Gypsy association’). The level of organisation among the 
Roma in general remained weak. Together with Professor Arne Trankell, Katarina 
Taikon brought attention to the need to improve and intensify Roma adult education, 
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bringing about a change in Roma policy from ethnologic assimilation to an ideology 
of social pedagogy (Montesino Parra 2002; 2010; Pulma, 2006: 138).   
Policy-makers and activists became aware of the importance of a recognised 
minority ethnic status. In the 1970s politicians and authorities ultimately declared 
that the focus should be on strengthening the voice of the Roma and involving 
them in decision-making (Pulma 2006: 145-149). Nevertheless, recent research 
indicates that Roma in Sweden are still subordinated to a second class citizenship. 
For example, a study by Rodell Olgac (2006) showed that Roma children still feel 
insecure in schools. Since more thorough research about the lived citizenship of the 
Roma is scarce, established presumptions about the Roma have remained influential 
for contemporary policy paradigms and grass-root perspectives have not been taken 
into account. Interventions are claimed to still be rooted in aims of adaptation and 
normalisation and social authorities have been accused of relying too much on 
a patronising stance with little result (see particularly Arnstberg 1998). Montesino 
Parra (2010) concludes that the Roma continuously have been categorised as a group 
requiring special measures based on special knowledge about the group. She is 
critical to the fact that the agency of the Roma themselves has been undermined in 
Swedish policy-making. The implementation of state policy is argued to have become 
a segment of employment predominantly for non-Roma during the decades of welfare 
state expansion.
6.6.2  Control, discipline and emerging resistance in Norway
While education and social policy have been in the forefront of Swedish assimilation 
and integration policy, the Romani Traveller (Tater) population in Norway was more 
strongly affected by measures to discipline families and children by family based 
labour-colonies and aggressive attempts to take children into public custody. The 
aim was to force the Romani to settle. Sociologist Eilert Sundt set off these policies 
in the late 19th century, followed by the priest Jacob Walnum and later in the 1940s, 
child protection became the target of the Norsk Misjon blant hemlöse (‘the Norwegian 
Mission among the homeless’). The mission continued its activities until the 
1980s (Minken 2009; Pettersen 2005). The Finnish equivalent to the Mission was 
predominantly concerned with taking Roma children away from their parents. The 
public image of the Romani as socially disabled, work-shy, irresponsible, non-reliable 
and criminals legitimised the assimilation policies of the Mission (Hvinden 2000). 
The policies culminated in legal measures to sterilise Romani women in the 1930s as 
part of the attempts to exterminate Romani culture and ways of living (Haave 2000). 
The assaults have gained substantial public attention during the last two decades, 
something which has mobilised individual Romani and Romani organisations around 
compensation claims targeted to the Norwegian state. Compensation has successfully 
been claimed for example for forced sterilisation and lost schooling opportunities, 
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even though it has been challenging for the Romani to acquire the bureaucratic 
capital required by decision-making bodies. The Romani have also been critical to 
the fact that the number of successful compensation claims has been low due to strict 
demands on documentation (Halvorsen 2004: 42). 
Rune Halvorsen found similar difficulties facing the Romani people in mobilising 
the grassroots as in the Finnish and Swedish case. Contemporary activism has 
been constrained by distrust within the group and a lack of a common agenda for 
claims-making other than that of the demands for compensation. He concludes that 
‘raising lawsuits against the state became an important part of the social mobilisation 
as this served to unite Travellers against the government’ (Halvorsen 2002: 222). 
Recent attempts to strengthen the recognition of Romani culture have been chiefly 
concerned with broadening the image of what it means to be a Romani but also with 
strengthening the Romani language (Halvorsen 2004: 47).
6.6.3  Diverging trajectories?
With the emerging Nordic welfare state in the late 1970s, ethno-political civil society 
started to lose its meaning and minority politics became part of the state machinery. 
Welfare state expansion drew on the presumption that the state was responsible for 
the welfare of the individual and being an ethnic minority was increasingly seen 
as a status entitling one to particular social rights. At the same time the grass-root 
movement lost much of its importance. When minority ethnic status is too closely 
linked to socio-political benefits, it risks narrowing and weakening the potential 
for societal participation (Pulma 2006: 202). Having said that, Roma and Traveller 
activist claims-making has partly taken different turns in the different countries. 
Even though the Finnish Roma have not been victims of systematic sterilisation as 
in Sweden and Norway, there is enough evidence of oppressive policies and practices 
to legitimise activist mobilisation around compensation claims for previous injustices. 
While the homogenising and disciplinary logic of the welfare state has framed 
Roma policy-making in rather similar ways in all countries, activist claims-making 
is additionally conditioned by the relationship between civil society and the state. 
In Finland, the strong connection between Roma civil society and state institutions 
has made the Roma reluctant to make claims against the state (Nordberg 2006a). In 
Finland civil organisations became organic parts of the consolidation of the nation. 
The civil war in 1918 accentuated the divisions between social classes for decades 
and the ruling bourgeoisie elite had to reunite the nation by the creation of a loyal 
and unified civil society (Stenius 1983: 119-121). Finnish political-institutional culture 
has evolved out of a legacy of conflict and compromise with less socio-democratic 
dominance than in other Nordic countries. There has been a stronger emphasis on 
instrumental necessity rhetoric and a tendency to depoliticise the social policy agenda 
(see Kroll 2005, for an empirical analysis). While Swedish Social Democrats claimed 
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a Third Way political position between Communism and Capitalism, Finland’s geo-
political situation between Sweden and the Soviet Union emphasised a pragmatic 
discourse on social reform drawing on rhetoric of functional needs (Kettunen 2006).
In Norway, the Romani have not only made claims for compensation but also 
been more critical to various politics of recognition, including being granted minority 
status. Formal recognition was understood as a form of forced categorisation and 
as a disciplinary measure which could reinforce social differentiation (Halvorsen 
2004: 56). Halvorsen concludes that the stigmatised position of the Romani people 
in Norway does not seem to generally have had a negative influence on the resistance 
towards state policies and initiatives, but the strong sense of vulnerability and shame 
has still, like in the Finnish case, weakened the mobilisation of a broader group of 
grass-root claimants (Halvorsen 2004: 106). 
The disciplinary and controlling elements embodied in the architecture of the 
Nordic welfare states have arguably contributed to the continuous injustice and 
oppression of Roma and Travellers. However, these structures do not independently 
explain the limited access to transformative power. The different trajectories of nation-
state building have evidently shaped differentiated political claims-making practices 
and outcomes. Moreover, the joint experience of misrecognition has evidently been 
constraining for broader grass-root driven struggles for social justice. 
6.7  Conclusion
Social justice should not be reduced to the level of distribution nor recognition. This 
may be particularly true with regard to a welfare state setting that emphasises a 
minority policy closely linked to socio-economic rights and redistribution. Whereas 
non-recognition and maldistribution are interdependent and intertwined in the 
everyday experiences of subordinated groups, it can be concluded that for analytical 
reasons, it is valuable to separate recognition issues as a distinct category when 
addressing social injustices. A dualist approach helps us to identify spheres of status 
subordination which would not be evident in a unifying theory of justice (Fraser 2003). 
Within the recognition framework, public policies have in particular been concerned 
with a re-evaluation of the Romani language in the Nordic countries. Finnish Roma 
activist narratives showed how self-respect and self-esteem have been fundamental 
obstacles to ‘participatory parity’; the emotional or psychological dimension has not 
effectively been conceptualised as a social justice claim in welfare state policies. A lack 
of attention to the recognition paradigm in general and to the emotional dimension 
in particular, has simultaneously been the result of and reinforced a rather narrow 
‘political expert’ agenda focusing on social rights, education, housing and welfare. It 
has been particularly detrimental to the fact that issues of contemporary racism have 
received fairly little attention. While redistributive issues are fundamental for the 
capacity to act as a citizen and are far from being solved, they are at least enacted in 
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the public sphere. ‘Participatory parity’ in itself is not necessarily enough to influence 
institutionalised inequality and subordination and to address difficult structural 
problems such as racism. Enhancing transformative power for Roma and Traveller 
actors in the Nordic public spheres would require a political-institutional framework 
which allows for more radical forms of agency and is open to a broad range of actors, 
including grass-root actors, with different perspectives and experiences. 
In this chapter, I have discussed the structural obstacles to transformative 
citizenship among Nordic, particularly Finnish, Roma today, arguing that the public 
sphere has either assimilated or excluded the Roma from effective political claims-
making that could challenge the social and symbolic order preventing the Roma from 
equal citizenship. Structural constraints to transformative agency have been activated 
in the dynamics between a disciplining and homogenising welfare state culture 
and consensualist political institutions. The Finnish Roma elite does hold a strong 
position in decision-making, or at least advice-making, on Roma issues, particularly 
through various public institutions such as the Advisory Board for Roma Affairs. 
Nonetheless, the participatory structures seem to have reproduced power-hierarchies 
between the elite actors and grass-roots. Class based social ordering is accentuated in 
a setting within which Roma elite activists collaborate in close companionship with 
state bureaucracy. There has been a substantial focus on the agency of citizens but 
not on the structural obstacles to agency.
The Roma issue at large is developing into one of the most severe, trans-national 
human right issues in contemporary Europe. In many post-communist countries, 
the Roma minority has been trapped in a vicious circle of collective expulsion with 
enormous difficulties to live an ordinary life, to settle, work and educate oneself. 
Escaping from poverty and persecution, Roma are increasingly using their right to 
free movement (see e.g. Sigona & Vermeersch 2012; Nacu 2009). The Roma ‘beggars’ 
are on a daily basis reminding Europe about one of the momentous moral issues of 
contemporary times. Nancy Fraser (2005; 2008) subsequently raises a valid question 
of whether the nation-state is the right ‘frame’ for the political representation of issues 
which are global and universal as to their roots. There is a case for a need to develop 
plural strategies targeted to exclusionary mechanisms on the local as well as on the 
trans-national level. 
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Reetta Toivanen
7  From Ignorance to Effective Inclusion: The Role of 
National Minorities within the Finnish Consensus 
Culture
7.1  Prologue
I am holding in my hand a rather new booklet, a booklet1 aiming to advise teachers 
in schools and kindergarten on how to treat Roma children in a correct and culture-
sensitive manner. The book aims at reducing barriers of cross-cultural understanding, 
and making teachers familiar with the Finnish Roma culture. The authors of the 
booklet underline that the Roma in Finland do have a different culture than the 
majority. Knowing this culture makes it easier for the teacher to take special care of 
the Roma child so that she or he will feel comfortable in the kindergarten and school. 
On page four of the booklet it explains that in Roma families there is a very traditional 
gendered sharing of household-work: women take care of the kitchen and house and 
men earn the living. On page six taboo topics are listed and the reader is informed that 
such issues as sexuality and normal physical activities should not be spoken about. 
The Finnish Roma are also told to have a different understanding of time, and this 
should be known by teachers. The booklet goes through specific features of Roma 
culture and also covers the term of ‘avoiding’. When a Roma kills or hurts another 
Roma, the perpetrator’s family needs to avoid by all means the family of the victim: 
this is explained as a means to pay respect to the victims’ family and therefore, it is 
noted, for example that children of the two families cannot attend the same school 
or kindergarten. After the rather culturalising tone of the booklet, it then stresses on 
page eight that ‘Not all Roma children are bound by culture!’ What does this kind 
of booklet tell us about Finnish society, the inhibited understandings of differing 
cultures within and its approach towards minority cultures?
This article discusses power relationships tied to the differing status positions 
of minority groups in a society in which decision-making is based on consensus: 
It addresses the ambivalence in a polity torn between a strong governmental 
(and societal) commitment to shared power in the name of equality and a weak 
inclination toward accommodation of diversity. The empirical material stems 
from research with two national minorities in Finland, the Sámi and the Roma. 
The main question concerns participation in the creation of the agenda behind 
decision-making processes: why certain interests (of minorities) do not find a way 
1 Romanilapsen ja –nuoren elämää, tapoja ja kulttuuria, Ovet Auki –projekti, Kalevaprint 2007, 
available also: http://www2.luovi.fi/ovet_auki/documents/opettajille.pdf, accessed in August 2010.
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to be articulated in the Finnish public sphere and whether the ‘closed' agenda of 
what can be articulated leads to non-participation among minority members on 
the one side and strengthens systemic and structural discrimination on the other 
side. 
7.2  Equality mainstreaming or societal strait-jacket?
In her article titled ‘The unfitting Sámi' (in orig. ‘sopimattomat saamelaiset'), Marjut 
Aikio (2006:21) argues that racism in Finland takes other forms than elsewhere. 
Reframing Erik Allardt's 40 year old statement, she goes on saying that in Finland 
any difference is in a systemic manner illicit and that Finnish society can only deal 
with a unity. According to her, that is the case, even though this unity is generally 
recognised as artificial. An artificial homogeneity is conceived as a convenient base 
for a conflict-free society. Similar arguments can be found in a book by Boxberg and 
Heikka (2009) who contend that there is not even a need for corruption in a country 
like Finland where the power relations are so clearly defined that power must not be 
articulated publicly.
Where power is invisible, it works most effectively. According to Garland 
(interpreting Foucault) power refers to ‘the various forms of domination and 
subordination and the asymmetrical balance of forces which operate whenever and 
wherever social relations exist’ (Garland 1990:138). ‘[P]ower reaches into the very 
grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into their very actions 
and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes, and everyday lives’ (Foucault 
1980:39). Steven Lukes (1974/2007) discusses in his groundbreaking book Power – A 
Radical View what he calls the third dimension of power or a radical view on power. 
This is the power ‘to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by 
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept 
their role in the existing order of things’.
Power is something that can be associated with a term that Pierre Bourdieu has 
called habitus: ‘the habitual, patterned ways of understanding, judging, and acting 
[…]’, ‘[…] habitus is what gives the groups they compose consistency’ (Terdiman 
1987:812-3). This habitus concept is useful when explaining that there are forms or 
modes of power, which silently formulate people to the norms of how they are to 
be, to behave, to feel without open or visible coercion forcing them to transform. 
To put it bluntly, habitus describes such forms of power which operate in the 
invisibility without causing any reasons to object to them. If there is such a thing 
as a consensual power sphere building on agreements by people guiding them 
without forcing them to follow certain life modes, the question then raised is how 
can we understand power’s ‘work’ in a society characterised by diversity? Lukes’ 
third dimension can be used to describe the situation of a society as a whole where 
‘there can be no personalities that are formed independently of [power’s] effects’ 
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(Lukes 2007:92). This means that power affects all members of a society but the 
question in this contribution is how it affects people in different status positions. 
So what is then the case when we move to think about power in the context of 
minority-majority relationships in a democratic setting? My assumption is that 
power ‘works’ differently among those belonging to a titular nation and those who 
identify themselves as minority members. 
Bud Khleif (1993) introduced the concept ‘minoritised’ which he uses in order 
to illustrate that no one chooses to have less power. This means that nobody wants 
to belong to a minority if there are chances to have a position with more power. The 
word also implies the existence of an active element: somebody makes someone 
a minority, it is not in the nature of some people to be in a marginal position. 
They are marginalised and through the process of marginalisation, they become 
minoritised. The question is who marginalises ‘them’ and why, can obviously be 
answered with the aid of Michael Mann (1999) or Claus Offe (1996) who point to 
the democracy deficit which is inherent to any democratically formed polity. In 
its core, any democracy is constituted by undemocratic means but the level of 
democracy, meaning rule by people, can grow or deepen to include more and more 
people, ideas, and forms of power.2 According to this understanding, those who 
are excluded from a national identity building process and bestowed a position of 
being the ‘other’ in the setting of a generally accepted national unity, constitute 
the segment called minorities. There are different kinds of minorities and their 
relationship to the segment deemed the majority varies: whereas some are closer to 
power, others are heavily marginalised. 
This article discusses these varying power relationships tied to the differing 
status positions of constructed minority groups. As a case study, it addresses the 
ambivalence in the Finnish polity torn between a strong governmental (and societal) 
commitment to shared power in the name of equality and a weak inclination toward 
the accommodation of diversity. The empirical material stems from my long-term 
research with two national minorities in Finland, the Sámi and the Roma. The main 
question concerns participation in the creation of the agenda behind decision-making 
processes: why certain interests (of minorities) do not find a way to be articulated in 
the Finnish public sphere and whether the ‘closed' agenda of what can be articulated 
leads to non-participation among minority members on the one side and strengthens 
systemic and structural discrimination on the other side. What does it mean for 
minorities' perspectives when the context of identity politics is ambivalent: when 
the official policy stresses equality but the public atmosphere is hostile towards 
difference? 
2 See here also Hannah Arendt on how new ideas and agendas get into the public sphere which is 
controlled by a certain segment of a society.
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7.3  Minorities in Finland
For a long time, Finland has been described as one of the most homogenous 
countries of Europe (Saukkonen 2010). It was the low number of foreign-born 
persons living in Finland, which made this argument a truism. Also the self-
image of Finland continues to underline that Finland is a culturally and socially 
homogenous country where all difference is considered as an exception (Lepola 
2000). Even if the self-image hasn’t changed, the population structure has: Between 
1990 and 2009, the number of foreign citizens legally residing in Finland increased 
six-fold. The number of foreigners in Finland in the beginning of the 1990s was 
26,300; today 155,700 foreign persons reside in Finland (Tanner 2011). According to 
the 2008 statistics, Finland had the seventh lowest proportion of foreign citizens in 
total population of all the EU-27 countries. One half of the foreign citizens live in the 
capital city area.3
The official state languages of Finland are Finnish with 4,836,183 speakers 
and Swedish with 289,951 (5.4 per cent) speakers.4 The official national minority 
languages include three different Sámi languages (Northern, Inari, and Skoltsámi), 
Romani, Tatar, Russian, Yiddish and Karelian.5 The constitution also guarantees 
rights to the speakers of each of the Sámi indigenous language which altogether 
have 1778 (0.03 per cent) registered mother tongue speakers. The number of Sámi 
people is estimated to be 9400 persons out of whom 60 per cent live outside the 
Sámi homeland territories in which Sámi enjoy specific rights.6 The Roma and other 
language groups’ rights are laid down in a separate law on language. The number of 
Roma speakers is estimated at 4000, which amounts to less than 50 per cent of the 
total Roma population in Finland (Granqvist 2006; Hedman 2008).
3 Statistics Finland: The population development of regions is going into different directions, pub-
lished 30. September 2010.
4 The Swedish and Finnish language should enjoy similar protection which is further clarified 
by law. The municipalities in Finland can be either monolingual Finnish, monolingual Swedish, 
bilingual with a Finnish majority, bilingual with a Swedish majority or bilingual on voluntary 
decision. A municipality is designated bilingual if the population includes both Finnish and Swe-
dish speakers and the minority comprises at least eight percent of the population or at least 
3000 persons. A bilingual municipality is designated unilingual if the minority comprises less 
than 3000 persons and its proportion has decreased below six percent. Language Act 423/2003, 
chapter 1, sector 5.
5 The European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages and the Advisory Committee of the Framework 
Convention on National minorities consider also the other official language of Finland, namely Swe-
dish, as de facto minority language. Finnish European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, http://
fiblul.huset.fi/etusivu.
6 Saamelaiskäräjät 2008, Koulutusraportti 1/2008 (The Education Report of the Sámi Parliament of 
Finland).
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Other languages account for 3.6 per cent of the population of Finland. There are 
now 30 different foreign-language groups with at least 1000 speakers in Finland.7 Over 
the last decade, due to immigration, the number of Russian speakers has increased to 
the largest foreign language in Finland with 51,683 speakers.8
The ethnic composition follows the lines of language communities. In 1995, the 
Sámi as an indigenous people secured a constitutional reform for cultural autonomy 
in their home region.9 90 per cent of the land in the Sámi homeland area is owned 
by the state: the constant extractive industries, notably mining and forestry, have 
created a situation in which one cannot gain a livelihood with the traditional 
practices of reindeer herding and fishing. At present 70 per cent of the Sámi children 
aged 11-24 live outside the Sámi territory and lack education in their mother tongue 
(Saamelaiskäräjät 2009).
The Roma children face several difficulties starting with access to education and 
continuing with racism. 70 per cent of the Roma still value highly their own mother 
tongue, but at the moment only 8.5 per cent of Roma children enjoy the right to mother 
tongue teaching provided by the law (Hedman 2008). Meanwhile, according to the 
Finnish Association of Russian-Speaking Organisations FARO, Russian speakers, 
very often due to discrimination, avoid using Russian in public places. There are 
also 10,647 Somali speakers in Finland who, along with others who have a differing 
appearance, face racism both at work and in public.
The Non-Discrimination Act was adopted in Finland in 2004.10 Its material scope 
is wide and it covers several grounds of discrimination: age, ethnic or national origin, 
nationality, language, religion, belief, opinion, health, disability, sexual orientation or 
other personal characteristics. Different governmental bodies monitor the realisation 
of that law: The Ombudsman for Minorities (ethnic origin) supported by the Advisory 
Body for Minority Affairs, the Discrimination Board, the Parliamentary Ombudsman 
and Chancellor of Justice, the Ombudsman for Equality (sex, gender and gender 
identity), the Ombudsman for Children and the Sámi Parliament. Discrimination 
7 Statistics Finland: Review of the population structure of Finland 2009, published on 30. Septem-
ber 2010, http://www.stat.fi/til/vaerak/2009/01/vaerak_2009_01_2010-09-30_kat_001_en.html, ac-
cessed in February 2011.
8 Finland has a traditional ‘old’ Russian minority of ca. 3000 persons which enjoys special protec-
tion. Finland has made a distinction between the Old Russians and the New Russians. For instance, 
Finland has considered that the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities de 
facto covers the former but not the latter group.
9 The section 121 of the constitution says: ‘In their native region, the Sami have linguistic and cultural 
self-government, as provided by an Act.’ The Act on the Sami Parliament was enacted on 17.07.1995, 
last amended 30.12.2002, (974/1995), http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1995/en19950974.
10 Yhdenvertaisuuslaki / Non-discrimination Act 20.01.2004/21, entered into force 01.02.2004, last 
amended 20.02.2009/84. Translated with amendments until January 2010, http://www.finlex.fi/en/
laki/kaannokset/2004/en20040021.pdf, last visited February 2011.
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in the field of employment is monitored by several labour protection districts. In 
addition to the Advisory Board for Minority Affairs, there are also Advisory Boards for 
Sámi Affairs, for Ethnic Relations, Romani Affairs, Disability11, Rehabilitation Affairs, 
Youth Affairs and Ageing and Pensioners’s Affairs.
7.4  Finnish commitment to equality and the practice of ignorance
The Finnish ministries, municipalities and towns follow a horizontal approach that 
addresses discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, age, language, religion 
or belief, disability, sexual orientation, and multiple discriminations (Aaltonen, 
Joronen and Villa 2009). This horizontal approach12 is tangible in the Finnish 
revised Non-Discrimination Act, which puts the principle of mainstreaming all fields 
of public administration in its centre, and applies non-discrimination policies to 
all fields of societal life.13 The primary mainstreaming tools consist of developing 
non-discrimination programmes for different authorities, the public sector and 
private sector, awareness raising, education and developing methods of detecting 
discrimination (Mahler, Mihr and Toivanen 2009). It has been argued that when non-
discrimination and mainstreaming are underlying principles they can, especially in 
such a consensual society as Finland, be ignored easily (Mahler 2009). It is important 
to remember that even in the 1980s, human rights was a ‘non-issue’ due to the 
political circumstances entailed by Finland’s close and complicated relationship with 
the Soviet Union.14 Human rights as a concept was interpreted in a socialist manner 
as a political tool of the ‘West’. After Finland joined the Council of Europe in 1991 
and the European Union in 1995, human rights has become a popular concept: the 
commitment to human rights standards can be found in many policy papers and 
governmental proposals. The commitment to human rights and non-discrimination 
are today found in almost every single Finnish policy paper or educational plan. 
For example, on the internet page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs it says: ‘(…) 
Finland belongs to a value community, which is based on democracy, the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights. One of the purposes of Finland’s foreign policy 
11 The correct name of the institution dealing with concerns of disabled is National Council on Disa-
bility.
12 Horizontal approach means that the government opted for a broad legislative approach rather 
than a specific law. The main tool of combating discrimination according the horizontal approach is 
in the mainstreaming of human rights provisions. Finland has since the adoption of the Non-discrimi-
nation Act, followed the principle of mainstreaming in all fields of administration.
13 Equality and non-discrimination: Definitions and Concepts, see www.equality.fi, accessed in May 
2010.
14 On the development of human rights law and politics in Finland, see i.e., Scheinin 1989.
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is to also emphasise the importance of these values internationally.’15 The new core 
curriculum is introduced by the National Board of Education with the emphasis on 
‘(Its) underlying values of basic education are human rights, equality, democracy’.16
According to recent polls, Finland indeed reveals an ambivalent picture of the 
nation. When on the one hand Finnish people value high levels of equality and 
they see it as one of the key markers of Finnish society,17 the attitudes of Finnish 
people towards foreigners and all other minorities have grown more rigid over the 
last decade (Jaakkola 2009). According to Eurobarometer 296,18 15 per cent of the 
population in Finland has experienced discrimination or harassment during the 
last year. Numerically most discrimination was experienced according to age and 
sex, whereas relatively most discrimination was experienced by members of ethnic 
groups. A larger group has witnessed discrimination (30 per cent) than report to 
have been subjected to it. 65 per cent of Finnish people felt that discrimination on 
the grounds of ethnicity is normal or very normal and ethnic discrimination was 
considered as the most common form of discriminatory behavior. Regarding causes 
of discrimination, 49 per cent believed that sexual orientation caused discrimination, 
45 per cent attributed discrimination to disability and 43 per cent thought that age 
caused discrimination. Only 27 per cent thought that religion and 25 per cent that 
gender leads to discrimination. In 2008 the results of another Eurobarometer19 
dealing with discrimination were published. Here Finnish people reported that they 
had experienced discrimination on the grounds of age and ethnicity (21 per cent), 
disability (17 per cent), religion or belief (11 per cent) and sexual orientation (7 per 
cent), with 21 per cent reporting multiple sources of discrimination. 
There is, however, very little litigation involving racist crimes and 
discrimination compared to the amount of potential cases, in comparison to 
these percentages. The major problem is that in Finland, reporting the case to 
the police, an ombudsman or to a lawyer (or in the case of discrimination at work 
to the occupational safety and health representative or a union representative) 
in order to file a lawsuit against the perpetrator, is exceedingly difficult for 
15 On Finlands foreign and security policy: http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=322
80&contentlan=2&culture=en-US, accessed in February 2011.
16 Finnish National Board of Education: New Core Curricula, http://www.oph.fi/english/sources_
of_information/articles_and_presentations/101/new_national_core_curricula, accessed in February 
2011.
17 Suomen Gallup: Suomalaiset väheksyvät poliittisia oikeuksiaan (Finns downgrade their political 
rights). Research by the Finnish Gallup for national Broadcasting Company YLE, published 6.12.2007, 
see http://yle.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/2007/12/gallup_suomalaiset_vaheksyvat_poliittisia_oikeuksia-
an_259633.html, accessed in May 2010.
18 Discrimination in the European Union. Perceptions, Experiences and Attitudes. Special Euroba-
rometer 296.
19 Discrimination in the European Union. Analytical report. Flash Eurobarometer 232.
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people who are by definition marginalised (Aaltonen, Joronen and Villa 2008:39). 
For example, the Office of the Ombudsman for Minorities tackled 737 cases of 
potential discrimination in the year 2007, but the police received only 47 suspected 
discrimination crime cases (ibid p. 36; Vähemmistövaltuutetun vuosikertomus 
2007). Another problem is that the recognition of racism and discrimination is 
exceedingly difficult for members of a majority who do not want to challenge 
the image of the country as a harmonious space. This is linked to the fact that 
forbidding discrimination (litigation on various grounds of discrimination) has 
been less attractive in Finnish society than giving policy advice on equality 
(Aaltonen, Joronen and Villa 2009). Finnish people do know their rights better 
than many other citizens of the EU, but the hurdle of bringing cases to court is 
high: discrimination cases are a particular rarity for Finnish judges (ibid). The 
inactivity to evoke minority rights and anti-discrimination law can be at least 
partly explained by the lack of human rights education in Finland: the majority 
population neither knows and recognises difference nor understands the reasons 
for differential treatment (Toivanen 2007).
The Finnish state and the municipal authorities view human rights and non-
discrimination activities positively but they have taken a passive stand (Aaltonen, 
Joronen and Villa 2009:15). The longer that authorities remain inactive, the more 
invisible difference is at stake: Gender, sexual minorities, religious groups or the 
Sámi do not seem to require non-discrimination action. When it comes to visible 
phenomena such as disability, race and immigration, authorities are more prepared 
for active policies. The common attitude among authorities towards minorities, 
often implicit, but sometimes expressed explicitly, is that minorities should not 
complain because the state is doing everything possible to enhance their situation. 
For example, in the Finnish Human Rights Forum 2009, the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Alexander Stubb was visibly upset by the claim of some people from the 
audience that the freedom of speech is regularly infringed in Finland. He said: ‘But 
really, do you know anybody in Finland who could not say whatever they wanted in 
this country?’20
Finland has strived to become ranked as a model country for minority 
treatment. The power hegemony is tangible in the way in which the government 
engages in international arenas in the development of minority protection. The 
rights of minorities are also stipulated in the reformed constitution of 1999. The 
belief among those holding power to the just regulation and shared power is very 
strong and the myth of the equal society is as strong as the belief in it. Because the 
majority of Finns, including many who are in a marginalised position, accept as 
20 Personal notes 01.10.2009. Human Rights Forum is organised by the Finnish League for Human 
Rights to address human rights in Finland. The event is popular for Members of Parliament who all 
can show off their commitment to human rights there.
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true that societal peace can be best maintained by believing in the general shared 
commitment to equality, bringing up themes which would challenge this view is 
fraught with difficulty. Finland is leading the European statistics on bullying in 
the workplace, the number being twice as high than the European average21 and 
there are reports underlining the situation that in Finland people try not to express 
difference or differing opinions in order to maintain the so-called ‘societal peace’ 
or an image of such (Vartia et al. 2008). If you belong to a group that has become 
minoritised, whether sexual and gender minorities, visible immigrants or refugees 
or national minorities, both institutional and individual power relationships look 
different than the perspective of people belonging to the ‘mainstream’, majority 
population. In the following I will tackle these challenges of addressing power 
in a consensual society with a rather short history of transparent democratic 
structures by using the examples of two different minorities, the Roma and the 
Sámi. 
7.5  The Sami and the Roma in Finland: Two unlike minority 
populations
In this section, I will use the case studies of the Finnish Roma minority22 and those 
Sámi indigenous people who live in the Finnish area of Sápmi23 to illustrate something 
that could, according to Lukes (2005), be called invisible power. Invisibility means 
here, that power takes such forms that it does not need to be openly executed but it 
is hidden in structures of society and influences the self-perception and strategies 
of people. We could speak here also about structural or systemic discrimination 
as the official names go. I however, think that using the term discrimination here 
would distract from the situation where the intent to discriminate is not obvious, not 
even to those with discriminatory attitudes and behaviour. The act of discrimination 
is so tightly ingrained within normal thinking and behaviour that people who are 
discriminated against may not be aware of it.
21 YLE uutiset, Suomi on työpaikkakiusaamisen ykkösmaa (Finland is the leading country in bully-
ing at work), 22.08.2008, http://www.yle.fi/uutiset/kotimaa/2008/09/suomi_on_tyopaikkakiusaami-
sen_karkimaa_320619.html, accessed in February 2011.
22 It is estimated that out of 20 million Roma people, 10 million live in Europe. Whereas the Finnish 
Roma community is small in numbers, they have played a crucial role in establishing European Roma 
organisations (such as the European Forum for Roma and Travellers under the auspices of the Council 
of Europe) which struggle for human rights issues for Roma.
23 Altogether ca. 100,000 Sámi people reside in four Northern countries, Norway (70,000), Sweden 
(18,000), Finland (10,000) and Russia (2000). They maintain institutions and organisations, which 
operate across borders and actively take part in international indigenous peoples’ human rights acti-
vities, e.g. through the UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues.
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7.5.1  Difference rights for Sámi vs. sameness rights for Roma?
The Roma and Sámi are very different ethnic groups in Finland, whether one looks at 
their legal standing, self-image or cultural expression.24 I have chosen these examples 
for several reasons. Firstly, because they play different roles in the Finnish public 
sphere and secondly because they claim different types of recognition and rights: the 
Sámi are officially recognised as the indigenous people of Finland and the government 
has tied itself to international agreements and national law to protect their traditional 
way of life. The Finnish Constitution was reformed in 1995 to include fundamental 
rights for Sámi people to maintain and develop their culture and language (Finnish 
Law 969/95). In the same reform, the government committed itself to ‘secure the 
realisation of fundamental rights and human rights'. The aim of these changes was 
to ‘guarantee the maintenance of the distinctive Sámi culture' (Government's Bill to 
Parliament 309/93). The concept of culture was interpreted to include the traditional 
Sámi livelihoods such as fishing, hunting and reindeer herding (ibid, p. 65). 
The Sámi Parliament, an elected body, was foreseen as the institution, which 
would develop and implement the right of Sámi people to promote cultural autonomy. 
Article 1 of The Act on the Sámi Parliament stipulates that ‘the Sámi, as an indigenous 
people, have a linguistic and cultural autonomy in the Sámi homeland' (Finnish Law 
974/1995). This acknowledgment is based on the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights of 1966 (UN 1966a) and its article 27 protecting minorities25 as well as 
on existing international law on the rights of indigenous peoples.26 The Sámi claim 
these rights and stress the importance of indigenous autonomy (including the right 
to continue with traditional ways of livelihood). They have a rather strong political 
institution, the Sámi Parliament, representing the interests of the whole group.27 The 
Sámi Parliament has in its statements made clear that it strives for recognition of 
Sámi as a distinct people and claims the right to be treated differently, according the 
specific needs of Sámi people.
24 It should be noted, that whereas Sámi can rather easily follow the assimilation strategy and priva-
tely choose to become a non-Sámi (for whatever reasons); this is not similarly possible for many Roma 
who often have a phenotype differing from the Finns.
25 However, the Finnish government has refused to acknowledge Sámi as a people in the sense of 
article 1 of the same convention in fear that this recognition would automatically entitle them the 
right to self-determination in issues concerning natural resources. The president of the Finnish Sámi 
Parliament, Klemetti Näkkäläjärvi (2009), criticised heavily the Government and said that ‘[t]he opi-
nion of the Finnish Government reflects a deplorable nationalistic tradition based on the idea of one 
people in one state.’
26 Such as the International Labour Organization’s convention 169 from the year 1989. Finland has, 
however only signed this convention but not been ‘able’ to ratify. I will return to this debate later in 
this article.
27 Even though it should of course be said that the organisation is by no means accepted by all Sámi 
as ‘the’ legitimate representative.
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The Roma are recognised as a language minority in the Finnish Constitution 
(731/1999, Article 17) next to the Sámi and other language minorities as one of the 
groups to be protected under the minority rights clauses. Finland has acknowledged 
the status of the Roma as a national minority, notably in the explanation to the 
Framework Convention on National Minorities (Council of Europe 1995; Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs 2010). The Finnish Romani Forum was established under the 
premises of the Council of Europe's European Forum for Roma and Travellers28 
but until today none of the bigger Roma organisations have joined the envisioned 
umbrella organisation due to internal conflicts and competition over cooperation.29 
Otherwise, the Roma are represented in the governmental structures through the 
Advisory Body for Roma Affairs (RONK) and have their own centre at the National 
Board of Education for Roma education matters. Also, the RONK and the Finnish 
Romani Forum can be regarded as organisations which are motivated by majority 
interests to get Roma representation ‘settled’, to find a body ‘to talk to’. In addition 
there are several Roma NGOs active in different societal and cultural fields in 
Finland, especially ones motivated by religious grounds. The Roma underline 
the need to reach standards of living similar to the majority population; therefore 
it can be reasonably argued that they claim sameness rights, rights for equal 
opportunity (whereas Sámi ask for different treatment). The main problem for the 
Roma is a deeply rooted socio-economic disadvantage caused by discrimination 
and intolerance towards the Roma as an ethnically separated group. They are much 
less inclined to claim cultural and language rights as opposed to claims related to 
economic and social inclusion.30
7.5.2  Defining minority identity in a majority context
The official definition of who can claim Sámi identity follows linguistic criteria even 
though no active language knowledge is required. Section 3 of the Act on the Sámi 
Parliament defines that a Sámi as a person who considers him or herself a Sámi, 
provided that this person has learnt Sámi as his or her first language, or has at least 
one parent or grandparent whose first language is Sámi; and is a descendant of a 
person who has been entered into the population register as mountain, forest or 
fishing Lapp, or at least one of the parents has or could have been registered as an 
elector for an election to the Sámi Delegation or the Sámi Parliament (Finnish Law 
974/95). It is the Finnish law which defines who can belong to the Sámi community 
28 http://www.ertf.org, last accessed in May 2010.
29 See the list of smaller local member organisations: http://www.romanifoorumi.fi/index.
php?page=jaesenjaerjestoet , last accessed in May 2010.
30 See also Nordberg in this publication.
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and even though this has been challenged by such persons who do not fulfil the 
criteria or cannot prove that they fulfil it, it has remained unchanged. 
The Roma identification is more a question of heritage and blood relations. 
For Roma, whose language was until the 1980s (and for some elderly especially 
still today) a secret language, there is very little information about the level of their 
language skills, which definitely do not delineate the Roma identity (Hedman 2009b). 
The number of Roma speakers in Finland is estimated at 4000 (less than 50 per cent 
of the Roma in Finland) (Hedman 2008; Granqvist 2006). This number contains both 
fluent and much more passive speakers. Numerically the two minorities reach similar 
numbers: there is no official statistics but the Sámi constitute a group of around 9000 
persons and the three different Sámi language communities (the Northern Sámi, Inari 
Sámi and Skolt Sámi speakers) have altogether 1778 (0.03 per cent) mother tongue 
speakers.31 The Sámi homelands are in the northernmost part of Finland and even 
though 70 per cent of the Sámi children live outside the homeland, their rights are 
most-effectively protected only in the Sámi home territory. Meanwhile, 10,000 Roma 
are scattered throughout the country and some 3000 of them emigrated in the 1960s 
and 70s to work and live in Sweden. The protection of the Roma is equally challenging 
in every corner of the country.
7.5.3  The public sphere as a hegemonic setting co-defines minoritisation
It might be easy to conclude that these two national minorities do not share anything 
in common, but in fact they do: Both are developing their own strategies to cope with 
Finnish majority rule and have to deal with the fact that their ‘own interests' cannot 
enter the Finnish public sphere without a certain kind of cultural translation which is, 
in its deepest meaning, a political translation of their own group interests to a language 
which is understood by the majority public. The Finnish majority has control over the 
framework and premises for Sámi and Roma identity claims and sets the limits regarding 
what they can ask for. The discrepancy is between what the Finnish government says it 
is doing in the field of minority rights with the reality of how these groups are treated.32
A prime example about the difficulty of harmonising the self-image as a minority 
rights friendly country is the question of the settling of rights of the Sámi people 
to natural resources and livelihoods. Another example is the failure to guarantee 
education of Roma people. Both these examples testify, as it should become obvious 
31 Statistics Finland > Population > languages, of 27.3.2009.
32 See e.g. for the legal sphere the concluding observation by the Advisory Committee of the Frame-
work Convention on National Minorities which stress the incredible discrepancy between laws on pa-
pers and legal action in Finland, under http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=67435, 
accessed in May 2010.
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in the next section, about the unwillingness of the Finnish state to accept the specific 
demands of minorities and to recognise their needs for differential treatment. 
7.6  Sámi and the denial of the right to their own culture
The Sámi homelands are located in Lapland, the northernmost part of Europe 
in the area of the Norwegian provinces of Finmark, Tromsø, part of Nordland, the 
northernmost part of Sweden and Finland, and the Kola Peninsula of Russia. About 
45,000 Norwegian, 16,000 Swedish, 10,000 Finnish and 2000 Russian citizens are 
Sámi. The number of people who identify as Sámi has grown during the last decade 
and the trend is presently continuing (Toivanen 2003:205). The Sámi people are 
recognised as national minorities in all three Nordic countries.33 There are nine living, 
yet comparatively very small, Sámi languages. Northern Sámi has the most speakers, 
and because it is spoken in Sweden, Norway, and Finland, and it has gained the status 
of the Sámi lingua franca. In Finland, in addition to Northern Sámi, Skolt and Inari 
Sámi are official languages. Even in their traditional homelands, the Sámi constitute 
a minority, and this was already the case at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
In Finland, Sámi history is full of conflicts with the majority nation. Not only 
have they been marginalised in every manner of life through law and order, be it laws 
regulating reindeer herding, fishing or education, but also in the socio-psychological 
sphere of creating ‘the other' against which Finnish identity could be constructed. The 
national romantic author, Zacharias Topelius (1943; orig. 1875) describes the Sámi, 
in his book Our Land (previously read by every pupil at elementary school level), as 
‘naïve, dirty, short, clumsy forest dwellers who would be jealous, foxy, drunk and 
unable for reasonable cooperation'.34 Denying that the Sámi could be a rational people 
with their own history has well served the nationalist interests of the titular nations 
in all four countries. Also, the claim that the Sámi would not have any understanding 
about ownership — as Karl Nickul (1984:48) said: ‘Sámi were believed to have a similar 
relationship to land as to water and air' — has for decades legitimated the fact that the 
Sámi home lands were occupied without compensation by the Nordic states. 
33 In the Finnish Constitution, Section 17 (3) and in the Norwegian Constitution, Section 110 
(a). The Swedish Constitution does not contain a section on Sámi but apparently the new propo-
sal would include the protection of Sámi as an indigenous people, see http://www.galdu.org/
web/?odas=4541&giella1=eng, accessed in May 2010.
34 The same adjectives seem to continue to live in stereotypic chat room writing on the internet. 
Reading the local Finnish newspaper of the district of Lapland, one can find sentences such as ‘Bitter, 
jealous, uncooperative drunk who demand Finnish land in the name of Sami, oh goddamnit, take the 
leather trousers and pull them over your head!’ [in orig. ‘Katkeria, kateellisia, yhteistyökyvyttömiä 
juoppoja vaatimassa saamelaisuuden nimissä itselleen Suomenmaata, voi jumalauta, ota ne nahka-
housut ja veä ne pääs yli!’ ], in Lapin kansa, keskustelu-palsta 14.02.2010.
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At the same time, since the 1970s, all Nordic governments have in the 
international arena acted as helpers and preservers of Sámi culture. As James Anaya 
(2010), the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Situation of the Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, stated recently ‘[t]he Sami people 
and the Nordic countries took a leading role in developing international standards 
and programs concerning indigenous peoples […]’. The Finnish Government plays a 
leading role in developing international law but, interestingly, implementing the laws 
back home, seems far less pressing a concern.
7.6.1  International law and ways to sidestep its requirements 
The ignorance of the Finnish state towards the Sámi — the right of the Sámi as an 
indigenous people to maintain their culture — can be concretely observed by following 
the Finnish Government's ‘efforts' to ratify the International Labour Organisation's 
(ILO) Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries (ILO 1989). From the viewpoint of the Finnish government, land rights 
questions are especially problematic. The lands formerly owned by Sámi villages are 
now 90 per cent in state-ownership (Korpijaakko 1989). Article 7 of the convention 
says that indigenous peoples have the right to ‘decide their own priorities for the 
process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual 
well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control over 
their economic, social and cultural development'. Since 1989 several national expert 
groups and committees have dealt with the question of how the ratification should 
be completed and what kind of legal changes it necessitates.35 One committee after 
another has come to the conclusion that the matter is difficult. Indeed, none of the 
expert bodies has been able to offer a concrete proposal about how to proceed, while 
the same matters have been in the centre in each report, namely the land rights. In 
2006 when Finland was striving for a permanent seat at the United Nation’s Human 
Rights Council, Finland promised to ratify the ILO 169 without delay if a seat was 
allocated to the country. In 2011 Finland obtained a permanent seat but has not yet 
ratified the convention. Various monitoring bodies of international human rights 
treaties have continuously raised criticisms towards the government’s failure in this 
matter. For example, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, held 
in its March 2009 Concluding Observations on Finland, the following concerns: 
35 For example the commissioned reports by Pekka Vihervuori in 1999, by the so-called Pokka Com-
mittee in 2000, by Juhani Wirilander in 2000, and by the so-called Land Rights Research Project by 
four Finnish scholars from the Universities of Oulu and Lapland.
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The Committee reiterates its concern about the limited progress achieved in resolving Sámi rights 
issues and the State party's failure to adhere to the International Labour Organization Conven-
tion No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.  The Committee 
renews its appeal to the State party to find an adequate settlement of the land dispute together 
with the Sámi people and its recommendations that it adheres to ILO Convention No. 169 as soon 
as possible (CERD/C/FIN/CO/19).
In Finland, the public argumentation is not talking about ignorance; instead 
the various efforts and the commitment of the government (after government) to 
settle the rights in the ways that meet international requirements is stressed in the 
public sphere. The Sámi Parliament receives a regular reassurance that a solution 
is just about to be finalised (Näkkäläjärvi 2010). The case of Sámi rights to natural 
resources has been ignored with arguments that the rights of the indigenous people 
may not go before the rights of Finns residing in the Sámi homelands. In 2009, the 
Minister for Agriculture Sirkka-Liisa Anttila, stressed that, as a response to the 
promise by the Minister of Justice, Tuija Brax, the government will ratify the ILO 169 
convention during this government period.  However, she will expect that evidence 
of a unanimous opinion on the ratification in Lapland will be presented before it 
will be accepted. Anttila also contended that the opinions of the other people who 
had settled in Lapland must be equally heard, not simply the views of the Sámi 
Parliament.36 
There is no doubt that the case is complicated: since the 18th century people 
other than Sámi have settled in the Sámi area, later and notably after the Second 
World War since the state has paid additional salary to Finnish authorities who have 
accepted to take jobs in periphery regions such as Lapland (Lehtola 2004). Most of the 
teachers, municipal authorities, city mayors, post officers, police officers, and health-
service personnel etc. are Finns, migrating from the South of the country. Some of 
these have by now indeed lived for generations in the area which today is called the 
Sámi homelands and quite a few of them have adopted parts of the Sámi lifestyle, i.e., 
reindeer herding, hunting and fishing. The situation is even more complicated by the 
fact that Sámi used to migrate freely in the area where we today find the state borders 
of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. This means that there are Sámi living in 
Finnish Lapland who moved there later than some of the Finnish people who moved 
there from the South.
All these complications and the question of who came first are, if we would 
recognise the Sámi as an indigenous people, irrelevant. The Sámi ‘earn' the right to 
different treatment and specific protection because they have a different lifestyle, 
which they want to preserve. Solely on this basis, they should be recognised as a 
36 Pääkirjoitus ‘Umpisolmu ei auennutkaan’ (An overhand knot did not open after all), 5.9.2009 
Lapin Kansa.
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people and if Finland wishes to continue having an indigenous group, quite radical 
positive rights are necessary: a total guarantee that the grazing areas of freely moving 
reindeer remain untouched (by the Finnish forest and mining industry), fishing and 
hunting rights should be more profitable for Sámi before all other habitants and 
especially before tourists, and regarding land usage matters, the Sámi Parliament 
should not only get consulted but decisions on land use should be made jointly with 
the Parliament possessing equal powers to the state. 
Similar questions came up in the drafting process of the Nordic Sámi 
Convention. The Finnish government together with the Norwegian and Swedish 
governments cooperated with the national Sámi Parliaments of all three countries 
on a convention, which would guarantee a similar level of protection for the 
Sámi in all three countries. The work took several years, but after the draft was 
finalised in 2005, the Finnish government decided that it could not accept the 
drafted compromise and there would be a need to reform it. As a consequence, the 
Nordic Sámi Convention has rested (together with the ILO 169) under the auspices 
of the Ministry of Justice, where a Committee is apparently working on it but no 
news about the state of affairs has entered the public sphere. Political scientist 
with Sámi roots, Rauna Kuokkanen (2008), has in her blog writing posed the 
question whether the state will deploy delay tactics ‘until the problem [the Sámi] 
disappear'. Martin Scheinin, who was a Finnish member of the team drafting the 
Nordic convention, wrote in Turun Sanomat that he is disappointed and ashamed 
of the Finnish Government.37 A group of Parliamentarians requested the intention 
of the government, from the Parliament in 2008, whether and if yes, when, it will 
proceed to ratify it. The response by the minister of Justice, Tuija Brax, does not 
provide a definitive answer and it seems that the government does not feel obliged 
to give any answers.38 In the Finnish Human Rights Forum in April 2008, Brax and 
in 2009, both the minister for foreign affairs and the minister for justice promised 
to find a solution by the end of the year 2009.39 In the beginning of the year 2011, 
Brax announced that the ratification process of all indigenous peoples' conventions 
(UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ILO 169 and the Nordic 
Sámi Convention) will not be completed during this government. She blamed the 
resistance by the Centre party and especially Paavo Väyrynen, Minister for Foreign 
37 Martin Scheinin, Opinion, Turun Sanomat 29.10.2008.
38 Written request on the ratification of the Nordic Sámi Convention to the Spokesman of the Parli-
ament KK 826/2008 vp — Tuula Peltonen /sd ym. on the 7.11.2008 and the answer by the ministry of 
justice, 27.11.2008.
39 Personal communication with Minister Stubb in the NGO hearing on the Finnish Human Rights 
Policy. Mr. Stubb regretted the slow advancement of the rights of Sámi 10.3.2009.
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Trade and Development, whose electors are Finnish-born residing in the county of 
Lapland.40
Finland has also endured a great deal of international pressure: 36 times 
individual Sámi reindeer herders either from Finland, Sweden or Norway have filed a 
complaint with the UN Human Rights Committee41 and the government has received 
a warning that it should not continue with such economic activities that harm the 
Sámi traditional way of life (HRC 2001). Also the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights of the Council of Europe and the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Issues 
have had to intervene, in for example, a case where the Finnish Forestry Company 
Metsähallitus was logging in a reindeer winter grazing area and forbade this activity 
for the next 20 years.42 
Interestingly, instead of focussing on political or economic rights, the Finnish State 
has been active in promoting language and culture rights for Sámi and that has worked 
as an effective deterrent to resolving the problem that is tied to the fact that Sámi have 
rights but the state does not want them to be equal. If they would have equal rights, would 
it look like they had more rights? With the rhetoric, also present in the country reports 
of Finland to the international human rights law instruments, which stresses that the 
government is ‘doing its best' in settling the dispute on the rights of Sámi, the country is 
saving face in the international arena. Negative media reports and a general national lack 
of knowledge about the specific needs of the Sámi insure that there is no active movement 
putting pressure on the Finnish government. This approach is also visible in the Finnish 
‘efforts' to implement the Sámi Language Act of 2003/1086 discussed below.
7.6.2  National laws and ways to sidestep their provisions
The process towards recognising Sámi languages as worthy of protection took several 
decades43 and it was not before the beginning of the 1990s that the Sámi languages 
40 Helsingin Sanomat: ‘Alma Media: Suomi ei hyväksy YK:n alkuperäiskansojen sopimusta’ (Alma 
Media: Finland does not approve the UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples), 21.1.2011, http://www.
hs.fi/kotimaa/artikkeli/Alma+Media+Suomi+ei+hyv%C3%A4ksy+YKn+alkuper%C3%A4iskansojen
+sopimusta/1135263201981, accessed in February 2011.
41 Only 7 of the cases have been accepted as admissible, see the database http://www.worldlii.org/
int/cases/UNHRC.
42 The letter was signed by the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen of Mexico. See also Matti Huuskonen,  Reinde-
er disputes in Finnish Lapland attract attention of UN, Helsingin Sanomat 26.10.2007, http://www.hs.fi/
english/article/Reindeer+disputes+in+Finnish+Lapland+attract+attention+of+UN/1135231431745, 
accessed in May 2010.
43 In Sweden and Finland the demand was tied to the growing number of refugees and asylum see-
kers who received home language / mother tongue teaching outside the school curricula for 2 hours 
a week. See Toivanen 1995. 
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and culture finally gained a secured status in the legislation of all Nordic countries. 
Before the 1990s, many Sámi people could not learn the language they considered to 
be their (political) mother tongue (Svonni, 1996; Rosjo, 1997:6). In Finland, language 
legislation was amended in 1991 to create better chances for the Sámi to learn their 
languages in schools.44 In 2003 the language law was revised radically in order to 
ensure that all local authorities and some state authorities provide services in the Sámi 
languages.45 The number of Sámi speakers is no longer declining rapidly, although for 
most Sámi languages the legislation has come too late. The number of pupils who 
express interest in learning Sámi languages has grown steadily as parents become 
educated and informed about the importance of minority language instruction but at 
the same time, the number of students receiving education in Sámi has declined from 
553 pupils to 483 pupils (Saamelaiskäräjät 2009:13). 
In 2009 the Ombudsman office for Minorities commissioned a report on the 
situation of Sámi language learning in the capital city area. The report gave alarming 
information indicating that the learning of Sámi has not become more accessible 
since most of the Sámi speaking children (ca. 70 per cent) now are born outside the 
Sámi homelands where the Law on Sámi Cultural Autonomy applies. According to 
another report by the Finnish Sámi Parliament, the number of Sámi living outside of 
the homelands has doubled between the years 1983-2007 (Saamelaiskäräjät 2009:8). 
Outside of the official home territory, Sámi language is taught as any other immigrant 
language, as part of a mother tongue education program, which equates to 2.5 hours 
a week if a group of 4 children is established and a teacher found (Opetusministeriö 
2007).
It is fair to state that the language rights of the Sámi are not being fulfilled in the 
way envisaged by the constitution and set out in the Sámi Language Act (Seurujärvi-
Kari 2010). This is due, not only to a lack of Sámi-speaking staff employed by the 
municipal and state authorities of the Sámi Homeland, but to the main problem that 
is created by oblivious attitudes by local authorities: The National Discrimination 
Tribunal has, on the request by the Ombudsman for Minorities, investigated cases 
against the city of Rovaniemi and the municipality of Enontekiö (cases Decision ref 
2008-25/Pe-2 and Decision ref 2008-367/Pe-2). Both were found guilty of not offering 
services and education in Sámi.
Irja Seurujärvi-Kari, a university teacher and the long-term vice-president of the 
Finnish Sámi Parliament, also accuses the National Productivity Program, which 
aims at improving the basis for competition and achieving higher results by Finnish 
authorities and companies. According to her, the goals of the program make it difficult 
to increase the proportion of services in Sámi because support for minority languages 
44 L 25.1.1991/171. Finnish Law on changing School legislation (Laki peruskoululain muuttamisesta).
45 The Sámi Language Act 2003, http://www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/2003/en20031086, ac-
cessed in February 2011.
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is costly. She states that ‘[ ] the Sámi language does not have the status of a proper 
subject or language of instruction in schools. For years, the Sámi Parliament has 
requested the Ministry of Education to correct the situation by discarding the regional 
restriction applied to the special funding of Sámi education' (Seurujärvi-Kari 2010). 
Nevertheless, a least ten schools have been closed in the Sámi home region, due to the 
low number of pupils (Saamelaiskäräjät 2009:10). If those international agreements 
to which Finland is a party and those laws that are currently in force in Finland would 
be taken seriously, then schools in which minority languages are taught should 
deserve another treatment than schools which operate in majority languages only. 
Moving Sámi speaking children to bigger schools means that the connection to Sámi 
languages is severely endangered, too.
A commonly shared opinion among Sámi activists interested in education is 
that ‘[w]hile the statutory status of the Sámi is satisfactory in Finland, the law is not 
adequately enforced' (Näkkäläjärvi 2010). Certainly there are efforts to revise the 
laws, too. But the actual problem is less the law than the fact that the state is not 
taking responsibility for the Sámi situation but instead, hopes that the difficulties will 
disappear, thus justifying delay tactics.
Many Sámi activists are disappointed with the weak role the Sámi have in 
their own institutions. The Finnish Sámi Parliament is entrusted with matters of 
culture and traditions, whereas political and financial matters have always been 
left to the states, who thus actually direct the development of Sámi movements. 
Before the Law on Cultural Autonomy was passed in Finland in 1995, Pekka Aikio, 
the president of the Finnish Sámi Parliament complained, ‘The only thing the 
delegation was allowed to decide independently was the dates of the meetings!’ 
(Aikio 1992:17).
Also the new president of the Sámi Parliament, Klementti Näkkäläjärvi (2010) 
who is considered to be much more moderate than Pekka Aikio said very precisely: 
The Sámi Parliament has a very limited genuine decision making power; it is restricted solely to the 
distribution of certain granted appropriations. The main means of the Sámi Parliament's pursuit of 
policies are negotiations, pronouncements and initiatives. The present right of self-determination is 
limited to the presentation of shared opinions and common representation through the Sámi Parlia-
ment. The right to self-government as a people is not fulfilled, because self-government is restricted 
to language and culture only. It does not apply to protection of Sámi livelihoods, though these, as 
part of the Sámi culture, enjoy legal protection granted by the Constitution of Finland.
There are laws protecting the Sámi and the government has committed itself to 
taking responsibility concerning the maintenance and development of the future of 
the Sámi. They enjoy a cultural autonomy in their home region; their languages are 
protected under a specific language act. The reindeer herding is regulated in several 
laws as are other agreements securing living in the Sámi homelands. On this level 
the Finnish state shows considerable interest in supporting the indigenous minority. 
At the same time, Finland has not signed or ratified the major international treaties 
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to protect indigenous peoples and enters time after time into conflict with local 
Sámi and international actors in matters concerning land use in Lapland. Finland 
does not want to give up the profits from the forest and mining industry in Lapland, 
neither does it want to let Sámi representation to participate in the planning of 
these economic activities nor in the profit-sharing. The international reputation 
of Finland has suffered because the promises Finland makes in international fora 
are at odds with the factual treatment of the Sámi: none of the laws were realised 
without repeated demands by Sámi individuals and organisations. The ‘power' of 
the majority society appears as a pressure to conform: Sámi representatives are 
constantly told to settle for what they have already attained, cultural rights. But 
giving up demands for land rights would not only mean giving up the international 
agreements' standards but ultimately the Sámi way of life would disappear 
completely when reindeer herding, fishing and hunting have become professional 
activities that undermine the traditional economy, and with it a traditional way of 
life.
7.7  Roma – a persistent underclass 
To understand the situation of the Roma today, one has to have an understanding 
of the length and severity of racism targeted at Roma people. One question that has 
been persistently posed by those sympathetic to their situation is, ‘why do Roma not 
protest against the minoritisation and marginalisation more openly?’
According to historical records, the Roma immigrated through Sweden and Baltic 
countries to Finland around 500 years ago. The history of discrimination against the 
Roma in the Kingdom of Sweden to which Finland belonged until 1809, is long: even 
until the 1750s Roma who were found loitering somewhere could be hanged and they 
could be convicted on the grounds of a nomadic lifestyle (Hirvonen 2008:2). The time 
when Finland was a Grand Duchy of Russia was characterised by strong assimilation 
efforts against all different nationalities residing in Finland, including the Roma 
(Pulma 2005:460). According to Camilla Nordberg (2007: 57), the Roma were not only 
considered to be a social problem but also a problem for forging national identity: 
their language and culture were defined as foreign, and thus they were perceived to 
be perpetual strangers. Within this context the state took efforts to ‘solve’ the problem 
of Roma cultural difference (Nordberg 2007:51). After the Second World War (in which 
many Roma served) and the loss of the Eastern part of Karelia to the Soviet Union, a 
large number of Roma was, together with other Finnish refugees, resettled in Finnish 
municipalities. Many Roma families, who had been living well integrated in cities 
such as Sortavala (which became a Soviet city after the war), found themselves 
homeless and unemployed. 
After the war, the socioeconomic situation of the Roma was bad, particularly 
concerning housing and education (Pulma 2006). Governmental organisations were 
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established in order to improve the living conditions of the Roma but listening to 
the Roma themselves describe their actual needs and wishes of Roma people.  For 
example, because discrimination was so persistent, many parents did not want their 
children to attend the majority schools, where they feared they would be victimized. 
Around this time, the oldest organisation serving Roma, the Romano Missio, which 
had been founded in 1906 as a Christian charity to ‘help and guide Roma people’ 
stepped up its activities.46  
The Roma’s common physical distinctiveness serves to underline their 
‘difference’: they have darker hair and skin than most Finns. In addition, many 
Roma women wear distinctive clothes (long and fancy velvet dresses) that identify 
them immediately as members of the Roma group. Over the years, Roma have been 
closely associated with certain professions such as equine-related businesses (trot, 
shoeing, horse health services), copper smiths, seasonal work at farms, lace works, 
and fortune telling—professions which are not tied to any geographical places and 
can be continued wherever necessary. Roma were often portrayed as premodern, and 
thus as out-of-sync with a modernizing society.  Even though many Roma families 
did settle down and earn their livelihood in quite common ‘Finnish’ professions, the 
general stereotype stamped upon them depicted their culture as contributing to their 
incapacity for normal rational living.
When Finland became independent in 1917 all population groups became 
Finnish citizens, including all Roma people who resided in the country. Different 
efforts were undertaken to assimilate the Roma population, which included taking 
children into custody to learn the Finnish lifestyle (through educating Roma to give 
up their ‘curious habits' and ‘become normal') (Komiteamietintö 1900:3). The effects 
were contradictory: the Roma became an even more closed community. Research 
conducted on Roma was undertaken basically by non-Roma and all the expertise 
guiding the efforts to domesticate ‘the wild Roma' ignored inside knowledge about 
the Roma. An Advisory Board on Gypsy Issues (later Advisory Board for Roma) was 
established in 1956, which also included several persons with Roma background. But, 
in its beginning, the working agenda was clearly defined from a majority perspective 
(Söderman 2006:11).
Since the 1970s there has also been a shift in Roma politics, and Roma have become 
more involved in Roma organisations and in different state committees, which have 
tried to ‘solve the Gypsy problem’. Different efforts have been undertaken first to force 
and then to persuade the Roma to send their children to school and keep them there. 
Also in the field of housing there have been, especially since the 1970s, programs 
to guarantee equal housing rights to Roma people and also to pay attention to their 
46 Romano Missio (founded as Gibsy Mission) cooperates closely with the Finnish Lutheran Church, 
see http://www.romanomissio.fi/index.htm, accessed in May 2010.
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cultural needs.47 Interestingly, despite their own participation, Roma as a people have 
remained at the margins of Finnish society. The last statistical research on the living 
conditions of the Roma people was undertaken in 1970 and it revealed a huge gap in 
the living standards between the mainstream and the Roma populations (Paananen 
2009). Due to privacy laws, such research has not been possible anymore because the 
law does not permit questions about ethnicity. Still the fact is, however, that the same 
or similar problems continue, tangled with discrimination, low education, cultural 
change and alienation (Hirvilammi and Laatu 2008). According to 2007 statistics, 
most of the discrimination cases in district courts were filed by Roma. Most of the 
cases were addressing the right to enter a restaurant or to right to housing (Aaltonen, 
Joroinen and Villa 2008:31).
Regardless of all the educational programs, which have been in place since the 1970s, 
the marginalisation of Roma has not diminished.  A study of the state of the education 
of Roma children in Finland concluded that despite all the hard work, the Roma are 
placed into special education, drop out of school or repeat the class much more often 
than mainstream pupils (Opetushallitus 2004:5-6). Discrimination studies, the few that 
exist, also indicate that the discrimination of Roma continues at a disturbing frequency. 
For example, according to a recent poll among 300 capital city area company leaders, 
only a half would hire a Roma. The reasons given by the employers are low educational 
attainment and lack of work experience. 12 per cent would not hire a Roma in any case, 
while 70 per cent of Roma think that prejudice is the main reason for unemployment 
(Syrjä and Valtakari 2008). They face discrimination in the area of employment and 
housing (Hedman 2009a) and are continuously subjected to everyday discrimination in 
the streets. The prejudices of the majority population and the weaker economic position 
of the Roma also make it hard for them to find adequate accommodation in the private 
housing market (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2004:9). In the current climate 
that is more favourable to diversity, a new tendency has arisen that promotes the 
involvement of the Roma in the planning phase of projects.  There is some evidence to 
indicate that this recent shift has improved the quality of projects as well as the interest 
of Roma to participate in them. 
7.7.1  Blood feuding 
There have always been Roma persons and families who have enjoyed great respect 
among the majority population and Roma have carried out ethnically distinct, and 
47 Finnish Roma have often been characterised as the most traditional Roma on Earth. Many families 
maintain traditions which prescribe that old people cannot use the same bathroom as the young or 
that young people may not live in an apartment located above the old people. After the death of a 
person, the family has to move to another ‘clean’ flat, etc. see i.e. Huttunen and Viljanen 1976.
Brought to you by | SIIS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/21/16 11:51 AM
132   From Ignorance to Effective Inclusion
for the majority’s well-being, important professions. But as an ethnic group, people 
classified as Roma, have suffered under negative stereotypes, open discrimination 
and racism even though they share a common history with Finns. Those persons with 
plenty of influence and power have sometimes served as ethnic brokers (Toivanen 
2001) between the majority and the minority. I shall get back to this matter later and 
discuss how this position has empowered the Roma both in respect to the majority as 
well as with minorities. 
When on the one hand it is important to underline that Roma have not selected 
a lower standard of living and not voluntarily chosen to be targets of racism and 
discrimination, it is equally relevant to underline that they have found ways to endure 
the situation in which laws do not equally protect them as they would other Finnish 
persons. This may be the main reason that Roma can be described as a separate ethnic 
community with internal specific ‘laws’ governing their life.
As Aulis Aarnio (1989:16-17) shows, existing power relationships always dictate 
the existing laws, and particularly impact the ways in which laws are interpreted. 
There are reasons why Roma have continued to act as an autonomous body inside the 
Finnish state. Because the national laws that focus on protecting the individual do 
not work particularly well for the more communally-oriented Roma, justice by their 
own hand has evolved as the customary system of justice among them. The leading 
families have been the care-takers of traditions: for example the Roma who lived by 
travelling in a geographical area from house to house to secure their living, did not 
want other (Roma) families to come to the same areas to take their share of jobs and 
business. Neither did they want other Roma to come and ruin their reputation by 
stealing or otherwise misbehaving. If a new Roma family entered the ‘area' of another 
Roma family, they were expected to ask for permission (Grönfors 1977). Today, in a 
modern economy when no one is depending on travelling from house to house to make 
their living, this moving permission has become a relic, but which is used especially 
in the city areas to hinder new Roma people to move to their neighborhoods. Of 
course, this can also be explained rationally: the settled Roma are always afraid that 
newcomers will do something bad and therefore their lives will get more difficult: the 
Finns will just think that it's Roma who stole etc. and accuse all Roma, not the specific 
individual who in fact committed the crime. 
Another example of difficulties between culturally developed traditions and 
modern understandings of equal laws is the case of blood feuding, which has been 
addressed recently in the majority media. According to Roma tradition, if A kills or 
severely injures B, the family of the person A has to immediately (even if it would 
be in the middle of the night) move away and take care that they never encounter 
the member of family B. This is the way to show respect to the family of the victim. 
The blood feuding is not about bringing peace between the families but to show 
the strength of the kin group (Grönfors 2001:168). Today, however, some people feel 
that, as they themselves have not harmed anyone, for example, a wife or sister of 
a murderer, who wishes to take no responsibility for the crime by the husband or 
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brother who (often in a drunken condition) killed an outsider, they do not want to 
begin avoiding. This is penalised by the Roma; it is for many difficult to accept that 
someone would not obey the customary law. If a person, who is afraid of revenge in 
the sense of blood feuding, would seek help and protection with the Finnish police 
force or other authorities he or she would be punished by other Roma. As Grönfors 
(2001:154) stresses, the police shall in no circumstance be involved and the revenge 
action shall not harm any Finns, not even the Finnish spouses of Roma, but the 
children from mixed marriages are considered Roma in this tradition. The transition 
caused by integration of Roma to Finnish culture, means today that there is often a 
serious conflict between those who wish to enjoy equal rights according to Finnish 
laws and those who distrust the state and wish to continue with the Romani internal 
legal system. Of course those who occupy powerful positions in the customary legal 
system are extremely reluctant to obey the Finnish laws already for the reason that 
inside of the Roma legal system they enjoy power whereas in the Finnish system, they 
are the outcast.
7.7.2  The Roma language – revitalisation efforts of a secret code
The Roma language spoken in Finland has been considered a secret language and 
the Roma were, according to their own customary law, not supposed to teach it to 
outsiders. In the 1970s the number of people speaking the language had already 
become very low and as refugee children started to receive mother tongue teaching 
in the schools, Romani language lessons were also proposed. The education of Roma 
language as a mother tongue was inspired by the example provided by Sweden, where 
Finnish Roma was taught as an immigrant language. The first Roma teachers were 
Finnish immigrants to Sweden from the 1960s and 70s who returned to Finland to 
teach. In the elementary schools, Romani teaching was first carried out in afternoon 
clubs and since 1989 Romani culture and language have been offered by parental 
request as mother tongue classes. 
The constitutional reform in 2000 levelled the right for Roma to maintain and 
develop their own language and culture as a constitutional guarantee. This was also 
bolstered by the Decree on Children's Day-care, which enabled support for Romani 
language and culture, and by the Basic Education Act, which confirmed the place of 
the Roma language as a mother tongue. The law mentions the right of the Roma to 
maintain and develop their own language and it obligates the public authorities to 
back this. This is a substantial support for improving the situation of the Roma. In 
ratifying the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Finland identified 
Romani as a non-territorial minor ity language, and in ratifying the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Finland identified the Roma and 
the Sámi as traditional national minorities. 
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It may be unfair to evaluate the workings of law after such a short time in force. 
However, it seems worrisome from the perspective of the Roma that the number of 
Romani language speakers continues to decline (Opetushallitus 2004). According to 
a report carried out by the Romani Education Unit of the National Board of Education 
in 2001 only eight percent of Roma children attending primary school receive Romani 
lessons (Ministry of Social Affairs and Health 2004:7), whereas today the number 
is less than 5 per cent (estimation by Granqvist 2006). Recent decades have seen 
the development of teacher training courses in Romani, the production of Romani-
medium teaching materials and the efforts to encourage its use among the Roma 
through things such as summer schools.
 According to the study carried out by the National Board of Education in 
2000 and 2001, 19 per cent of Roma children repeat a class, 5 per cent drop out of 
school completely, 12 per cent change their school during the school year, 50 per 
cent receive special education, 2 per cent attended pre-school classes and only less 
than 6 per cent received education in Romani language and culture (Opetushallitus 
2004). The numbers are extremely high and tell a simple story: the education of Roma 
has not improved despite of all the projects and programs. As of 2011, not a single 
person has graduated from the teachers’ education unit with the Romani language as 
their teaching language, which means that there is not a single teacher with formal 
competence to teach Romani in Finland.48
7.8  Power as a theory and a practice
The question of why the Finnish Roma people have remained so marginalised is often 
explained on the basis of factors having to do with cultural differences: they want to 
keep to themselves and even their language is so well protected that outsiders cannot 
learn it. It is certainly true that the Roma have ‘kept to themselves’ but less due to 
cultural reasons. As has been shown above, many Roma have lived integrated lives 
as respected neighbours in many Finnish communities over an extended period of 
time. They have had traditional professions and big families. The family relationships 
have been extended to other towns and regions and formed a network with strong 
ties and ruled within the hierarchical power relationship inside the network. At the 
same time, especially after the Second World War, when Finland lost eastern Karelia 
to Russia, many more Roma arrived as internally displaced persons and started 
looking for livelihoods and places to live. This formed one basis for the travelling 
life-style: a periodical workforce was necessary in the Finnish countryside and Roma 
families had their own annual travelling routes. They knew those houses that offered 
48 The University of Helsinki is currently participating in a three-year EU project Qualirom led from 
the University of Graz, with aim of improving the quality of teaching Roma languages in Europe.
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work and a place to wash and stay. In return they took care of diverse chores on the 
farms. Modernisation and industrialisation has change the lifestyle of all habitants 
of Finland, and also the Roma conditions of living have changed, in that they have 
had extreme difficulties to enter the new kind of job market that requires educational 
credentials. The Finnish policies have been highly ambiguous: on the one side are 
the policies driving for equal opportunity and cultural neutrality, while on the other 
side there are policies stressing the cultural (or even human?) difference of Roma, 
explaining how and why they have to be treated differently in the day-care, school 
or workplace. Either way, the Roma have only had a marginal part in revising the 
policies and only such Roma who have either grown in Finnish families or are from 
powerful Roma families with in-group prestige have been included. These cultural 
brokers may, in a worst case scenario not have any real interest in empowering the 
Roma.
Similar arguments can be made about the Sámi. Finnish laws have dictated the 
Sámi way of life for such a long time and the Sámi activists have been educated in the 
Finnish system. Asking for a real ‘Sámi interest' may be an impossible task. Those 
Sámi who mobilise international bodies to shake the picture of the Finnish state as 
a Sámi or even minority friendly state are often dismissed, even within their own 
ethnic group. Both Sámi and Roma try to find ways to stay in contact with the state 
authorities, but acquiring the reputation as ‘difficult' means to be left outside of the 
sphere of decision making completely. The cultural brokers have to very carefully find 
ways of balancing between the two ends of the spectrum: the needs and demands of 
the Finnish state and what could be defined as a true ethnic interest. 
Charles Tilly (1991) posed the question that many others have kept asking for 
years before and after: Why do subordinates comply, why are they not resisting 
continuously? Why would e.g. the Roma people accept the amount of discrimination 
against them without going to streets and protesting against the injustice? Why do 
they not make both the out-group and in-group discrimination public? Why would 
the Sámi obey the Finnish politics e.g. in land use questions which lead to a complete 
fading of the traditional way of life in the North and not address the injustices more 
openly in the public sphere? Why are they not openly bringing their cases to the 
streets of the capital city of Helsinki where the decision-makers pass?
Tilly’s famous check-list for possible answers begins with the statement that it 
might be that the premise is incorrect: that subordinates rebel all the time but in covert 
ways, or they get something for agreeing to be subordinate, or subordinates are so 
closely part of the given system that they do not recognise themselves as subordinates, 
or as a result of mystification, repression or lack of alternative ideological frames, 
the subordinates remain unaware of their true interests, or they lack means and 
resources, ability or all of the above-mentioned. Steven Lukes (2005) commented on 
Tilly’s answers saying that of course all the above mentioned in various combinations 
apply. But the answer that makes Lukes curious is that people may not know their 
‘true interests’. This is what Lukes has called the third dimension of power which 
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is the power ‘to prevent people, to what-ever degree, from having grievances by 
shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept 
their role in the existing order of things’ (2005:11). The third dimension of power, the 
dimension in which no action is visible or even necessary, when things are as they are 
and nobody feels the necessity to question the situation, has been my interest in this 
project and this article.
My empirical assessment took a critical look on the following three dimensions 
of power following Steven Lukes’ (2005) theory. The first dimension of power, which 
he calls the pluralist view of power, stresses concrete and observable behaviour. For 
Dahl (1958:466) who is one of the prominent protagonists of this approach, power 
can be analysed only after ‘careful examination of a series of concrete decisions’. 
The clear limit of this view is that it is restricted to the observable decision making 
and is not able to grasp the agenda-setting behind it. The two-dimensional view of 
power is a critical response to the one-dimensional and tries to include the question 
of how certain biases are mobilised in the agenda setting before the decision making-
process can even begin. For Bachrach and Baratz (1970:43-4), these biases are a set of 
predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures that operate to the 
benefit of certain persons and groups, at the expense of others. This approach makes 
it possible to analyse both decision-making and non-decision-making. It allows the 
investigation of questions related to agenda control and ways in which potential 
issues are kept outside of the political process. But the same restriction remains as 
in the first model: Only observable conflicts, even though both overt and covert, 
can be analysed. In my view, a three-dimensional approach, as envisioned by Lukes 
originally in 1974, is necessary for a study such as this one, which focuses not only 
on clear majority-minority relationships but also on the intermingled liaisons inside 
these categories and on the mixed and multiple co-operations between individuals 
identifying with several categories. This ‘radical view’ allows for a power analysis 
without an observable conflict. This approach means a study of notions, such as the 
public sphere or civil society, as hegemonic concepts, which control and change the 
new topics before they are allowed to enter the public sphere or to be included as 
actors and interests of civil society.49
One can identify at least two strong research trends here. One which may be best 
associated with James Scott (1990) who says that whatever we see, hear and believe, 
people are constantly rebelling and resisting, even though in covert ways. The other 
starting place is Foucaultian theory. Michel Foucault (1978) argues that domination 
cannot be escaped, it is everywhere and there is no freedom of thought or reasoning 
independent of it.  Contrasting these two and addressing the question whether we can 
ever tackle the true interests of people, I have discussed the ways in which the Finnish 
Sámi and Roma tackle power and their relationship to a hegemonic Finnish state.
49 See here the feminist critique of the public sphere, i.e. Bell 1999.
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In concluding, the Finnish state is officially committed to creating an equal 
society. The non-discrimination and respect of equality are defined today as the 
cornerstones of Finnish society. This has been effective in the way that most Finnish 
people themselves define equality as one of the true markers of Finnish identity. 
When it comes to minority interests, Finland has pursued a policy which has tried to 
include difference-demands within the general policies: to each specific difference-
claim, there is an advisory board where people of the ‘difference-claim-makers' sit 
next to Finnish authorities from relevant ministries to discuss matters of mutual 
concern. This sounds like exemplary inclusion politics where, e.g., the Sámi and the 
Roma representatives have the right to participate in the decision-making process. 
My assessment is, however, that as this inclusion is initially defined from a majority 
vantage, it only works towards further undermining minority identities. The Sámi 
have been granted cultural and language autonomy at the cost of rights to land and 
natural resources. The autonomy is effective in an area where fewer and fewer Sámi 
can afford living traditional ways of life because their right to gain their livelihood 
in their traditional professions has been made ever more difficult. 70 per cent of 
Sámi children are born outside of the area of the cultural autonomy homelands. The 
right to difference, to a different way of life, has been compromised with negative 
consequences, endangering their future as indigenes. When few or no Sámi pursue 
traditional livelihoods, will they still be granted rights as indigenous peoples? 
The Roma have been granted sameness rights; they cannot be segregated anymore 
without violating the non-discrimination law. Several official bodies discussing the 
matters concerning non-discrimination in housing, employment, family-life and 
education have been established and representatives of Roma people are in most 
cases involved. There are strong promises to level the way for Roma to become equal 
citizens. At the same time, the hundreds of years of continuing racism against the 
Roma, has developed a segregated Roma community with its own rules and laws. The 
response of the Finnish political establishment has been to develop guidebooks for 
Finnish employers, teachers and health personnel about how to face the difference 
represented by Roma. Even those Roma who would like to break out from the rather 
strict cultural codes of the Roma community face the difficulty that they are treated 
by authorities as Roma (with whom you shall not speak on certain topics and whose 
in-group discrimination shall not be noticed officially). They seem to be doomed 
to difference: Instead of ensuring that the Roma way of life could become a part of 
Finnishness, they are categorised as outsiders.
The real interests of these two minorities remain untouched in the state politics. 
Recognising their needs and guaranteeing them rights to both equality and difference 
is ever more difficult when the minorities are represented in official bodies by persons 
who are quite assimilated in the ‘Finnish-way-of-thinking'. Those who argue for 
another perspective are often dismissed as difficult persons and are excluded from 
ministry-led advisory boards. If the answer to the problem is even more participation 
by minorities, it would still be an open question whether a state with a homogenous 
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self-image would be able to change: If participation is defined in terms set by the 
majority, the marginalization of minority interests will continue. The future will show 
whether the Sámi and Roma will radicalise their approach and find a platform to 
address difference-demands on a more effective manner or whether they will fade 
away and get dissolved into a homogeneous version of ‘Finnishness'.
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8  Orchestrating National Unity: An Assessment 
of Discourses in Immigrant Legislation and the 
Surrounding Parliamentary and Public Debates
8.1  Introduction 
In this paper, we examine the articulations and perceptions of the state’s role in the 
management of immigration during the past decade in Finland. We look at recent 
developments in Finnish immigration legislation – with particular focus on the Aliens 
Act of 2004 – and in the surrounding debates in parliamentary and media arenas. 
With the focus on these debates, we seek to explicate in three separate sections how 
and to what effect the state’s role is being articulated alongside the endeavours to 
manage immigration.
First, we consider the policy-level data in terms of the preparatory work in the 
ministries and in the parliamentary committees. This is done in order to identify 
some underlying national discourses that support the management of the perceivably 
immigration-induced, societal heterogenisation. Achieving this also entails 
identifying frames within which national belonging and unity are being discursively 
constructed vis-à-vis the immigrant Other.1 The section will also propose four frames 
through which national unity is discursively produced in the data considered in the 
subsequent sections. These frames will also be illustrated through some concrete 
examples from the preparatory process of the 2004 Aliens Act. By establishing this 
in the first section, this chapter outlines the nature and interconnectedness of the 
various impediments that the top-down articulations of national unity may present 
to the development of more decentralised and case-sensitive immigration regimes 
within a welfare state context. 
Secondly, we examine the empirical manifestations of the belonging frames 
within parliamentary speeches of the Finnish MPs, analyzing the 2003–2004 debates 
on the Aliens Act and a complementary text from the 2003 Integration Act debates. 
We track down themes and ways of talking which relate to the ones identified in 
1 Othering is an important theoretical apparatus here. It defines the process through which an indi-
vidual or collective is placed in the position of the Other (Eide 2008:156). Simultaneously, the notion 
of a shared collective is delineated through these social boundaries. Thus, othering is decisive when 
discussing the questions of belonging that are in the core of national unity (McIver 2003).
 © 2015 Niko Pyrhönen, Karin Creutz and Marjukka Weide
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the preparatory material of the Aliens Act (section 1 of this paper).2 We regard the 
parliament as a privileged arena for making discursive constructions of national 
unity. Rather than really aiming at influencing the decisions, the plenary speeches 
address the citizens and the media, trying to communicate the angles and emphases 
of the representatives to those they claim to represent (see Saward 2006).
Thirdly, a similar kind of analysis is extended to the immigration debate in public fora 
in order to identify the kinds of articulations on the role of the state in the management 
of immigration that resonate there. This is crucial, because it is mainly through the media 
representations of state agency (rather than actual MP performances and the legislative 
process per se) through which the citizens participate in the public debate on immigration 
and hence also contribute to the delineation of the boundaries of national unity. The data 
considered here consists of editorials and newspaper articles, letters to the editor and 
posts to the discussion board of Finland’s biggest newspaper Helsingin Sanomat. The 
accounts considered were published during the important junctions within the past 
decade when relevant immigrant legislation was pending (1999, 2004 and 2009).  
In examining the discourses framing the state’s role in the management of 
immigration, we adopt a markedly institutionalist (or top-down) perspective. This 
means that we are first and foremost concerned with what the state is perceived to 
be doing and what goals it is perceived to have in ministries, the parliament and in 
media debates. On this basis, in this paper we propose some effects these perceptions 
might have on civil society. This can be contrasted with many classical takes on the so 
called input model of representative democracy that start bottom-up, by tracing the 
development of policies from grass root ideas and public philosophies.3 
Despite the above juxtaposition, we do acknowledge interplay between these two 
poles of civil society and government. We only start our analysis from the other end of 
the continuum. This means that we evaluate the role of the state and government as 
instruments of national unity by identifying characteristics in the top-down discourses 
that have been successfully mediated to penetrate into civil society. This entails examining 
those facets of popular articulations of national unity that belong in an officially 
sanctioned discourse in the sense of having a legalist and statist emphasis and dealing 
explicitly with the role of the state in the management, or orchestration, of immigration.
2 Here our assessment of the parliamentary debates is delimited by the framework established in the 
second section. For a grounded descriptive of the parliamentary debates on the Aliens Act of 2004, 
see Pellander, Saara. 2009. “Sending and Receiving, Welcoming and Excluding: Developments and 
Debates in Finland’s Migration Policy.” Pp. 128-136 in Debating Migration: Political Discourse on Labor 
Immigration in Historical Perspective, edited by M. Spång and S. Mayer. Innsburg: Studien Verlag.
3 An example of the classic with the emphasis on the latter kind of bottom-up channeling would be 
Lipset, Seymour M. and Stein Rokkan, ed. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National 
Perspectives. New York: Free Press, whereas our approach would share its starting point with histo-
rical institutionalist classics such as Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
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This approach is particularly interesting within the context of immigration, 
because at the same time that some contend that the role of the state and the national 
context are becoming less pertinent in the actual process of immigrant integration 
(Caponio and Borkert 2010), the articulations of how the state should manage 
the increase in the allegedly immigration-induced societal heterogeneity appear 
to be proliferating within the Finnish public debate. While we exemplify these 
articulations with only the Finnish context in mind, there is good reason to believe 
that the propagation of the statist critique of immigration within civil society is not a 
Finnish anomaly. Rather, this tendency could be hypothesised as a common feature 
of countries with a long welfare-state tradition and an enduring support for it even 
in the face of new serious macro-level challenges, as is particularly the case with the 
Nordic countries (Hemerijk 2004:184-185). 
The relevance of the emphasis on the Finnish context can also be justified by 
regarding it as a ‘case’ where nation-minded articulations seek to challenge a 
supranational harmonisation of immigration related norms. The notion that national 
European regimes of immigration law are increasingly being constrained by the 
international discourse of human rights and free mobility – as stressed in treaties 
signed by most of the union countries – has become increasingly challenged (see, for 
example, Lahav 2004:26). This is also a further reason for not considering the Finnish 
public sphere here as an object of research per se, but rather as context, where many 
ubiquitously transnational juxtapositions are articulated.  
Exploring the legislative dimension of immigration from ministry-level 
preparation through parliamentary performances to media discourses and public 
debates allows us to sketch a discursive continuum addressing the reinforcement of 
national unity from a top-down perspective. Especially for societies that are marked 
by relatively high levels of homogeneity in terms of ethnicity, the legislative process 
seeks to gather support from citizenry by reproducing many of the constructions of 
national unity that proliferate throughout civil society. However, to the extent that 
these legislative constructions are forged as tools for distinguishing existing, ‘good’ 
national’ practices from those perceived as of foreign origin, the top-down dimension 
effectively reproduces ethnocentric particularisation in civil society instead of only 
passively reflecting some supposedly existing civic consensus.4 In terms of theoretical 
contributions, it is useful to consider the conclusions based on the Finnish data to 
give grounds for some tentative extrapolations concerning the nature of impediments 
that articulations of national unity may pose for the development of immigration and 
integration regimes and how some of these hurdles might be discursively overcome.
4 While there is, naturally, a significant pressure from the grass root level to influence public policy 
pertaining to immigration, our focus on representations of Finnishness exclusively in legislation-rele-
vant discourse does not allow us to explore that avenue within the confines of this paper.
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8.2  Framing the boundary-work of national unity – a model of 
discursive practices with reference to the preparatory process of 
the Aliens Act of 2004
A multiplicity of societal practices and discourses incorporate the socio-spatial 
specifications of who is included and who is excluded (Paasi 2002:158) and, as such, 
these boundary-defining practices play a key role in the process of establishing and 
reproducing national unity. Configurations of these ‘symbolic boundaries’ have 
also been used to illustrate the sharpened public opinion toward immigration into 
European countries (see Bail 2008). Put simply, collective identification, solidarity 
and the sense of unity in the bonding sense of social capital (see Putnam 2000:20-
23) are negotiated in relation to these borders that also establish a more or less 
dichotomised relationship to an immigrant Other. We propose that a constructionist 
mindset in the analysis allows an acknowledgment of the top-down reproduction 
of national unity around the normalising institutional frames as one of the implicit 
co-products of this form of Othering, to which ‘immigrants’ (as a group purportedly 
forming a unitary whole) are subjected (concerning the use of reified categories in 
Othering, see, for example, Hall 1997).5
Here, a national immigration regime becomes crucial in the reproduction of 
national unity since such a regime incorporates an institutionalised, legal stance 
towards the Other. Moreover, such a national regime is not only manifest in the 
legislation but also reflects on the ‘public philosophies’ of the state’s role in the 
integration of immigrants (see Favell 2001:14-16) as exemplified in part within the 
public debate on immigration legislation. Therefore, in order to study how national 
unity has been reproduced in Finland during the past decade, one important aspect 
to examine is how the articulations of the state’s role in managing immigration 
contributes to this boundary-work by facilitating a national variant of unity as a 
counterpoise to the perceived immigrant-induced heterogeneity. This is also how 
these discourses can be linked to the practice of Othering in the Finnish context.6
There is another reason for concentrating on these discursively formed 
boundaries, as opposed to some quantitative immigration-relevant phenomena. 
Namely – as also suggested by our data – it is a relatively common perception among 
5 It is relatively common in Finland to debate immigration with reference to the category of immi-
grants who, nevertheless, constitute a highly variable spectrum of people – refugees from Africa, 
migrant workers from Eastern Europe, skilled workers from US and wealthier European countries. It 
is questionable if they indeed do have some common denominator that is pertinent to many of the 
arguments made about ‘immigrants’. This reification of represented categories is also criticized by 
Hall on a more theoretical level.
6 It is not possible to present a historical discussion of immigration and othering in Finland here. For 
good analysis on the process of othering towards immigrant minorities in Finland, see, for example, 
Löytty 2005.
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autochthonous populations who nurture narratives of an ethno-national homogeneity 
of the past to regard societal heterogenisation as significantly immigration-induced. 
These perceptions may spread even when asserting them may be clearly at odds with 
the demographic hard data on the magnitude of the impact of immigration. Indeed, 
often there are a myriad of other societal phenomena at work that may be much more 
efficient in eroding the traditional notion of the citizenry as homogenous (see, for 
example, Soysal 1994). 
Such a development is particularly pertinent to Finland, which is also underlined 
by the fact that a markedly heated political and public debate has evolved over the 
phenomenon in the late 2000s (on the proliferation of anti-immigration sentiment 
in public debate and the ‘I am not a racist, but…’ discourse, see Keskinen 2009). 
This discursive development can be contrasted with the demographic fact by that, 
concurrently, the country has consistently experienced levels of immigration 
significantly below that of EU-15 countries.7 
Indeed, we argue that within the Nordic welfare state context, nation-specific 
unity and solidarity constructions do play a major part in the way a ‘just’ and 
‘practicable’ form of immigration management and integration is conceptualised. It 
seems that these relatively idiosyncratic considerations – rather than an application 
of some quantitative and objectively perceivable indicators – is what defines to a 
large degree how the policy programmes and other top-down measures for regulating 
immigration and organising immigrant integration are formulated by the government 
and evaluated by the citizens.
The discontinuity between perceptions and objective quantifiers pertaining 
to immigration is noticeable throughout assessed discourses. This suggests that – 
although commonly framed otherwise by the discussants themselves – the material 
well-being of an ethnic Finn in Finland is not the explicit cause of anxiety in the 
discourses. Rather, the immigration-related anxiety concerns questions of identity 
that can be understood in terms of the third Lukesian level of power. According to 
Lukes, the first dimension of power is manifest in an explicit conflict of interest; for 
example, when one manner of redistribution is being chosen over others that are 
on the table. The second level pertains to the agenda setting power – the question 
of what issues are brought on the table in the first place. Finally, the most relevant 
dimension in the context of our study is the third dimension, which entails the power 
to change what people want by creating new kinds of identities (Lukes 1974:21-26). 
7 United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, “International 
Migration 2006” in United Nations Publication, No. E.06.XIII.6, March 2006. The discontinuity bet-
ween the demographic reality and the public debate around immigration further suggests that the 
discursive construction of the phenomenon of immigration is highly dependent on nation-specific 
logic, rather than on search for some neoliberal rationalized optimal outcomes.
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It is from many perspectives useful to conceptualise Othering in terms of this 
third dimension of power, since the anxiety over national unity is rarely reducible 
either to the struggle for material resources or the ability of the ‘power elite' to put 
immigrant issues on the political agenda. Rather, this third dimension of power, 
denoting the control over the subjectively experienced, identity-relevant interests, 
has great potential to explain the perceived need for top-down management of 
immigrant integration in terms of containment of increasing heterogenisation which 
is supposedly significantly eroding the national unity. As noted earlier, a more 
constructive, research-oriented approach allows us to see how the relative strength 
of the heterogenising impact of immigration vis-à-vis other, pre-existing processes of 
heterogenisation is highly questionable. The same applies for the empirical validity 
of the discourse linking national unity and the economic feasibility of welfare 
structures (Crepaz 2006). Therefore, with an emphasis on the discursive level, we 
have identified four discursive frames that produce national unity through Othering 
in the preparatory work of the Aliens Act of 2004. In the following we will first briefly 
introduce some interesting particularities of the Act. Then we will illustrate each of 
the aforementioned frames and their interconnectedness with concrete examples 
from the legislative context, before finally analysing the parliamentary and media 
debates by applying the same four-fold framework.
Starting in 2000, the Ministry of the Interior organised an extensive legislative 
review of the Aliens Act, even though the old act had only been enacted nine years 
before. According to the then Minister of the Interior Kari Rajamäki (SD)8, the review 
was motivated by the need to prepare the legislative means to confront the inflow of 
immigrants from the upcoming enlargement of the EU in May 2004 and to capitalise 
on the assets of international migration whilst eliminating any possible negative 
repercussions for Finland (PTK 40/2003 vp). The extension of the preparatory 
work over five years is partly explained by the parliamentary elections and change 
of the government in the middle of the process in 2003, but the delay can also be 
attributed to what Rajamäki calls the ‘extensive, active hearing-process of national 
and international NGOs' (Ibid.).
The breadth over which this hearing-process was extended is indeed significant 
in the Finnish context, consisting of over 60 civic bodies. However, regardless of 
this extensive hearing-process, the memos of the parliamentary committees (most 
significantly, see Memorandum of the Parliamentary Administrative Committee, 
HaVM 4/2003) that assess the expert statements submitted by the human rights and 
migration NGOs indicate that the vast majority of the feedback (see, Ministry of Interior, 
8 SDP = The Finnish Social Democratic Party. The other party abbreviations used in this  paper are: 
NC, The National Coalition Party; SPP, The Swedish People’s Party; C, The  Centre Party of Finland; 
CD, The Christian Democrats; TF, The True Finns; G, The Green League of Finland; LA, The Left Alli-
ance.
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The General Overview of the Statements Concerning Aliens Act Memorandum), 
although formally ‘heard’ in the preparatory process, has not been discussed and 
considered in the committees. 
This indicates that extensiveness of the hearing process does not seem to 
correlate with any measurable increase in the political power or influence of the 
expert organisations that were heard. Moreover, of the few NGO-mediated revisions 
acknowledged and initially supported by the committees (such as the removal of 
the anomalous right to appeal from the Finnish Immigration Service or the right for 
recently graduated students to extend their stay while seeking employment), most 
failed to influence the letter of the law.  In light of this, the official rhetoric of laudation 
pertaining to the role and the impact of this hearing-process in the preparation of the 
Aliens Act of 2004 can be disputed. 
A key into understanding the nature of this highly selective incorporation of 
elements from the hearing process into the statute can be found in the Othering and 
national unity producing discursive practices visible in the preparatory process – 
especially to the extent that similar discursive practices appear in the parliamentary 
and media debates. This boundary-work of national unity exhibits a unifying 
welfare state rationale. However, this boundary-work does not commonly manifest 
itself as direct opposition to some concrete or explicit policy measures. Rather, the 
impediments it creates for integrative accommodations tend to get formulated as 
assertions for distinct and particular forms of national unity that can then be used 
as a basis for various policy measures. One of the paradoxes of these assertions of 
unity is that this unity is simultaneously perceived as independently existing but 
also requiring support from the state in the form of an officially articulated legislative 
regime that alleviates the impact of the supposedly immigrant-induced increase in 
heterogeneity. 
In the following we identify four discursive frames manifesting this top-
down rationale of a national legal control of the perceived immigration-induced 
heterogenisation. An awareness of the national unity discourses that consistently 
frame immigration debates on various levels enables critique and alterations in a way 
that can anticipate some of the most typical hindrances that the welfare-state context 
may facilitate in the development of a more accommodative integration regime.
Our material points to the conclusion that immigration is regarded as a catalyst in 
the heterogenisation of values, which advances societal change and inequity and that 
attains specific negative attention in the analyzed discourses. We suggest that it is 
against this tendency that national unity is being reinforced with four key discourses 
that span the top-down continuum from the preparation in the ministries, to the 
parliamentary debates, to debates in media and internet fora. The four discursive 
frames considered in our analysis can be illustrated and linked together as indicated 
in the graph below: 
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Figure 1: Top-down discourses exhibiting unity-producing rationale in a welfare-state context
The first frame we call ‘instrumentalism' since there appears to be an inclination to 
portray the immigration question as one of instrumental management of pros and 
cons in which minimising the cons gets a significant priority. An example of the use 
of this frame can be found in the account of Minister of Interior Rajamäki, who first 
presents the governmental bill to the parliament. According to Rajamäki, reaping the 
benefits of immigration must be subject to minimising its ill effects to the greatest 
possible extent:
[T]he positive aspects of the cross-border migration flows had to be capitalised on while keeping its 
ill effects as small as possible. [...] The government considers it important that the motion for the 
Aliens Act will be given to the parliament [...] as soon as possible with the aforementioned justifi-
cation. (PTK 40/2003 vp) (a).
While it is only logical to try to minimise the ill effects of any societal phenomenon, 
the direction of this instrumentalism is significant. Namely, a rationale in which 
minimising the disadvantages would be subject to receiving the maximal benefits 
from immigration, forms a scenario very different from the one proposed by 
Rajamäki where reaping any benefits is first and foremost subject to minimising the 
perceived disadvantages. This primacy of averting ill effects amounts to a markedly 
assimilationist hierarchy in the conceptualisation of the administration of immigrant 
affairs. It is also strictly at odds with the more multiculturalist accounts – favoured 
by many minority NGOs – that regard sustainable immigration as primarily a process 
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of give-and-take.9 Rajamäki’s address suggests that the prudent way to organise 
immigration is rooted minimising the ‘gives’ rather than maximising the ‘takes’. This 
strategy suggests that the official stance emphasising national unity is not particularly 
keen to embrace the aspect of mutual exchange and compromise in immigration, 
even when there are some quantifiable assets to be secured.
The second frame, solidarity, pertains to a common, ostensibly civic (i.e. non-
ethnically based) unity which is regarded as an important means for limiting socio-
cultural stratification. This is a highly salient frame to be considered here because, as 
noted earlier, stratification as a central negative effect from societal heterogenisation 
is commonly interpreted as being due to increased immigration. Juxtaposition of 
national security and the immigrants’ rights in the preparatory material is a clear 
manifestation of this assimilationist solidarity frame. Rajamäki nails down this 
dichotomy in passing: 
The most fundamental aim [of the revision of the Aliens Act] has been to find a balanced whole 
where Finnish internal security as well as the rights of the alien residents and immigrating aliens 
are taken into consideration. (PTK 40/2003 vp) (b).
While Rajamäki argues that it is possible to balance between the two considerations, 
the fact that he regards them as the opposing ends of a spectrum is telling. Since 
Rajamäki does not consider it necessary to explicate why and how exactly national 
security requires compromises pertaining to immigrants' rights and vice versa, one 
can only assume that the connection is somehow direct and self-evident; that the 
existence of an immigrant minority population with a wide range of rights is in and 
of itself a challenge to national security in terms of the security of a particular form of 
nation — the allegedly shared experience of security in Finnishness. 
The validity of this assessment is reinforced in the study by the Finnish Institute 
of Migration, ordered by the Ministry of Labour in 1999 and used as background 
information in the preparatory process also for the Aliens Act of 2004. In defining the 
term ‘ethnocentrism’ as the willingness to live without social disruptions caused by 
the presence of outsider practices, the governmental document also bluntly states: 
‘Finns are mostly ethnocentrists’ (Ministry of Labour, 15.9.1999). This perceived 
ethnocentrism as a commonly shared trait in the electorate renders Rajamäki's 
curtness intelligible. An inflow of immigrants with a set of rights (also cultural in 
nature) does challenge the security of the continuity of certain national practices to 
the extent that they have enabled by the relatively homogenous ethnic background 
(such as singing religious hymns in festivities in public schools). These practices are, 
by definition, attributed an inherent value within an ethnocentric mindset. However, 
what makes solidarity a problematic discursive frame is that emphasis on ‘solidarity’ 
9 See, for instance, Taylor 1992; Kymlicka 1995.
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may entail support for practices and ideas that are only indicative of a pre-existing 
solidarity and as such possibly everything but solidarity-building.
The third discursive frame, ‘tradition of consensuality’, is perhaps the most 
complex of the frames and refers to a practice that has for decades been considered 
central in Nordic decision-making based on proportional representation (see, for 
example, Lepola 2010). Our data indicates it is also commonly invoked as an element 
reproducing national solidarity. Indeed, the power-sharing and majority-restricting 
elements considered to be in the core of consensualism10 do have many links to 
bridging solidarity functions (see, for instance, Schuller, Baron and Field 2000:10). 
The practical reality is somewhat different, however. While the preparatory material 
of the Aliens Act that seeks to portray the traditional Finnish decision-making system 
as one incorporating consensuality at its core, the attempts to apply such principles 
in more heterogeneous and diverse contemporary contexts are questionable at best. 
Legislative counsellor Jorma Kantola – the civil servant in the Ministry of Interior 
in charge of the preparation of the Aliens Act – challenges the critique according to 
which minority opinions were not acknowledged in preparation with a particularly 
idiosyncratic argument: 
Some NGOs have been disappointed in the Aliens Act claiming that it failed to note opinions 
expressed by the minorities, but that is not true. All statements were duly noted. But it is not easy 
to implement minority opinions when the majority disagrees. (Interview of Legislative Councellor 
Jorma Kantola from the Ministry of Interior in 5.12.2008) (c).
This indicates that while the importance of this consensual tradition of decision-
making is asserted in the studied discourses, the actual history of relatively high 
ethnic homogeneity furnishes the system with a distinct majoritarian bias. Instead 
of forming new ways to conceptualise and implement consensualism in a more 
heterogenised societal setting, old ways of governance are still referred to in terms 
of ‘consensualism’. This means that power sharing is understood only as a practice 
taking place among the various factions inside a pre-existing sphere of solidarity but 
quickly skipping the invitations to mutual compromises by the immigrant Other that 
appears external to the sphere of solidarity. 
A similar dichotomy between hearing a member of a minority group and acting 
upon what is heard is present in many places in the Act itself. A good example of this 
is presented in a memo by the Administrative committee stressing the importance ‘to 
evaluate the entirety of the child’s best interests, also by taking into consideration 
the opinions, wishes and individual needs of the child, where appropriate [...]’ (HaVM 
4/2004 vp) (d). While hearing minority members in issues concerning them has 
10 For a distinction between the ideal types of majoritarian and consensus democracies, see Lijphart 
1984.
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certain legitimising value, the substantial purpose for hearing a minority (member) 
both in preparation and implementation of a law remains unclear when weighted 
against this allegedly consensual, but actually majoritarian practice. To the extent 
that the officially recorded minority perspectives coincide with the majority ones, the 
practice of hearing minorities does create a semblance of a multiculturally minded 
administrative process. It is, therefore, only when the minority views would challenge 
the majority's way, where the national security is nested (as Rajamäki alluded), that 
the assimilative bias we suggest can be observed.
The last frame, governmentality, is not related to any Foucauldian framework. 
Rather, governmentalism entails the norm of wilful subjection to the decisions 
made by the government. This norm is legitimised, in part, through the assertions 
of consensuality in a political decision-making system, thus establishing a threshold 
for any objections against purportedly commonly reached decisions. Effectively, 
governmentalism as a discursive frame attaches a strong positive, republican value 
in yielding to administrative control by a paternalist welfare-state. This is established 
by portraying such control as adding to the person’s own capabilities to exercise 
power through the state. This value of governmentality is highly desirable from the 
instrumentalist point of view, because the norm of submission sustains a power-wise 
economical form of governance.
The issues concerning the well-being of the immigrant minorities that the 
parliamentary committees raise are commonly considered possible to be remedied 
through relatively paternalistic state-mediated interventions. Such interventions, of 
course, belong to the core operating modes of the welfare state, which is sometimes 
portrayed as the ‘People’s Home’ (Esping-Andersen 1990:67-69) and are not peculiar 
to Finnish immigration policy per se. This fact, nevertheless, only underlines the 
saliency of these welfare considerations in the endeavour to integrate immigrants 
into a welfare-state. The motion for an alternative Aliens Act by Esko-Juhani Tennilä 
(LA), although opposed by the Administrative parliamentary committee, suggested an 
exemplary paternal expansion. According to him, in labour disputes where a foreign 
citizen is a party, the state capabilities to intervene should be expanded by effectually 
allocating many minor complainant offences under public prosecution by furnishing 
the labour market organisations with the right to sue (LA 163/2003 vp).
It is worth noting that here Tennilä argues for corporative representation of 
immigrants in courts instead of a legally protected right for the immigrants to seek 
legal counsel from the said organisations. It seems therefore that the measure is not 
primarily intended to help immigrants to integrate but rather to ‘take care' of them, 
while also making it more risky for corporations to hire foreign labour in comparison to 
native workers. This case suggests that the accentuation of the paternalist tendencies 
of this ‘welfare Finnishness' is seen as more legitimate when applied to the immigrant 
minority population. While extrapolation from a single case is always subject to many 
caveats, in the light of these considerations, it becomes interesting to assess in more 
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detail the extent to which immigration is used to expand the scope the welfare state's 
corporatist responsibilities.11
It must be noted that while this fourfold framework is illustrated through 
examples from the preparatory legislative context, each of the contexts – the legal 
jargon, the parliamentarians’ performances and the mediated civic debate – would 
enable quite divergent ways to interpret the frames. This means, of course, that using 
a unique framework for each of these contexts could also be justified. However, as 
we will illustrate in the following, the four national unity discourses identified do 
permeate through the dimensions we analyse, even if they manifest in different 
forms depending on the context. Moreover, we do not seek to exhaustively describe 
the three dimensions but rather look for similarities between them that are pertinent 
to national unity constructions in a welfare state context. Therefore, the uniform 
application of this four-fold framework allows us to pursue this goal and show how 
exactly this welfare state rationale of national unity can delimit the ways immigration 
questions are debated at various levels of society.
8.3  Parliamentarians’ constructions of national unity through the 
state
It is commonly accepted that the plenary discussions of the parliament have little 
relevance to the policy-level of actual political decision-making. The debates serve 
other functions — those of political performance, symbolic representation, and public 
ideological and argumentative contestation (see Pekonen 2008, Turja 2008). Taking 
this understanding of the parliamentary discussions as the point of departure, this 
section examines claims made about the proper role of the state vis-à-vis immigration 
and foreigners in the plenary debates on the 2004 Aliens Act12, complemented by an 
analysis of the 1999 Integration Act from roughly the same time period.13 In total, the 
11 An alternative way to conceptualize the immigrants’ role in the development of the welfare state is 
to see immigrant minorities as a catalyst through which a variety of conflicting Finnish agendas can 
be advanced. For instance, the next section considers Paula Kokkonen’s (NC) speech (PTK 74/2002 vp) 
where Kokkonen warns of the mistake of building the integration system into ‘another totalitarian 
system, building of which we have been too fond of.’ This could be read as an integration-mediated 
argument for dismantling some of the existing welfare structures considered by the right wing parties 
as ‘totalitarian’.
12 As a measure to restrict the size of the material, debates on the government bill (HE 265/2002 vp), 
which expired due to the parliamentary elections in 2003, were not included.
13 A follow-up debate on the Government Report on the implementation of the law (VNS 5/2002, 
HaVM 20/2002), 5.2.2003. In contrast to the Aliens Act debates, this debate stems from the time before 
the 2003 general elections. The debate was included in the material in order to diversify the empirical 
base. Nevertheless, the Integration Act debate constitutes only a small share of the overall text mate-
rial and is consequently drawn on less than the Aliens Act debates.
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empirical material covers six debates of various lengths from a fourteen month period 
in 2003–2004. The material contains over two hundred addresses by almost seventy 
parliamentarians. Fourteen parliamentarians feature as especially active debaters in 
this material, most participants addressing the floor only once or twice. 
The purpose of the parliamentary debate on the Integration Act was to approve a 
government implementation report; the discussion largely deals with general aspects 
of good immigrant integration and contains relatively few addresses which are 
confrontational in tone. The proposed bill for the Aliens Act is a matter of a different 
nature. The material is saturated by a persistent disagreement about a few different 
aspects of the law, especially issues related to asylum seekers from the ‘safe countries', 
the ‘grey economy' and the access of foreign labour to certain seasonal jobs without 
work permits. Other recurrent themes include foreign degree students' possibilities 
to stay in Finland for work and the rights of asylum seeking minors. While several 
parliamentarians expressed trust in Minister Rajamäki's leadership, some criticised 
both the bill and the preamble for shortcomings. It is acknowledged in the discussion 
that much of the disagreement springs from the difference in values and priorities 
between those who stress the security and economics of the nation-state and those 
who take human rights as their point of departure (see Hiltunen (SD) in PTK 39/2004). 
In the following, we aim at detecting how the four frames established in the first 
section of this chapter are present in the debate material. We seek to demonstrate 
how parliamentarians construct aims and roles for the state, emphasising the frames 
identified earlier. In the empirical data covered in this section, these frames translate 
into: 1) solidarity towards Finns (selective solidarity), 2) calculative management of 
migration (instrumentalism), 3) the strong embrace of the state (governmentality), and 
4) conceptions of the sound decision-making process (tradition of ‘consensualism’). 
While the relationship between the discourses within our set of data remains as 
suggested in the previous section, the frames are discussed in a different order in this 
section than in sections two and four. This is because the parliamentarians typically 
debate in a manner that establishes solidarity towards fellow citizens (or towards 
the ‘weak refugees’ as in the counter-discourse) as the justification for the reasoning 
within other discursive frames. The qualities of a sound political process, on the 
other hand, receive relatively little attention in this material, and thus, that frame is 
discussed last. Moreover, we employ an approach which concentrates especially on 
talk that represents migration as a source of problems for Finland beyond most other 
challenges the country has to face. In order to complement the main analysis, we also 
point out some instances of parliamentarians proposing alternative conceptions to 
the dominant ways of discussing the topics at hand.
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8.3.1  National solidarity
Growing international migration increasingly challenges states to deal with the 
question of who the state is responsible to protect and care for. Struggles to reinforce 
old boundaries of solidarity and establish new ones are also present in the Finnish 
parliament. Notably, the debates on the Aliens Act reveal two distinct approaches: 
the idea that as a sovereign nation Finland can legitimately care more for Finns than 
for immigrant Others, and a challenge to this discourse which emphasises wider 
responsibilities, international conventions and human rights. Ulla Anttila (The Green 
League, PTK 39/2004 vp) formulates this latter position neatly: ‘As to if Finland is quite 
a separate state […] I don’t myself quite believe in it.’ (e). This more rights-oriented way 
of arguing about the relationship between the Finnish state and foreigners cannot 
be described as marginal as it appears as a strongly defended line of argumentation 
alongside the dominant, more restrained view of the state’s responsibilities. Due to 
our analytic focus, however, we concentrate below on describing the dominant frame 
of national solidarity.
The task of this parliament [...] is to take care of our own citizens. In certain situations, taking care 
of our own citizens provides that we receive [...] foreign workers [and] refugees [and] take care of 
them. It’s a part of the whole. But [...] the primary task is that we in this hall decide first and fore-
most on the problems of Finnish people. – Ahti Vielma, NC (PTK 39/2004 vp) (f).
Finland and Finns always have the right to decide who and how many come here. It is our task and 
our right in this country, as the Turkish have in Turkey, Slovaks in Slovakia and Swedes in Sweden. 
This is a national question. – Timo Soini, TF (PTK 39/2004 vp) (g).
In a world where the state has lost many of its previous powers to control 
movements of capital and means of production, the management of people seems 
to lend itself to the discursive reproduction of sovereignty, a conception evident in 
the quote by Timo Soini above. According to the MPs following this line of argument, 
national self-interest – aiming at the best possible (economic) outcome for Finns – 
is natural (e.g. Zyskowicz PTK 39/2004 vp). In a very clear form, this preference is 
manifested in claims that labour immigration should not be excessively encouraged 
or at all considered as long as there are Finns out of work (e.g. Rönni 39/2004 vp). 
Correspondingly, the countries of emigration are portrayed as sovereign entities, and 
recruitment from areas that suffer from emigration is condemned. This view can be 
exemplified by a quote from a Social Democratic MP in the Integration Act debate 
who establishes that ‘it is not either in the interest of Finland that we would coax the 
best work force of the small Estonia to come here, rather it [the work force] should be 
there, taking care of patriotic duties.’ (Skinnari PTK 195/2002 vp) (h). 
Parliamentarians also attach themselves to the frame of national solidarity 
in less explicit ways. The fact that Finnish citizens are consistently referred to in 
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the parliamentary debates simply as Finns (suomalainen) – a word also bearing a 
connotation of Finnish ethnicity – connects the idea of solidarity between citizens 
of a state to solidarity between people of shared ethnicity (see Lepola 2000). Pride 
in the nationally developed structures, distinctiveness of other cultures and the 
priority of the current arrangements (in contrast to new ones) are hinted at in 
expressions such as ‘rules of the game of the Finnish labour market’, ‘norms of 
Finnish society’ or ‘becoming a part of the normal Finnish every-day life’, when 
appearing in contexts where the idea would be comprehensible without the 
national attribute or could, for the sake of the main point, be replaced by another 
word (e.g. ‘rules of the good working life’). The idea of putting the Finns first runs 
through most of the other topics discussed in this section; in particular, this idea 
is clear in both the discourse of costs and gains of immigration and in that about 
racism. 
8.3.2  Costs and gains 
The costs-and-gains frame is frequently employed in the debates. Calculative 
approaches to migration and diversity appear in the material as references both to 
positive potential and to negative expenses. While it is possible to see the references 
to ‘resources’ as opposed to articulations of the ‘costs’, the two approaches share the 
logic of measurability and rationality. Partly, the economic-rationality discussion 
relates to the efficiency of the public systems – for example claims that the municipal 
economies should not be burdened further or that it would cost little to expand 
service in English. However, the parliamentarians also try to assess the qualities of 
migrants. While the economic potential carried by migrants is particularly lucidly 
acknowledged in the Integration Act debate, the concern about costs is pervasive in 
the debates on the Aliens Act.
The discourse of direct gains incorporates articulations of the need to import 
experts and specific groups of skilled workers in order for Finland to perform 
economically well. This point is presented in a straight-forward manner, and 
extends to foreign degree students, whose possibilities to stay for a job-search in 
Finland after graduation are restricted by rigid residence permit rules. Not being 
able to stay to work renders the investment into these people’s (often tuition-free) 
education unproductive. A more subtle register for articulation comes into play 
when considering the potential gains related to migrants who are currently outside 
the labour market. For those who emphasise the value of migrants, the arguments 
deal with the future needs at hand, recognition of the skills instead of mistrusting 
applicants with a foreign background, and seeing education of immigrants as an 
investment rather than as a cost. This idea of resources that are yet to be discovered 
is captured in a quote by a Centre MP: 
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Finland does have a comparably short immigration history. Maybe that’s why we are not yet fully 
capable of recognising and utilising the social, linguistic and cultural know-how brought by immi-
grants. Taking into productive use of this existing but untapped resource would serve Finland on 
various fronts. – Paula Lehtomäki, C, (PTK 195/2002) (i).
Things get more complicated when we turn to the cost-side, since not all costs are 
equally negatively loaded. Even promoters of the strictest entry policy are quick to 
underline that those in ‘real distress’ should be allowed to stay. To discern between 
the worthy and the scam asylum seekers is one of the core elements of the costs 
discourse pertaining to individual migrants. MPs engaging in a disapproval of the 
undeserving asylum seekers, operate with clear categories of ‘real’ and ‘unreal’, as 
illuminatingly expressed by a Social Democratic MP: 
If only someone would bring [to light] the figure in a quite straight forward way and tell the truth 
about who are real refugees and who have only come in the hope of better [life] [...]. – Tero Rönni, 
SD, (39/2004 vp) (j).
Legitimate distress is not often very thoroughly defined by those referring to it. 
The expression ‘life in danger’ appears in this connection (Soini PTK 45/2004 vp), 
clearly not implying endangered subsistence due to economic or social but political 
reasons. It is clear, nevertheless, that the vast majority of asylum seekers are seen 
by these debaters as undeserving and directly consuming the public budget. For 
example, the Central and Eastern European Roma may be discriminated against, but 
not persecuted – an understanding which a few parliamentarians, nevertheless, do 
strongly challenge. 
The argument of those focussed on the false asylum cases has two facets. On 
the one hand, the welfare provision to ungrounded asylum seekers is claimed to 
translate directly into diminished public expenditure on deserving Finns. On the 
other hand, the resources of the reception system are viewed as relatively stable since 
the sluggishness of granting protection to those worthy of it is said to be caused by the 
burden of processing the bogus applications: ‘The more we have people groundlessly 
applying for asylum, who only have arrived in order to seek access our social welfare, 
the less resources we are left with to receive those individuals who would really be in 
need of asylum.' (Hemmilä, NC, PTK 39/2004 vp, see also Paajanen and Oinonen in 
the same debate) (k). These calculations construct the asylum seeker as an ultimately 
immoral individual who whittles away the welfare of Finns in need and stands in 
the way of a deserved new life of the few truly persecuted applicants. In a similarly 
dual argument, the substandard wages paid to foreign workers are referred to both 
as a violation of the rights belonging to the foreigners themselves (cf. worthy asylum 
seekers) and a reason for the economic suffering of many Finnish workers (see PTK 
16/2004). 
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8.3.3  The strong embrace of the state 
Closely related to the frame discussed above, the next frame relates to the understanding 
of the state as a potent actor capable of governing and administering various aspects of 
life successfully. This notion of the internally strong and legitimate state manifests in 
claims by the parliamentarians which call for more state responsibility within Finnish 
society, at times to the extent that these wishes could be characterised as paternalist. 
Responsibility is notably called for in relation to two themes: the preservation of high 
morals of the citizens through state regulation, and the education of immigrants.
It is very important to act against the grey economy, because if it is allowed to grow [...] it almost 
inevitably erodes Finnish working morals, Finnish ethics, our conduct. This particularly high ethics, 
that taxes are paid and fines are paid [...] has, after all, been born in the course of hundreds of 
years. This kind of moral ethics can also weaken relatively quickly if space is given. – Kari Uotila, 
Left Alliance (PTK 16/2004 vp) (l).
The claim to protect the morals of Finns appears to address two topics, one related 
to work and the other to racism. Firstly, a clear division is established between 
orderly Finnish work and the ‘wild’, ‘grey’ economy attached to foreign workers. This 
is expressed, among other instances, by Matti Kangas’ (LA) illustrative expression 
‘ungoverned immigration messes up the labour market’ (PTK 40/2003 vp) (m). His 
choice of verb [‘sotkea’, to stain] carries a connotation to dirt thus linking disorder 
and impurity (see Douglas 2005 [1966]), the potential for which the labour migrants 
carry within themselves. In general, the Finnish nationality of the employers 
allegedly committing breaches of laws and agreements is not referred to. This pattern 
is, however, broken by a Left Alliance representative, stating that it is the Finnish 
employers who exploit labourers legally entering Finland (Laakso (LA), PTK 40/2003 
vp). This address can be read as an alternative counter-position (capitalist–worker) to 
the one focussed on nationality (Finns–foreigners).
The morality of ethnic Finns is further presented as precarious and threatened by 
outside forces through the references to racism. Racism is called a ‘sickness’ (Tiusanen, 
PTK 99/2003 vp) which should be strongly objected to – and the means proposed 
is the control of immigration and monitoring of foreigners within the country. It is 
intriguing that the alleged prevalence of racism can be drawn on in this discussion 
to make legitimate claims about restrictive policy. To try to discern whether the talk 
about racism demonstrates a genuine concern for discrimination or whether racism is 
simply rhetorically employed as a deterrent is not of relevance for our analysis. 
In the addresses concerned with racism, both the ‘grey’ foreign work force and 
the groundless asylum seekers present a moral hazard: It is argued or feared that 
‘the people’ (Finns) cannot accept the public spending on the asylum system in 
which many applicants are not eligible (but ‘ungrounded’), and/or that ‘the people’ 
cannot accept being offered lower pay following from the ‘dumping’ of wages due to 
unfair foreign competition. Consequently, the citizens are said to develop undesired 
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racist attitudes and resentment towards all foreigners, including the innocent 
ones.14 In an extreme depiction below, a MP even links domestic violence and the 
management of immigration policy. Again, the state is called for to act to manage 
immigration to guard the well-being – the morals as well as material security – of 
Finns.
[I]f we can handle this foreigner policy right, it will also effectively prevent the furthering of racism, 
which already now smoulders [...] kind of hidden in many places and in people’s minds, but doesn’t 
manifest itself. We [the Finns] are the kind of people that we grouse and grouse and then go behind 
the house and give the wife and the kids a caning, and talk like ‘I would have wanted to say it in the 
meeting and I should have told those people home truths for once’, but as one doesn’t dare to say, 
they go behind the house and do that [the caning]. [...] [W]hen racism really breaks out, like it did 
in Joensuu, it was indeed because too many folk [foreigners] pack in one place and people [Finns] 
feel they are now in an unequal position. – Tero Rönni, SD, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (n).
The racism issue was debated in conjunction with the Aliens Act. The Integration Act 
debates, however, show another side to the frame that highlights state involvement 
in the citizens’ lives. Here, the state is attached to connotations of a benign actor 
with responsibilities towards the education of newcomers. The Integration Act 
particularly concerns resident foreigners who are in weak positions in society – 
individuals with a refugee background, for example. Unlike the Aliens Act debates, 
the right to stay is not disputed in the Integration Act debate, and the discussion 
revolves around the conditions for the newcomers’ ‘integration’ into society. In other 
words, while the most debated type of immigrant in the Aliens Act was a scheming 
asylum seeker, the ‘protagonist’ of the Integration Act debate is presented as rather 
inoffensive. 
In fact, these migrants are often expected to have very low capabilities. Making an 
Integration Plan is, for example, said to aim at ‘giving the immigrant real possibilities 
to learn how to manage one’s own life and attain the skill and ability to make a living 
in Finland’ (Tiura (NC), PTK 195/2002, our emphasis) (o). The immigrants are to be 
schooled, cultivated, made aware of their position as citizens in the society and 
taught to trust the public authorities as Finns do. The role of the state thus becomes 
defined primarily as one of a caring agent especially towards youth and immigrant 
women who care for their children at home. Nevertheless, the control function – the 
obligatory nature of adaptation to Finnish society – is also occasionally highlighted. 
For example, the leader of the True Finns party suggests it would be best to assign 
an ‘individual [...] overseer to each immigrant starting in an integration programme’ 
(Soini (TF), PTK 195/2002 vp). 
14 With different emphases and angles, see e.g. Karhu PTK 39/2004 vp, Kangas PTK 40/2003 vp, 
Lahtela, E. PTK 39/2004 vp, Peltomo PTK 40/2003 vp, Salo PTK 39/2004 vp, Satonen PTK 39/2004 vp, 
Soini PTK 45/2004 vp, Tennilä PTK 45/2004 vp, Rajamäki 39/2004 vp.
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There is also a focus on the need for the public system to be perfected, especially 
in relation to coordination between offices and levels. In the following quote, it can 
be noted that even a vocal NC representative, who would normally call for some form 
of state retrenchment, actually expresses her support for the state’s involvement in 
integration work together with the third sector and the ‘integree’ him/herself (see 
Tiura, PTK 195/2002 vp). The strong system orientation is also critically noted by the 
parliamentarians themselves, as in the quote below:
It feels like, to officials, ministries and various organisations, the immigrants are only compulsory 
objects of existence who have to be guided or advised to have these [Integration] Plans made. – 
Heli Paasio, SD (PTK 195/2002 vp) (p).
8.3.4  The sound political process 
The frame of ‘consensualism’ refers to a tradition of doing politics that is particularly 
pertinent to Finland as a Nordic welfare state (Lijphart 2008:93). This tradition 
highlights inclusion in the policy process that, nevertheless, does not necessarily 
lead to a decision and output that would accommodate minority views. Rather, the 
bargaining takes place between alternatives backed by the powerful mainstream 
actors. 
This ambivalence is illustrated within the parliamentary debates material in 
Minister Rajamäki's presentation of the Aliens Act bill (PTK 40/2003). The bill had been 
presented once already, but had expired due to general elections. When bringing the 
bill to the parliament for the second time, Rajamäki referred to the extensive hearing 
round conducted previously and motivates not repeating that part of the preparation. 
His argument was that the Government was already aware of the different viewpoints 
of the various NGOs and others they had ‘actively heard' (although the validity of this 
can be questioned on the basis of the findings in the previous section). On the one 
hand, much time and effort had been put into collecting these views, but on the other, 
the Minister seemed to regard the long preparation procedure as a burden rather than 
an asset. 
The Integration Act debates also contain a few references to ‘immigrant 
participation' which relate to this frame. Claims are made for more active participation 
and cooperation with public authorities by immigrants, but it is left open to what 
this participation would mean in terms of influence. An example of this type of talk 
can be found in an address by a Social Democratic representative who claims that 
‘civic and immigrant associations should be given the possibility to participate in the 
preparation and implementation of the municipal integration programme, if they so 
wish' (Kähkönen, PTK 195/2002 vp) (q). This proposition seems to promise much but 
does not suggest concrete ways of putting such ideas into practice. The only exception 
to the pattern within our material can be found in an account by a Left Alliance 
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representative who specifically considers quota based representation in municipal 
committees for migrants and refugees arranged through the parties (Turtiainen, PTK 
195/2002 vp). The fact that no other comparably concrete suggestions appear in this 
debate indicates that consensual ways to implement ‘immigrant integration' are not 
considered in the parliament.
8.4  A macro-societal approach to immigration topics – media 
discourses and internet debates
The media stand in a dialogical relation with the social environment, where 
institutionalised practices are conceptualised and discourses of the everyday-life 
reified – simultaneously functioning as societal actors per se. For the purpose of 
studying grass root level rhetoric, however, media articles represent only a narrow 
selection of opinions, as letters to the editor pass through strict qualification systems. 
The possibility of expressing opinions publicly through print media is thus restricted, 
and this lack of anonymity strains out the harshest and the most polarizing attitudes. 
Internet-forums therefore provide a better means for this purpose of ‘venting’. To gain 
insight in the public discourses we have analyzed both media articles and internet 
debates related to the media topics – as the same themes appear at both levels, we do 
not present these separately.
Since our media material is related to legislative aspects and revolves around 
societal practices, it is important to emphasise the specificity of the findings of this 
study – media discourses related to immigration and Finnishness in general might 
address different aspects. To a large extent, the analyzed texts approach the topic 
through macro-level aspects of immigration discourses, focussing on structures 
and bypassing micro-sociological issues. The societal changes occurring in the 
period, from 1999 to 2009, are partly visible in the media articles. The terminology 
used in the earlier texts is unclear and seems unfamiliar to the writers, as also 
pointed out concerning the Parliament debates. Refugee, immigrant, foreigner and 
migrant15 are largely used synonymously, even within the same text. A change can be 
observed during the discussions on the Aliens Act 2004, where also the frames and 
approaches to the theme are more versatile. The vocabulary used in 2009 shows a 
more ‘professional’ approach. The concepts are more precise and the Finnish term for 
integration, ‘kotouttaminen’ [literally: homing], relatively new in 1999, is in the 2009 
texts used with confidence and familiarity. Signs of uncertainty concerning certain 
concepts, however, continue to exist in the articles from 2009. 
15 [Pakolainen, maahanmuuttaja, ulkomaalainen ja muuttaja].
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8.4.1  The meta-discourse: Finnishness through boundaries 
Differences in the discourses appear between the legislative processes; when 
discussing the Immigration Act – both 1999 and 2009 – immigration is conceptualised 
through differentiation, positioning ‘immigrants’ as distinct from the notion of 
Finnish society, as noted also within the parliamentary debates. The dichotomisation 
is not expressed explicitly, but is rather present as a tacit assumption; a perception of 
‘the immigrant’ as the stranger16, the Other — essentially different and separate from 
the familiar and natural — ‘Finnish society' (see Pietikäinen 2000; Horsti 2005). This 
aspect is not as visible in the texts discussing the Aliens Act (2004), where the topic 
is approached from a broader perspective and placed in a less nationally dominated 
context, e.g. by comparing European policies and discussing supra-national borders 
and Schengen. This is in principle self-evident, as the notion of integration directly 
relates to the society in question. The following quotes illustrate how the conception 
of the ‘immigrant’ is dissociated from the conception of Finnishness. 
To get a job is almost the only way for an adult refugee to get involved in the Finnish every-day life 
and to adapt to their new country [...] when learning the ways of the country. (HS -Pääkirjoitus, 
15.7.1999) (r).
During the waiting period, the immigrants do not necessarily get any information about Finnish 
society. [...] ‘As a premise, people do want to integrate.’ (HS quoting Ministry of Internal Affairs 
official -Kotimaa, 21.12 2008) (s).
Evergreen stereotypes of ‘the immigrant’ are present in the differentiating rhetoric – 
there are however clear differences between the rhetoric in media texts and internet 
forums; in the articles the stereotyping is subtle, in the forum comments openly 
articulate racist opinions. Stereotypes appear as binary relations coupled to their 
respective poles: ‘the lazy immigrant’ or ‘the helpless immigrant’ vs. ‘the capable 
society’; and the counter-discourse ‘the capable immigrant’ vs. ‘the structural 
failures of society’. Thus ‘the immigrant’ is always mirrored against the perception 
of ‘the Finnish state’ as an authority.  The stereotype of ‘the lazy immigrant’, an 
image appearing also in the parliamentary debates, concerns a view of immigrants 
as unwilling to work, lazy at learning the Finnish language or disinterested in 
co-operating with the system, which is perceived as striving to ‘help the immigrant 
integrate’. This role is prescribed to the Finnish state also in relation to the view of the 
immigrant as feckless and incompetent. 
16 The stranger, in the terminology of Georg Simmel, becomes connected to a group simultaneously 
being distanced from a We-collective. This group is perceived through something similar to a norma-
lity principle – the norm is set by what is considered to represent the own collective, the excluded are 
represented through their difference. (see Simmel 1981.)
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The dichotomy of ‘the capable immigrant’ vs. ‘the structural failures of society’ is 
a counter discourse within the same macro-level thinking, where the system is blamed 
for unsuccessful employment and integration of immigrants. When discussed, the 
poor employment situation of highly educated immigrants is addressed by quoting a 
researcher stating that the main reason for the problem is the Integration Act that has 
been in place for ten years (HS Kaupunki, 10.6.2009). The notion of the immigrant is 
thus mainly positioned in relation to the Finnish society as a structure and to a lesser 
extent in relation to the notion of a Finnish population – Finnishness is mainly shown 
as an institutionalised political frame. In the following sub-sections we examine 
central frameworks through which immigration is approached – these frameworks 
are partly overlapping and not mutually exclusionary, but clarify different aspects of 
the macro-level orientated discourses on immigration.
8.4.2   Management of the pros and cons of immigration – the instrumentalist frame
Integration is important from the national economy point of view because non-employed immig-
rants only cause society expenditure and do not pay any taxes. (HS -Kotimaa, 21.12.2008) (t).
A frame visible at all levels – from the legislative processes to the political debates, 
media rhetoric and forum discussions – is the resource/expense way of approaching 
immigration questions. Within this instrumentalist frame, the frame of calculated 
Finnishness, immigrants are objectified and function as statistical figures or 
conceptual tools concerning societal management – as a means for the economic 
success of the society or as an expensive and demanding burden. Immigration 
is presented as a resource only in regard to economic benefits – other aspects are 
addressed in only a few texts from 2004. It is emphasised that immigrants become 
contributors to the economic development of society through successful integration. 
The main positioning of the notion of immigrants as resources is in relation to the 
need of the labour market as potentially contributing to the economic growth of the 
state. Regardless of the positive tone within this resource-approach, immigrants are 
in most cases objectified – statistical figures, denominated as, for example, ‘a brilliant 
potential of immigrant background' (HS Pääkirjoitus 16.3.2009): 
[...] a twenty-year old youngster brings 85000 FMk to the Finnish economy, a trained engineer, 
doctor or a nurse approximately 2,5 Million FMk. (HS -Kotimaa 19.1.1999) (u).
According to the South Savo TE-center, the total need of the labour force is 75 000 persons in South-
Eastern Finland by 2015. (HS -Kotimaa, 31.1.2004) (v).
Among the immigrants there are persons who really would like to work in jobs that correspond to 
their profession and for whom the search for work could be made easier by changing the legislation. 
[...] This means that we lose many good tax payers. (HS Internet forum; Alias: Ystävyyttä ja tasa-
arvoa kaikille, 9.6.2009) (w).
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The other side of this instrumentalist approach is the representation of immigrants as 
societal expenses; since in the Parliamentary debates, immigration is conceptualised 
in terms of costs and gains. The aim within this rhetorical strategy is to support the 
argument with statistical means. The figures are not mere numbers; they verify the 
viewpoints of the writers. The implementation of the Integration Act is presented as 
an economic burden and a huge effort overloading the municipalities with work and 
responsibility.
About 30 Million euro are used annually on immigrant education. (HS -Kotimaa, 21.12.2008) (x).
The local authorities have time until the end of September to make a plan for each who cannot get 
work by themselves. [...] Money was not allocated to the municipalities. (HS -Kotimaa, 31.8.1999) 
(y).
The rhetoric of the internet forums is more polemical. Immigrants are depicted as, 
by definition, incapable of contributing to Finnish society. Specifically concerning 
refugees the focus on expenses is central: the refugee is seen bringing in nothing 
and costing a lot. This aspect, clearly posing a problem for a development-oriented 
approach, is parried by emphasising the aspect of asylum seekers as not being 
permanent residents.
The refugees have probably little such work experience that they could apply here. (HS Internet 
forum; Alias: Ei koske käytännössä pakolaisia, 9.6.2009) (z).
[...] the refugees are secured temporary stay and their return home is secured. They will not become 
residents in the municipality. (HS -Kotimaa, 22.4.1999) (aa).
Education in their mother tongue is arranged for the children. ‘The children learn a foreign language 
fast, and this may make their return to the home country more difficult.’[...]. Adults get training to 
the extent that they can cope here momentarily. (Ibid., quoting Ministry of Labour official) (bb).
8.4.3  Immigration as societal threat – negotiating solidarity
One conceptual angle appearing at all levels of our analysis is the notion of risks 
related to immigration issues from the societal perspective — both in connection to 
concrete problems as criminality and security, and to social cohesion, addressing the 
dangers of stratification and racist attitudes. A central theme in the internet debates 
is the hierarchical positioning of immigrants and the majority population in regard to 
social support; it is stressed that the responsibility of the state is primarily to cover the 
needs of the majority. By sarcastic statements and questions such as ‘Which country 
will take us highly educated and top qualified unemployed Finns and support us?' it 
is argued that immigrants are getting the support the majority population needs, and 
Brought to you by | SIIS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/21/16 11:52 AM
164   Orchestrating National Unity
would have the primary right to receive (HS Internet forum; Alias: Mikä maa ottaa 
MEIDÄT, 9.6.2009) (cc). The same theme is repeated in many varying formulations:
When will there be an initiative and an office for offering Finnish young people work that corres-
ponds to education? (HS Internet forum; Alias: Koulutusta vastaavaa työtä meille suomalaisille, 
9.6.2009) (dd).
This approach appears in the Aliens Act related discussions, but is less visible 
when discussing the Integration Act. In the latter, comparisons to problems in other 
European countries are brought up, emphasising the importance of preventative 
measures.
European Immigrant Suburb Problems to be Avoided in Finland. (Heading in HS -Kotimaa, 
11.1.2009) (ee).
In the 1980’s, there were extremely few foreigners in Finland. There were small groups of newco-
mers and they were not regarded as a socio-economic threat. During the recession fears appeared 
that there will be a lot of them [...] (HS quoting researcher -Kotimaa, 16.9.1999) (ff).
The quote above exemplifies how racism is viewed from a cause and effect perspective 
within the social system orientated discursive framework of the discussions in our 
material, bringing in the social structures as the explanatory and underlying force. 
8.4.4  Prioritising ‘us’ – the precedence of the majority
Our way may not be the only right one, but it is the one that the majority of Finns want to be applied 
in this country. (HS Internet forum; Alias: Thors erotkoon, 2.6.2009) (gg).
This frame is applied to a vast scale of issues – integration should happen on the 
terms of ‘the host society’; education, subsidies and aid concerning participation in 
the labour market should be primarily targeted towards the majority. The decision 
making power over who is allowed into the country and who is allowed to stay, is 
the state’s, as the authority of the majority population – With certain preconditions, 
the state can decide who may settle in its territory (HS -Mielipide, 9.3.2004) (hh). This 
prioritising rhetoric was primarily present in the discussions prior to the Aliens Act, 
particularly in explicating the sovereignty-emphasising premise for the system of 
accelerated returning of asylum seekers. 
Minority and majority unemployment is a central theme in the internet discussions, 
conceptualised through conceptions of fairness and unfairness. Here the selection 
of ‘most qualified’ is emphasised as synonymous to a fair procedure. However, little 
thought is given to the cultural construction of the category of the ‘most qualified’. 
The consequent bias towards Finnish candidates could be avoided by adopting some 
Brought to you by | SIIS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/21/16 11:52 AM
 A macro-societal approach to immigration topics – media discourses and internet debates   165
other, perfectly reasonable conceptualisations of these qualifications in cooperation 
with the immigrants themselves.  
It is not easy to correct the situation as the unemployment of Finns is also high, but according to the 
law, the most qualified applicant should be chosen. (HS -Pääkirjoitus, 15.7.1999) (ii).
I do well understand if an employer is reluctant to employ an immigrant. As long as we live in a 
market society an immigrant is more of a risk than an opportunity or possible strength to many 
companies. (HS Internet forum; Alias: Elämme markkinoiden ehdoilla, 9.6.2009) (jj).
8.4.5  Integration through legislative policies – immigration from a governmentalist 
perspective 
A perception of the state as the capable and trustworthy actor through which 
integration and other immigration-related aspects are manageable, runs through 
all the frames discussed in this chapter, and on all discursive levels analyzed within 
this study. Reified in its most distinct shape – the conception of the Finnish system 
within a paternalistic frame – the role of the legislative structures, as law and 
practice could be compared to the role of a parent, a helpful and capable actor – 
also capable of punishing when needed; the carrot and the stick embedded in the 
societal structures. Through institutionalised practices, ‘the willing immigrant’ may 
become a member of society, but will lose benefits if not acting in accordance with 
the societal premises.
[...] training plans are made for the migrant. If the migrant does not want to participate in the trai-
ning her/his benefits will gradually decrease (HS -Kotimaa 19.1.1999) (kk).
[...] the integration legislation wisely demands that refugees are brought to a more diversified 
interaction with Finnish society. The newcomer commits, in exchange for the support she/he gets, 
to learn the language of the country, to complement her/his professional skills and acquire other 
necessary information to be able to make a living for her/him and participating in life in other ways. 
(HS Pääkirjoitus 15.7.1999) (ll).
An aspect appearing both within the parliamentary debate and the media discussion 
is the view on the role of the laws in question as existing primarily for the sake of 
the majority population. Simultaneously seen as a functional means for placing 
the immigrant in a majority defined position in society, these laws are perceived as 
concretising the duties and rights of the immigrants, thus securing authority over 
Otherness – the power to define the criteria for acceptance. Through measures at 
the decision making level, different aspects of immigration are made manageable 
– from ‘successful integration’ to societal membership as a means of combating 
racism. 
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8.4.6  The media and internet discussions as a reification of the institutionalised 
policy-oriented discourses
The media and internet discussions create a vague picture of the institutionalised 
integration system. It appears as simply a specific terminology – an institutionalised 
conceptual tool framing societal practices. The picture painted through the 
discussions related to ‘integration’ bears resemblance with to assimilationist view 
on immigration. Through the ten year range, the terminology becomes clearer and 
the concepts appear more familiar. However, statistics remain a central way of 
conceptualising immigrants, creating a picture of objectives subordinate to social 
structures rather than individuals and different groups of people. The approaches 
turn more multileveled through the temporal range – as the 1999 material talks 
about ‘floods of immigrants’ (HS 22.4.1999), in the later periods it is stated that 
‘asylum seekers are individuals, not ‘floods’ or ‘streams’’ (HS 28.2.2004). In some 
texts from 2009, micro-level aspects of immigration are brought into the structure 
dominated discussion, introducing everyday life as an aspect of immigration and 
multiculturalism at the level of experience.
When speaking about integration one should use as a starting point that immigrants are part of 
the population living in Finland and as different from each other as the rest of the population. (HS 
-Mielipide, 11.6.2009) (mm).
Yet, immigration continues to be largely constructed in a dichotomist relation to 
Finnishness, positioning the immigrant as the Other, and the member of the majority 
population and the Finnish state as the norm and authority. A more inclusive public 
sphere would require a reassessment of the standard positions, such as the ‘model 
Finn’, and a questioning of the essentialising trends within policy making, in favour 
of a more reflexive approach towards social belonging.
8.5  Concluding discussion
In this article, we have briefly examined how various discursive frames pertaining to 
national unity have been evoked in parliamentary and media discourses revolving 
around immigration legislation within the past decade. We discovered that the 
concern with preserving a common national fabric is often expressed in terms of an 
external threat posed by the immigrant Other, rather than as a function ‘internally’ 
dividing developments. While this is interesting enough on its own, this finding 
should be evaluated in conjunction to the discontinuity between the readily available 
quantitative data on a relatively low immigrant presence (in the European context) 
and the sharp increase in accounts that link this presence to various threats for 
national identity and solidarity. A particularly lucid account of the latter is given by 
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the immigration director of the Ministry of Interior who recently reiterated the often 
ignored fact that the current dimensions of the inflow of immigrants per se cannot 
result in any demographically relevant changes in Finland in the foreseeable future 
(HS -Mielipide, 17.8.2009). Again, the perceptions of national unity being threatened 
by the immigrant Other appear independent from the objectively measurable 
dimensions of immigration. Therefore, in order to overcome some of the nationally 
implemented hurdles to immigration and to the integration of immigrants, this 
subjectively experienced frailty in the symbolic boundaries of national unity should 
to be taken into account. 
One of the most valuable conclusions from our enquiry relates to the possibility 
for a researcher to discursively overcome some of the untenable and misguided 
convictions.  Whereas measurable demographic facts play only a limited role in 
alleviating the fear of the Other, many of the discursive practices also contain implicit 
hints as to how such ethno-nationalistic discourses could possibly be developed into 
a direction that is more adaptive towards societal change and would better facilitate 
integration. Making careful use of these hints is called for in order to develop the 
immigration policy towards a direction more responsive to upcoming developments, 
without being hindered by the kind of fears for the future of national unity that can be 
downplayed in a different way to contextualise the necessity for these developments.
 Firstly, the instrumentalist mindset that attempts to weigh the pros and cons in 
opening and revising certain nationally determined practices is at a loss at measuring 
them ordinally and arguing for some losses to be an acceptable price for certain gains. 
The statement by the Minister of Interior Kari Rajamäki underlines this difficulty; 
according to him, reaping benefits must be subject to minimising problems and not 
the other way around.  Therefore, we suggest that in presenting the benefits related 
to developments that may be regarded as challenging the symbolic boundaries of 
national unity, special emphasis should be put on scenarios that can be presented 
as win-win ones, rather than constantly arguing the acceptability of certain losses. 
While this naturally restricts the scope of benefits one can refer to, this strategy is 
nevertheless fruitful in the sense that it allows for focussing on instances that will 
actually be interpreted as beneficial through a mindset fixed on preserving solidarity 
that is defined in a majoritarian manner. This is particularly important concerning 
the evidence of the relative impotence of non-binding measures of advisory hearings, 
through which any, even potentially upsetting suggestions are most commonly 
channelled.
Secondly, there is a distinct discourse through which any actual or potential 
structural flaws in the welfare system are discussed in terms of a lack of familiarity 
and competence of those who suffer from these flaws. In this discourse the Other is 
defined through the inability to cope with the existing structures. Therefore, it does 
not appear likely that arguing the existence of structural flaws by underlining the 
problems they cause to a population outside the nationally defined majority is a 
prudent way of advancing a more cosmopolitan mindset. It is rather by underlining 
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the problems that are caused to both the insiders and outsiders by certain, existing 
policy structures that more outsiders can be brought within this vaguely defined, 
symbolic in-group. This is essential in order to facilitate integration on the more 
concrete level as well.
Thirdly, and similarly to the second point, the ideas challenging the majoritarian 
paradigm that stresses social cohesion at the national level should not be presented as 
altogether external to the extant paradigm. This is likely to have repercussions as the 
republican understanding of national solidarity considers itself threatened by these 
very ideas. Rather, a more constructive approach would be to argue that many of the 
positive values linked to developing the existing immigration regime into a more open 
direction can already be found within the boundaries of the welfare-state ideology 
and that their implementation would also constitute a more coherent approach to an 
inclusive and bridging form of solidarity in an increasingly heterogenising society. 
This strategy would also act against the attempts to pose the ‘medicine’ as the 
‘disease’ and move the revisionary ideas away from the particular focus on the existing 
confrontation that is being discursively built between these two ideologies. At the 
same time it would generate much less of the resentment that currently stems from 
the fear that it is these cosmopolitan developments that are currently undermining 
national sovereignty and the state’s authority to create public policy.
What is reassuring in the Finnish context is that during the span of twelve years 
a slight shift in the discourse can be noticed, especially within the media. The fact 
that metaphors such as ‘immigrant floods’ have shifted towards an emphasis on 
the individuality of the immigrants is a start. However, while the media appears to 
pave the way for an atmosphere suitable for change towards a more cosmopolitan 
mindset among citizens, it still remains hardly unproblematic in Finland to welcome 
different cultures and their rights. Moreover, the evidence of current legislative 
discourse suggests that these are particularly difficult issues to viably promote within 
the parliamentary context of partisan politics, where no party can afford to dismiss 
the growing numbers of those critical towards any challenge to a republican and 
ethnocentrically assimilative nation-state. A change at this parliamentary level can be 
discursively facilitated by convincingly presenting these particularly critical groups 
of citizens – and the politicians and media representing them – a convincing picture 
of the future of national solidarity in an era of increasing societal heterogeneity that 
does not reaffirm the prejudices and reconstruct the confrontations discussed here. 
This also entails systematic expert participation in the current debate with facts that 
challenge existing convictions.
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Appendix 1: Original Quotes
a) [R]ajat ylittävän muuttoliikkeen lisääntymisen myönteiset puolet oli hyödynnettävä 
ja samalla oli saatava siihen liittyvät haittavaikutukset niin pieniksi kuin mahdollista. 
[…] Hallitus on pitänyt tärkeänä, että esitys ulkomaalaislaiksi saatetaan edellä 
mainituin perustein ja kuten alussa totesin eduskunnan käsiteltäväksi pikaisesti.
b) Uudistuksen perimmäisenä tavoitteena on ollut löytää tasapainoinen kokonaisuus, 
jossa otetaan huomioon niin Suomen sisäinen turvallisuus kuin maahan tulevien ja 
maassa oleskelevien ulkomaalaisten oikeudetkin.
c) Joissain yhdistyksissä ollaan oltu tyytymättömiä Ulkomaalaislakiin ja on väitetty, 
että siinä ei ole huomioitu vähemmistöjen näkemyksiä, mutta se ei pidä paikkaansa. 
Kaikki esitetyt lausunnot on otettu huomioon valmistelussa. Mutta vähemmistön 
linjauksia ei ole helppo toteuttaa kun enemmistö on eri mieltä.
d) Lapsen etu on aina yksilöllinen ja sidottu lapsen kulloiseenkin elämäntilanteeseen. 
Lapsen etu tulee harkita kokonaisuudessaan ottaen huomioon mahdollisuuksien 
mukaan lapsen toivomukset, mielipiteet ja yksilölliset tarpeet.
e) Mitä tulee siihen, onko Suomi aivan erillinen valtio [...] itse en usko tähän.
f) Tämän eduskunnan keskeinen tehtävä, meidän pitää se muistaa, on huolehtiminen 
omista kansalaisista. Omista kansalaisistamme huolehtiminen edellyttää tietyissä 
tilanteissa, että me otamme tänne ja ilman muuta ulkomaalaisia työntekijöitä, 
pakolaisia, pidämme heistä huolen. Se kuuluu siihen kokonaisuuteen. Mutta kuten 
sanoin, ykkösasia on se, että me päätämme tässä salissa ennen kaikkea suomalaisten 
ihmisten ongelmista.
g) Suomella ja suomalaisilla on aina oikeus päättää siitä, keitä tänne tulee ja kuinka 
paljon. Se on meidän tehtävämme ja meidän oikeutemme tässä maassa, niin kuin 
turkkilaisilla Turkissa, niin kuin slovakeilla Slovakiassa ja ruotsalaisilla Ruotsissa. 
Tämä on kansallinen kysymys.
h) eikä se ole Suomen edunkaan mukaista, että me pienen Viron parasta työvoimaa 
yrittäisimme houkutella tänne, vaan kyllä sen pitää olla siellä hoitamassa 
isänmaallisia velvoitteita.
i) Suomessa asuu tällä hetkellä noin 100 000 ulkomaalaista. Suomella onkin verrattain 
lyhyt maahanmuuttohistoria. Ehkä siitä johtuen emme osaa vielä kunnolla tunnistaa 
ja hyödyntää maahanmuuttajien mukanaan tuomaa sosiaalista, kielellistä ja 
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kulttuurista osaamista. Tämän olemassa olevan, mutta käyttämättömän voimavaran 
saaminen hyötykäyttöön palvelisi Suomea monella eri rintamalla.
j) Kunpa joku toisi sen luvun suoraan ja kertoisi sen totuuden, ketkä ovat todellisia 
pakolaisia ja ketkä ovat tulleet vain paremman uskon toivossa [po. ‘paremman 
elämän toivossa’? MW].
k) Mitä enemmän meillä on perusteettomasti turvapaikkaa hakevia henkilöitä, 
jotka ovat saapuneet maahamme pelkästään kokeilemaan sosiaaliturvaamme, sitä 
vähemmän meille jää resursseja ottaa vastaan niitä henkilöitä, jotka tosiasiassa 
olisivat turvapaikan tarpeessa.
l) On erittäin tärkeää toimia harmaata taloutta vastaan, koska väkisinkin, jos se 
päästetään kasvamaan,[...] niin se murentaa suomalaista työmoraalia, suomalaista 
etiikkaa, meidän käyttäytymistämme. Tämä tällainen varsin korkea etiikka, että verot 
maksetaan ja sakot maksetaan [...] on syntynyt kuitenkin vuosisatojen kuluessa. Aika 
lyhyesti tällainen moraalietiikka voi myöskin heikentyä, jos sille tilaa annetaan.
m) Vaarana on, että hallitsematon maahanmuutto sotkee työmarkkinat ja työnantajat 
pääsevät käyttämään hyväkseen ulkomaalaisten hädänalaista asemaa. 
n) [J]os me osaamme oikein hoitaa tämän ulkomaalaispolitiikan, se myöskin estää 
meillä hyvin tehokkaasti rasismin eteenpäintuomista, joka nyt jo kytee [...] monissa 
paikoissa sillä tavalla piilossa ja ihmisten mielissä, mutta se ei tule esiin. Mehän 
olemme semmoista kansaa, että jupistaan ja jupistaan ja sitten mennään nurkan 
taakse ja annetaan muijalle ja lapsille selkään, kun puhutaan, että olisi tehnyt mieli 
sanoa siellä kokouksessa ja olisi pitänyt sanoa sille porukalle kerrankin kunnon sanat, 
mutta kun ei kehdata sanoa, mennään nurkan taakse ja tehdään tämmöiset jutut. 
[...] [K]un tämä rasismi oikein kunnolla pääsee ryöpsähtämään, kuten Joensuussa 
yhdessä vaiheessa teki, kyllä se johtuu siitä, että sinne yhteen paikkakuntaan 
pakkautuu liikaa väkeä ja ihmiset kokevat, että he ovat nyt eriarvoisessa asemassa.
o) Kotouttamissuunnitelman tarkoituksena on antaa maahanmuuttajalle tosiasialliset 
mahdollisuudet oppia oman elämän hallinta ja saavuttaa taito ja kyky hankkia 
toimeentulo Suomessa.
p) Tuntuu vain, että erillisille viranomaisille, ministeriöille ja eri organisaatioille 
maahanmuuttajat ovat vain pakollisia olemassaolon objekteja, joita heidän täytyy 
ohjata taikka neuvoa, tehdä näitä suunnitelmia.
q) kansalais- ja maahanmuuttajärjestöille on annettava halutessaan mahdollisuus 
osallistua kunnan kotouttamisohjelman valmisteluun ja täytäntöönpanoon.
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r) Työpaikka on aikuiselle pakolaiselle lähes ainoa tie päästä mukaan suomalaiseen 
elämänmenoon ja sopeutua uuteen kotimaahansa. [...] opittaessa maan tavalle.
s) Odotusaikana maahanmuuttajat eivät välttämättä saa mitään tietoa suomalaisesta 
yhteiskunnasta. [...] ‘Ihmiset kyllä lähtökohtaisesti haluavat kotoutua’.
t) Kotoutuminen on kansantaloudellisesti tärkeää, sillä työttömät maahanmuuttajat 
aiheuttavat yhteiskunnalle vain kuluja eivätkä maksa veroja.
u) [...] 20-vuotias nuori tuo Suomen kansantalouteen 850000 markkaa, koulutettu 
insinööri, lääkäri tai sairaanhoitaja noin 2,5 miljoonaa markkaa.
v) Työvoiman kokonaistarve on Etelä-Savon TE-keskuksen mukaan kaakkoisessa 
Suomessa vuoteen 2015 mennessä 75000 henkeä poistuman ja uusien tarpeiden 
korvaamiseksi.
w) Maahanmuuttajissa on niitä, jotka todella haluaisivat tehdä ammattiaan vastaavaa 
työtä ja joille työnhaku voisi lainsäädännöllisten muutosten avulla tulla helpommaksi 
[...]. Eli menetämme monia hyviä veronmaksajia.
x) Maahanmuuttajakoulutukseen käytetään vuodessa noin 30 miljoonaa euroa.
y) Kunnilla on aikaa syyskuun loppuun tehdä suunnitelma jokaiselle, joka ei omin 
avuin saa työtä. [...] Rahaa kunnille ei annettu 
z) pakolaisilla taitaa harvemmin olla työkokemusta, jota täällä voisi soveltaa
aa) [...] pakolaisille turvataan tilapäinen oleskelu ja heidän paluunsa kotiin turvataan. 
Heistä ei tule kunnan asukkaita 
bb) Lapsille järjestetään kouluopetusta äidinkielellä. ‘Lapset omaksuvat nopeasti 
vieraan kielen, ja se voi hankaloittaa heidän paluutaan kotimaahan’ [...]. Aikuisille 
suomalaista yhteiskuntaa opetetaan juuri sen verran, että he tulevat täällä tilapäisesti 
toimeen. 
cc) Mikä maa ottaa meidät suomalaiset korkeastikoulutetut huippuosaavat työttömät 
elätettäväkseen? 
dd) Milloinkohan syntyisi aloite ja virasto siihen, että suomalaisille nuorille Suomessa 
tarjottaisiin koulutusta vastaavaa työtä? 
ee) Euroopan maahanmuuttajalähiöiden ongelmat halutaan estää Suomessa.
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ff) 1980-luvulla Suomessa oli kauhean vähän ulkomaalaisia. Tulijat olivat pieniä 
ryhmiä, eikä heistä koettu olevan sosioekonomista uhkaa. Laman aikaan tuli pelkoja, 
että heitä tulee niin hirveän paljon [...].
gg) Meidän tapamme ei ehkä ole ainoa oikea, mutta se on se, jota enemmistö 
suomalaisista haluaa maassa harjoittavan.
hh) Valtio voi tietyin edellytyksin päättää siitä, ketkä sen alueelle saavat asettua.
ii) Tilannetta ei ole helppo korjata, kun suomalaistenkin työttömyys on korkea, mutta 
lain mukaan pitää valita pätevin hakija.
jj) Ymmärrän siis oikein hyvin, jos työnantaja on haluton palkkaamaan 
maahanmuuttajaa. Niin kauan kuin elämme markkinataloudessa, monelle yritykselle 
maahanmuuttaja on yksinkertaisesti suurempi riski kuin mahdollisuus.
kk) [...] muuttajalle laaditaan koulutusohjelmia. Ellei muuttaja halua osallistua 
niihin, hänen toimeentulotukensa pienenee asteittain 
ll) [...] kotouttamislaki vaatiikin viisaasti saattamaan pakolaiset entistä 
monipuolisempaan vuorovaikutukseen suomalaisen yhteiskunnan kanssa. [...] Tulija 
sitoutuu vastikkeeksi saamastaan tuesta opiskelemaan maan kielen, täydentämään 
ammattitaitoaan ja hankkimaan muut Suomessa tarpeelliset tiedot pystyäkseen 
elättämään itsensä ja osallistumaan muuhun elämään 
mm) Lähtökohdaksi on kotoutumisessa oivallettava, että maahanmuuttajat ovat osa 
Suomessa asuvaa väestöä ja samalla lailla keskenään erilaisia kuin muukin väestö.
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Niklas Wilhelmsson 
9  Social Capital as a Resource for Political Participa-
tion: Finland in a Nordic Comparative Perspective
9.1  Introduction and research questions
The advanced industrialised democracies have witnessed a decreasing civic 
involvement among its citizens during recent decades (see Dalton 1996; Dalton et. al. 
2002; Wass 2008).1 Within a general trend towards decreasing political participation 
and societal fragmentation, immigration poses an additional challenge by bringing 
further diversity into European societies (Ireland 1994). With the prospect of an ageing 
and declining population more immigration to Europe is likely in the coming years. 
In the mid-2000s, the number of third country nationals residing in the EU-countries 
amounted to approximately four percent of the total population and immigration has 
since become the main factor of demographic growth in most European countries 
(Ahokas 2010).
While immigration and integration in recent years have received frequent 
attention in the academic literature, the subject has remained largely absent within 
political science (Saukkonen 2007). Although traditionally integration policies tend 
to focus on socio-economic topics, governments are increasingly concerned about the 
importance of the personal dimensions of integration, societal participation and the 
frequency and intensity of social interactions.2 This approach stipulates the need of 
integration into all aspects of society, including civil society and the political field. 
Studies show that migrants are often under-represented in democratic assemblies 
and hold a marginal position in the public domain (see Myrberg 2004; Vogel and 
Groupas 2006; Triandafyllidou and Groupas 2007). The participatory parity between 
migrants and the majority population has been addressed from a number of different 
angles, some focussing on individual and cultural factors, while others looking at 
institutional and contextual factors. According to Dahlstedt and Hertzberg (2006:9-
16) there has been a tendency of blaming migrants for sharing such cultural and 
social features which generally are unfavourable for political participation, while 
their relatively marginal position in the public domain is related to asymmetric power 
relations and divergent possibilities to participate and influence the political process. 
It would thus be more fruitful to address the problem of inequalities in the political 
domain by focussing on the political and the social context, the institutions and the 
1 Electoral participation and other forms of civic engagement have been declining in most Western 
democracies during the last two decades.
2 This is reflected in the Finnish democracy policy programme (Oikeusministeriön julkaisuja 14/2010).
 © 2015 Niklas Wilhelmsson
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Brought to you by | SIIS
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/21/16 11:52 AM
 Introduction and research questions   177
opportunity structures available for different social groups (Dahlstedt and Hertzberg 
2006:9-16).
In recent years some scholars have used the political opportunity structure 
approach (POS) for explaining differences concerning political involvement and 
political action repertoires in a comparative perspective3 (Koopmans 2004). This 
approach focusses on the participatory opportunities that the legal framework and 
the political system offer. In the academic literature one can find several contextual 
and institutional explanations for political participation (for an overview see Lane 
and Ersson 1990; Dalton 1996; Wass and Wilhelmsson 2009). At the macro-level, the 
institutional context, the legislation, the party system as well as the socioeconomic 
surrounding affect people’s opportunities to participate in politics and in the decision 
making process (Lane and Ersson 1990). The political inclusion of migrants is 
additionally affected by the way the government and the legislation take cognisance 
of migrants and by the way people, political parties and organisations perceive 
immigration and diversity (Anderson and Cohen 2005). 
The integration process is thus not only a relationship between the state and 
individual migrants, but a partnership between different levels of actors, including 
civil society associations. Civil society actors can support the integration process 
if they are proactive in addressing the changing needs, social dynamics and well-
being of an increasingly diverse population. It is generally believed that social 
capital, measured as the degree of social involvement and trust, offers many positive 
features both for individuals and society (Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000). Accordingly, 
social capital can empower resource weak groups and also serve as a means for more 
equality in the political domain. Alternatively, access to power can be hampered in 
the social domain by excluding certain groups from organisational activities and 
social networks (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Fahmy 2003; Tillie 2004). 
It is however still not clear how and if social capital affects political participation. 
First, it is a contested issue whether social capital actually affects the degree of 
political participation. Some findings indicate that there is a strong relationship 
between social capital measured as the degree of organisational participation, trust 
and political participation (Fennema and Tillie 1999; Tillie 2004), while other findings 
point towards very modest correlations between these factors (Lundåsen 2004). There 
may also be contextual differences between countries and local variations, which 
3 At the macro-level the effect of the political system for political mobilisation is often studied 
through the political opportunity structure-approach, which examines how different features of the 
political system affect political mobilisation. The political opportunity structure approach is not a 
unified concept or theory, rather, as Tarrow argues, a cluster of variables that describes certain fea-
tures of the political system which is thought to be relevant for political mobilisation. (Tarrow 1988: 
430) The core assumption of the theories is premised on how people act and which strategic choices 
they make are strongly influenced by the political-institutional context in which they live (Giugni and 
Passy 2004, 55).
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make the effects of social capital context dependent (Rothstein and Stolle 2003:18). 
Secondly, there are conflicting views on which types of social connections are most 
beneficial for individuals and societies. From one perspective ethnic organisations 
are viewed as important facilitators of the integration process, including political 
integration — while the opposing view holds that they may block migrants from 
participating in the majority society.4 In the social capital literature this phenomenon 
is usually addressed through the concepts bridging and bonding social capital 
(Putnam 2000).
Social capital research has gained quite substantial attention within the Nordic 
countries.5 The Nordic states have traditionally been characterised by strong civil 
societies, consensus politics and a close relationship between civil society and 
the government. These countries also traditionally share some other features of 
social capital, such as a high level of interpersonal trust and a high degree of trust 
towards the authorities (Rothstein and Stolle 2003). Some researchers are, however, 
questioning how well the Nordic welfare states are equipped to deal with diversity. 
Forsander, among others, argues that the strong social capital of the Nordic welfare 
seems to be exclusionary concerning migrants. In Forsander’s words, 
Many aspects of the strong social capital hinder immigrant integration into the labour market and 
therefore into society in general. The homogeneity of the norm base and tight social networks leads 
to strong in-group loyalty that excludes outsiders who do not— from the perspective of in-group 
members— share the common norm base. Following the division between bonding and bridging 
social capital, it seems that the Nordic forms of social capital are more bonding than bridging in 
nature. (Forsander 2004:1-3)
The purpose of this article is twofold; first to test how and if social capital, 
measured through different forms of organisational participation, affect the political 
participation of migrants in the Finnish context; and second, to review the Finnish 
political opportunity structures and the social capital of migrants in Finland from a 
Nordic comparative perspective. Civil society organisations can both in Finland and 
in the other Nordic countries be expected to have a central role in the integration 
process as social connections in these countries mainly are structured based on formal 
organisation memberships (Siisiäinen and Kankainen 2009). It can also be assumed 
that migrant organisations and ethnic communities are differently structured in 
different contexts. The situation in Finland, which is a new country of immigration 
with a small immigrant population, may be rather different to the one in for example 
Sweden, which has a long history of immigration and a large immigrant population. 
4 The question also indirectly in a broader perspective relates to the debate on whether states should 
adopt multicultural or assimilationist policies.
5 For example the Academy of Finland has financed a substantial research programme in the field 
(2000-2007).
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The following research questions will be addressed in this chapter:
 – Does social capital (measured as participation in organisations and other forms of 
social activities) affect the degree of political participation?  
 – Which form of social involvement is most beneficial for political participation?
 – Is social capital in the Nordic countries exclusive (bonding), making societal 
participation of migrants difficult?
The research questions will be answered through: a survey dataset collected by 
Statistics Finland among Russian, Estonian, Somali and Vietnamese immigrants 
living in the Helsinki capital region, Tampere and Turku;6 election statistics; the 
Migrant Integration Policy Index7 and the European Social Survey (ESS).8
The article begins with a brief overview of the concept of political participation, 
where the normative importance of an active and engaged citizenry and the problems 
of political exclusion and marginalisation are discussed. After that, the explanatory 
factor social capital is discussed, followed by a presentation of the central control 
variables, which will be used in the multivariate analysis in the empirical portion of 
6 The immigrant survey that was conducted by Statistics Finland in 2002 is used as research material. 
Electoral participation was measured through the following question: Did you vote in the last muni-
cipal elections? It is not entirely reliable to measure electoral participation by surveys because of the 
problem of over-reporting. The reported electoral participation in surveys is generally higher than the 
actual turnout. This also seems to be the case concerning the immigrant survey. It is difficult to evalu-
ate the reliability of the survey due to a lack of comparable register data. The following question was 
asked to measure organisational participation: Have you during the last 12 months participated in any 
of the following activities. 1) sport- and hobby clubs 2) interest organisations 3) political organisations 
or political parties 4) other organisations (e.g. humanitarian organisations etc. 4) immigrant sport- 
and hobby clubs 5) multicultural meeting places. Social contacts were measured with the following 
questions: do you have any Finnish friends? How often are you in contact with immigrants from your 
own ethnic group? How often are you in contact with other immigrants? The sample size of the groups 
in the survey is in a statistical sense rather small. The samples have been compared to register data 
from the population register according to age, gender and education categories. The research material 
seems fairly accurately to represent the compositions of the immigrant groups. There are however sta-
tistically significant differences in the response rates between the age groups except for the Somalis. 
Especially weak response rates are found among over 35 year old Vietnamese immigrants and among 
the youngest age cohorts of the Estonian and Russian immigrants. Electoral participation was measu-
red through the following question: Did you vote in the last municipal elections?
7 The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) measures policies to integrate migrants in 25 EU 
Member States and 3 non-EU countries. It uses over 100 policy indicators to create a rich, multi-di-
mensional picture of migrants' opportunities to participate in European societies. MIPEX covers six 
policy areas which shape a migrant's journey to full citizenship. For a more detailed description on 
the methodology see: http://www.integrationindex.eu/.
8 The European Social Survey (the ESS) is an academically-driven social survey designed to chart 
and explain the interaction between Europe's changing institutions and the attitudes, beliefs and 
behaviour patterns of its diverse populations. Now preparing for its fifth round, the survey covers 
more than 30 nations and employs the most rigorous methodologies. For a detailed description of the 
methodology and questioners see: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/.
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the study. The last section of the article is devoted to a comparative analysis of the 
political opportunity structure, social capital and political participation within the 
Nordic countries.  
9.2  Political participation 
Political participation can take many different forms and is partly dependant on 
the definition of the concept itself. Political participation is already by definition 
a contested concept since it is without a universally accepted definition. One often 
used definition of political participation is the one of Verba, Nie and Kim (1978). 
They define political participation as ‘those legal activities by private citizens 
that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental 
personnel and/or the actions they take’ (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978:46). This definition 
may serve its purpose when investigating conventional forms of participation 
but it is clearly too restrictive when studying political activity from a broader 
perspective. Not only does it exclude actions which are not directly pointed towards 
the conventional channels of participation, it also excludes civil disobedience and 
such new forms of political participation which often target non-state actors in the 
public, non-profit and private sectors (Norris 2002:193). A broad and more inclusive 
definition of political participation is for example the one by Barnes et al. (1979:42) 
where they define political participation as ‘all voluntary activities by individual 
citizens intended to influence directly or indirectly political choices at various 
levels of the political system.’ This definition includes both conventional as well as 
unconventional forms of political participation. The former entails the participation 
in the political sphere through direct and often highly institutionalised channels 
such as voting in elections, candidacy in elections, party membership, campaign 
activities and petitions. The latter refer to new forms of political actions which often 
target non-state actors in the public, non-profit and private sectors and different 
forms of protest behavior, ranging from demonstrations to civil disobedience 
(Dalton 1996).
Despite the fact that political participation may take many different forms, this 
article will, due to limitations of space and research materials, mainly focus on 
electoral participation.9 To use electoral participation as an indicator of political 
participation can also be motivated by the fact that it is the most common form of 
political participation. It is also known to be strongly connected to more demanding 
forms of political participation, i.e. those who vote, are usually also taking part in 
more demanding forms of political activities (see Dalton 1996; Wass and Wilhelmsson 
2009).  
9 i.e. It forms the dependent variables of the analysis.
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9.2.1  The importance of political participation and equality 
To enable migrants to feel part of our society, it must be ensured that they have proper 
tools to participate fully in the society. The political participation of migrants is often 
addressed through the multi-dimensional concept of political integration, which 
involves adherence to democratic values, political trust and political participation. In 
order to be able to talk about political integration, people must at least adhere to the 
central values of democracy, at least hold some degree of trust towards the political 
system and the political institutions, and at least to some extent participate in the 
political process (Tillie 2004:530-531). 
One central component of political integration is political participation. Political 
participation fills many important societal functions and is important both from a 
normative perspective and from a practical point of view. Robert Dahl argues that 
some of the most fundamental demands on a well functioning democracy involve 
political equality and effective citizen participation (Dahl 2000:62-63). This does not 
however imply that everybody should have to participate in everything all the time. 
It rather means that the ‘decision to participate reflects a political statement instead 
of being a reflection of a lack of resources or a feeling of powerlessness and political 
marginalization’ (Bengtsson 2004:8). 
As political participation forms the input side in the political system, 
uneven participation patterns may lead to divergent political influence and 
power configurations. One of the most significant problems relating to divergent 
participation patterns between different social groups relates to the impact it has on 
the political agenda (Teixeira 1992). If political participation is considerably lower 
among some social groups, their interests and desires might to a lesser degree be 
observed, especially as the political parties often direct their campaigns and efforts 
towards those groups which are more easily mobilised. A disadvantageous political 
agenda may in the long run even decrease the interest for involvement among those 
groups that feel that their voices are not heard and that their interests are not properly 
taken into account (Wass and Wilhelmsson 2009:19-20).  
9.2.2  Political rights of migrants in the Nordic countries
A number of European countries have granted basic political rights to migrants, 
including voting rights in municipal and regional elections (table 1). However, 
nearly half of the EU Member States countries do not grant voting rights in municipal 
elections to their resident foreign population. Altogether 12 of the EU-countries 
strictly deny local enfranchisement. Belgium and Estonia only offer partial political 
rights for non-citizens. They provide voting rights in municipal elections but 
deny the possibility of candidacy in elections. Eleven EU-countries offer full local 
political rights for non-citizens provided that they fulfil the criteria stipulated by 
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law. The limitations for obtaining local voting rights vary considerably between 
member states.10 All the Nordic countries provide full political rights at the local 
level for non-citizens. 
The Nordic countries11 have had a different path towards providing political 
rights to non-citizens, which probably both reflects their migration histories as well 
as the political climates in the countries at the time. 
Table 1: Voting rights for third country nationals in EU Member States
Political rights EU Member States
No local voting rights Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Poland
Local voting rights but not the right to stand as a 
candidate in elections
Belgium, Estonia
Full voting rights conditional upon fulfilment of 
some requirements 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden, UK
Source: Triandafyllidou and Groupas (2007)
In 1975, Sweden was the first country in the world to introduce voting rights in local 
elections to foreign citizens. In Denmark and Norway migrants received voting rights 
in the 1980s. In Finland, residents of other Nordic countries gained voting rights in 
1975 but it took until 1992 before other foreigners received similar rights. In Finland 
laws governing the political organisation and the political participation of foreigners 
were restrictive before the 1990s. 
In the Nordic countries a reform of election laws was seen as a necessary step 
towards including migrants in politics. It was believed that immigrants as any other 
citizens would have a natural interest to be involved in the decision making process, 
because they are directly affected by the political decisions that are made at the 
municipal level. It was also believed that allowing migrants to participate in the 
political process would more strongly bind them to society (Hammar 1979; Lepola 
2004:278-282). 
10 The time limit of residence and residence status for obtaining voting rights vary quite considerab-
ly between different EU member states. For an overview see: www.politis.org; Triandafyllidou and 
Groupas (2007).
11 The Nordic countries can be characterised as a municipal state with fairly extensive rules for 
municipal self- governance. Municipalities are in charge of arranging many of the welfare policies, 
housing, education and healthcare. Many of these important decisions are made at the local level, 
making local elections important. 
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9.3  The explanatory variable: social capital
The civil society has been at the centre of democratic theory ever since Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s study of 19th century America revealed that democracy works better 
and citizens are more engaged when people learn to cooperate within the civil society 
(de Toqueville 2000). During the decades after World War II civil society fell into the 
background of academic debates. The discussion about the importance of the civil 
society for democratic performance was revitalised through social capital theory. The 
concept was introduced by Hanifa at the beginning of the 20th century but gained 
larger acknowledgement especially through Robert Putnam (Infed encyclopedia 
2005). 
The concept of social capital has been highly contested in the academic literature.12 
Different definitions have resulted in divergent understandings of the concept. In 
Putnam's view social capital refers to social networks, reciprocity norms, mutual 
cooperation and trust (Putnam 1993). Social capital, in Putnam's meaning, is of utmost 
importance in a multicultural society for building trust between groups coming from 
different cultures. Intercultural dialogue and bridging social connections are needed 
in order to build social capital between different groups (Niemelä 2007:86-87). Civic 
activities are important in developing reciprocity and mutual norms, as civil society 
organisations form a protected environment where people can learn to cooperate, 
trust each other and learn necessary civic skills (Fennema and Tillie 2001:203-204).  
The role of social capital for the inclusion of migrants in the political domain 
of the receiving society has received increasing attention since the frequently cited 
article by Fennema and Tillie (1999) was published. According to the authors (1999), 
social capital – measured as the degree of ‘ethnic civic community’ – was the most 
important factor explaining the political mobilisation of immigrant groups in the 
Netherlands. Their hypothesis has been tested in a number of studies since, but the 
results have been ambiguous. Contradictory results have been found, particularly 
concerning different forms of social organisations and the impact they have on 
political participation and political trust in society (see Uslaner and Conley 2003; 
Berger et. al. 2004; Togeby 2004).
9.3.1  Bridging and bonding social capital
The role of social capital for a well functioning society has frequently been discussed 
since Putnam’s seminal study of Italy (Putnam 1993). Putnam’s work was originally 
criticised for being too optimistic and ignoring the negative aspects of civil society 
organisations. As a reaction to the critique, Putnam introduced the concepts bridging 
12 For a discussion see Rothstein and Stolle 2003.
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and bonding social capital.  Bridging social capital refers to social connections which 
are inclusive and connects different groups. Bonding social capital is on the other 
hand exclusive and tends to strengthen closed identities. A bridging social capital has 
often, from a societal perspective, been viewed as more beneficial because it connects 
people and creates unity. A bonding social capital is on the other hand considered 
exclusive and tends to strengthen closed group identities. It may however form an 
asset as it can maintain mutuality and solidarity within a specific group (Putnam 
2000:22-23).
One of the central questions in the debate concerning bridging and boding 
social capital is whether states should adopt assimilationist or multicultural policies. 
Borevi notes that based on Putnam’s notion it seems to be more beneficial for states 
to favour assimilationist policies because it creates a bridging social capital, which 
favours the integration of migrants. On the other hand it is not in accordance with the 
normative basis of the liberal state to try to enforce migrants to abandon their own 
cultural traditions in favour of integration. At the same time it violates the principle of 
political equality by imposing a certain identity on persons in order to be included in 
the political community (Borevi 2004:34-35). As was explained in the introductory part 
of this chapter, the Nordic welfare model has been criticised for creating a bonding 
social capital, which makes it difficult for migrants to get fully involved within the 
Nordic societies. I will come back to this issue in the empirical part of the study.  
Another question concerning bridging and bonding social capital deals with 
the role of immigrant organisations (Berger et. al. 2004; Togeby 2004). According to 
what sometimes is called the assimilationist view, social organisations are important 
resources for migrants as long as the activities occur within the framework of the society 
in general. Immigrant organisations on the other hand, have a tendency to isolate 
migrants from the rest of society, as strong social networks within a closed community 
isolate outsiders and inhibit members from participating in social networks outside it 
(Uslaner and Conley 2003). Meanwhile it is argued that they may lead to an increasing 
fragmentation of the society and being unbeneficial for the integration process. 
Concerning political participation, the assumption is that members of strong social 
circles inhibit a formation of common political goals and interests between migrants 
and the majority population. Meanwhile, members of closed migrant communities 
have less access to such organisations where the political learning process takes place 
and thus also get exposed to a lesser extent to political information and recruitment 
attempts, than those that are engaged in ‘bridging networks’ (Teorell 2003:51-52). They 
consequently have less opportunity to attain the democratic skills that are needed for 
political participation. 
The opposing view maintains that immigrant organisations may function as a 
gateway into society in general (Togeby 2004) as strong social ties within a specific 
group brings about a strong confidence in one’s own identity, which at the same time 
develops respect and a will to co-operate with others (Valtonen 1999:475). Immigrant 
organisations can also provide information, advice and assistance for immigrants 
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in their native languages and act as a contact channel to the majority population 
(Mikkelsen 2003:16) forming the basis for what Togeby calls double integration 
– where immigrants interact both within the ethnic community as well as within 
society in general. This also provides the basis for an inclusion into the political 
domain (Togeby 1999:671). Borevi also notes that vertical relationships within a closed 
community may equally represent a resource for political participation because they 
form a social base for participation for the group members (Borevi 2004).
9.3.2  Hypotheses 
Based on the theoretical discussion in the previous chapters, it is possible to formulate 
four research hypotheses which will be tested by using the research material described 
in the introductory section of the study. The following hypotheses will be tested: 
1. Social capital, operationalised as organisational participation, constitutes a 
resource that enhances electoral participation, i.e. electoral participation is 
expected to be higher amongst immigrants participating in organisational 
activities. 
2. Organisational participation forms an asset for electoral participation irrespective 
of the type of activity (ethnic versus non-ethnic).
3. The range (the share number) of organisational participation is a more decisive 
feature for electoral participation than the type of activity.
4. Social capital is bonding in the Nordic states due to the homogeneity of the norm 
base and tight social networks which form an obstacle for migrants societal 
participation.  
9.4  Control variables
In order to confirm the validity of the hypotheses that were posed, each hypothesis 
should hold even when other variables affecting electoral participation are taken 
into account in the analysis. Socio-demographic and human capital features of the 
electorate have usually formed the foundation for explaining differences in political 
behaviour (Holmberg 1981:16-17). Research on the social characteristics of voters 
has been common in electoral studies since they are easy to measure and they 
stand behind many variables that are more difficult to measure (Milbrath and Goel 
1977:86). At the individual level many studies have shown that the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the electorate are significant explanatory factors for electoral 
behaviour. Differences in electoral participation have, amongst other factors, been 
explained by differences in age, gender, educational attainment, occupation and 
marital status. General patterns that have been found include that younger people 
participate to a lesser extent than middle aged and older ones, that married people are 
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more active than singles and that highly educated and those who have a higher level 
of income participate to a higher degree than other groups in society. Traditionally, 
men have participated more actively than women, but over the last two decades this 
pattern has changed in favour of women in many developed democracies (Verba and 
Nie 1972; Millbrath and Goel 1977; Van der Eijk 2000). 
Some studies have shown that the lower electoral participation amongst migrants 
partly reflects their lower human capital (Hammar 1979; Bäck and Soininen 1996). 
Studies dealing with the societal participation of migrants have also shown that there 
is a relationship between language proficiency and political participation. It is argued 
that language proficiency makes it easier to follow politics and election campaigns 
which raises interest towards politics and increases electoral participation (Jacobs 
and Tillie 2004:422).
Citizenship has also been viewed as an important prerequisite for political 
participation because it provides people with the right to vote in ‘first-order’ elections 
(parliamentary and presidential elections), which strengthens the democratic learning 
process and increases interest towards politics. Citizenship also makes living in the 
country of immigration become permanent, which increases engagement within all 
sectors of society (Togeby 2004:521). With the above stated motivations, gender, age, 
marital status, educational attainment and labour market position have been chosen 
as control variables in the analysis. The impact of citizenship and language skills will 
also be taken into account in the analysis. Before analysing the relationship between 
organisational participation and electoral participation a brief presentation on the 
electoral turnout rates and organisational participation of migrants in Finland will 
be made. 
9.5  Political participation among migrants in Finland
The political participation and representation of foreigners in Finland has so far been 
fairly modest and it has mostly been concentrated within specific groups (Lepola 
2004:8). The political parties have only recently reacted to the growing number of 
people of foreign descent having voting rights. Electoral participation among foreign 
citizens has remained at a low level ever since 1992, when foreigners were first granted 
voting rights in municipal elections (see table 2). 
The fairly steep decline in electoral participation that occurred between 1992 
and 1996 is most likely related to a revision of the municipal law, which took place in 
1995. This provided a much larger number of migrants with voting rights, and reduced 
the time limit for obtaining voting rights. Electoral turnout since the 1996 municipal 
elections among foreign citizens has been fairly stable. The mean turnout rate among 
foreign citizens has been between fifteen and twenty percent, compared to the total 
average turnout rate in municipal elections, which has ranged between 56 per cent 
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and 71 per cent.13 The turnout rate among EU-citizens and citizens of Norway and 
Iceland has been somewhat higher than amongst the rest of the foreign population. 
There are also some smaller regional variations in electoral turnout between foreign 
citizens living in the periphery and those living in the cities.14 In some locations, such 
as Pirkanmaa in Eastern Finland and Lapland in the North, electoral turnout amongst 
foreign citizens has been higher than in other regions, which at least partly reflects 
differences in the composition of the migrants groups living in these areas, as well as 
favourable candidate nominations (Wilhelmsson 2008). The number of candidates 
with migrant backgrounds has been growing since the 1990s, but is still lower than 
the number of foreigners holding voting rights would indicate. In the last municipal 
election in 2008, 3.2 per cent of the electorate had a mother tongue other than Finnish, 
Swedish or Sámi, while only 1.5 per cent of the candidates and 0.3 per cent of those who 
where elected had a different mother tongue than the above mentioned. Altogether, 34 
persons with foreign background, of which 13 where women, were elected in the 2008 
municipal elections (Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities 2010).  
Table 2: Electoral participation
Electoral 
turnout (%)
Total  Turnout   foreign 
citizens
EU-citizens, citizens of 
Iceland and Norway
Other foreign citizens
2008 61.3 19.6 20.8 16.6
2004 58.6 15.3 17.9 13.5
2000 55.9 20.8 30.4 17.7
1996 61.3 20.7 32.0 16.7
1992 70.9 40.5 50.1 34.4
Source: Statistics Finland
9.5.1  Organisational participation among immigrants in Finland
Finland has sometimes been characterised as a country of organisations. Most 
Finnish people belong to one or several civil society organisations. Even if some quite 
fundamental changes have occurred in Finnish civil society in recent decades, the 
organisations sector is still vibrant and a fundamental part of how social activities are 
arranged in Finland (Siisiäinen and Kankainen 2009). 
13 Immigrant groups are by no means homogeneous. Migrants should be considered, rather, as individuals 
or members of specific sub-categories defined by national or ethnic origin, religion, gender, age or reason for 
their arrival. It is however impossible to single out persons from the electoral register based on other features 
than nationality. Migrants who have received Finnish citizenship do not appear on the register.
14 Most of the foreigners enjoying voting rights live in the capital region and in other larger cities.
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Immigrant organisations in Finland are, on the other hand, a fairly recent 
phenomenon due to the country’s short migration history. The first immigrant 
organisations were established in the 1990s and the number of organisations has 
rapidly increased since then (Saksela 2003). Overall the possibilities for ethnic 
integration into organisations are relatively scarce in the Finnish context due to 
the relatively low number of immigrants living in the country and the relatively 
heterogeneous feature of the migrant population (Forsander 2004:190). In the 
immigrant survey that was conducted by Statistics Finland in 2002 migrants were 
asked about their participation in organisational activities. The results are presented 
in table 3. 
Table 3: Organisational participation among immigrants in Finland
Type of organisation / activity (%) Estonian Russian Somali Vietnamese Total






























































Range of activities (%)
No participation 54 56 54 78 58
Participates in 1 activity 35 33 29 17 30
Participates in 2 activities 10 8 14 4 10
Participates in 3 or more activities 0 3 4 1 2
Mean 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.5
N 312 521 324 193 1355
 (Source: Statistics Finland)
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As the figures of table 3 reveal, almost half of the migrants participate in residence 
activities and a third participate in some forms of organised leisure and sports 
activities.15 Almost one in ten participate in some form of voluntary organisations; a type 
of organisational activity, which during recent years has been growing the most among 
native Finns (Siisiäinen and Kankainen 2009). Differences in participation patterns 
between the groups in the research sample are relatively small, except for leisure and 
sports activities in which Russian and Estonian migrants are most actively engaged, 
while participation overall is more modest especially among Vietnamese migrants. 
Participation in political organisations is on the other hand rare for all of the groups, 
which probably reflects the fact that political parties in Finland have only recently 
directed special efforts to recruit migrants as party members or nominated candidates 
with migrant backgrounds (see Weide 2008). Meanwhile there has in general been a 
steep decline of overall party memberships in Finland during the last two decades 
(Mickelsson 2009).    
We also find some variations in the participation patterns in labour market 
organisations, which at least partly may reflect the labour market positions of the 
respective groups. Almost one fifth of the respondents in the immigrant survey 
reported that they participate in the activities of immigrant organisations. Somali 
migrants are most actively involved in the activities of the immigrant organisations. 
The involvement among Russian and Vietnamese immigrants is considerably 
lower. Estonian migrants participate the least in the activities of the immigrant 
organisations, which probably reflects the fact that Estonian immigrants to a greater 
extent are involved within organisations in the majority society. Overall, roughly 
half of the migrants do not participate in any organisation activities (organised 
activities), while the other half participates in one to two activities. The greatest 
group differences are to be found between Vietnamese migrants and the rest of the 
groups in the sample.    
9.5.2  An analysis of the link between organisational participation and electoral 
participation among migrants in Finland
The link between organisational involvement and electoral participation is tested in 
the regression analysis in table 4. The regression model is based on the analytical 
model presented in the theoretical part of the article. In the first regression model 
the range of organisational participation (participation in organised activities) has 
been entered into a logistic regression analysis together with the control variables, 
presented in paragraph 4 (control variables) Electoral participation forms the 
15 This finding is in line with previous studies (see Harinen 2005).
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dependent variable of the analysis.16 In the second regression model different forms 
of organisational memberships (ethnic versus non-ethnic) have been entered into the 
analysis together with the same variables as in regression model one.
The results essentially confirm the hypothesis that was posed. Organisational 
involvement comes out as a fairly strong predictor of electoral participation, even 
while controlling for other social differences, i.e. the more actively one participates in 
organisational activities the higher the odds are for electoral participation. It thus appears 
that organisational involvement would form a pathway towards increasing political 
involvement. Based on earlier research one may also assume that if organisational 
involvement in general is beneficial for electoral participation, it should be even more 
beneficial for participation in more demanding forms of political activity (Vogel and 
Groupas 2006:14). One problem remains with the conclusion: is increasing political 
participation actually an effect of social involvement or is it merely just a reflection of 
overall active citizens? This question remains largely unanswered within the literature, 
even if there is quite profound theoretical evidence to support the argument in our case 
(see Putnam 1993; Fennema and Tillie 1999; Rothstein and Stolle 2003).
Secondly, I find no evidence suggesting that involvement in immigrant 
organisations would isolate migrants from the majority society. On the contrary, 
participation in immigrant organisations positively relates to electoral participation, 
even if the relationship is more modest than among other types of organisational 
activities. This may reflect the largely non-political character of immigrant 
organisations (see Ålund and Shierup 1991:120-121 for an overview of immigrant 
organisations in Sweden; for Finland see Saksela 2003) or limitations concerning the 
research material.17 Another feature that seems to support the case is that most of 
the migrants participating in immigrant organisations also participate in some non-
ethnic organisational activities, which indicates that they function as a gateway into 
civil society in general, rather than separating migrants from the majority population. 
Aside from organisational involvement, citizenship comes out as the most decisive 
predictor of electoral participation. Citizenship provides people with full political 
rights and makes the state of residence permanent, which according to earlier studies 
significantly increases the odds for participation in all types of societal activities (see 
Togeby 2004). This also raises a question on how citizenship policies may act as a 
16 A logistic regression model has been used as the dependent variable is dichotomous (voted / did 
not vote). The variables have been entered by the forced entry method, which generally is the most 
suitable and most widely used method of entering variables into a regression analysis in social scien-
ces. The measure in the right column of the table signifies the B coefficient in the regression model, 
which tells us how strong the influence of the variable is. The stars signify the level of significance, i.e. 
if the variables can statistically be confirmed. This implies that there is a 90 per cent or greater chance 
that there is a relationship between the variables.
17 Limitations may relate to how the question was phrased in the survey and the fact that many mi-
grants left the question unanswered.
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barrier for political integration and participation. In Finland citizenship policies are 
rather strict from a comparative perspective, which may have a negative impact on 
the political integration of migrants, as it may take almost a decade of permanent 
residence in the country before acquiring full civic rights.  






Marital status 0.210 0.191
Age 26-35 -0.165 -0.179
Age 36-45 0.124 0.087
Age 46-55 0.358 0.332
Education (in country of origin) 0.956*** 0.893***
Education (in Finland) 0.064*** 0.066***
Labour market position 0.210 0.214
Language proficiency 0.123 0.156
Citizenship 1.112*** 1.107***
Time of residence in Finland -0.403*** -0.400***
Ethnic group: Estonian -0.309 -0.393*
Ethnic group: Somali 0.207 0.252
Ethnic group: Vietnamese -0.370 -0.396
Participates in 1 organisation 0.838*** -
Participates in 2 organisations 1.339*** -
Participates in 3 or more organisations 1.716*** -
Organisational participation (ethnic) - 0.371**
Organisational participation (non-ethnic) - 0.175*
N 1087 1076
-2 Log lik. ho. 1172,443 1160,857
Nagelkerke R 0.27 0.27
Commentary: Regression analysis (binary logistic). Dependent variable: 0 = did not vote, 1= voted. 
Independent variables: Gender: 0 = female, 1 = male. Marital status: 0 = unmarried, divorced, 
widow, 1= married, cohabiting. Age: 18-24 coded as reference category, other age variables coded 
as dummy variables. Education in country of origin: continuous variable ranging from 0-23 years of 
education. Education in Finland: 0 = no formal education, 1 = ammattitkulutus or university degree 
in Finland. Language proficiency: 0 = weak Finnish/Swedish skills, 1 = good or sufficient skills in 
Finnish. Citizenship: 0 = foreign citizenship, 1 = Finnish citizenship. Time of residence in Finland: 
continuous variable ranging from 0-20. Ethnic groups: Russians coded at reference category, other 
ethnic groups coded as dummy variables. Organisational participation (range): no organisational 
participation coded as reference category, the rest coded as dummies. Organisational participation 
(ethnic): 0 = no participation, 1 = participates. Non-ethnic organisational participation : 0 = no parti-
cipation, 1 = participates.  Notation : p < 0.01 = ***, p < 0.05 = **, p < 0.1 = *. 
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Besides citizenship, time of residence in Finland, gender and education are the 
other variables which show a statistically significant relationship with electoral 
participation. It is not highly surprising that the time of residence is connected to 
the level of political participation as it takes time to get acquainted with society and 
the political system, which makes it more likely for those who have stayed longer in 
the country to participate in politics. We also know from earlier studies that people 
who are frequently moving are often less engaged in their local communities. Gender 
differences may on the other hand reflect the fact that politics in some cultures are 
male dominated, making the political integration of women an issue one should 
direct special attention to. Education, on the other hand, is one of the so called 
‘usual suspects’ while studying political participation, as it strengthens the skills and 
abilities to follow and engage in political activities. One could thus raise the question, 
of whether education in societal matters should be more strongly incorporated into 
the agenda of the integration courses that are offered to immigrants.
9.6  Civic rights, electoral participation and organisational activity 
among migrants in a Nordic comparative perspective
In the previous sections we have discovered that the electoral participation of migrants 
in Finland at the individual level is connected to organisational involvement, formal 
citizenship and other social resources. In order to put Finland into a comparative 
perspective and discern how organisational involvement and other systemic features 
affect political participation, the next section includes a comparative analysis of the 
Nordic countries. The Nordic countries are often used in comparative analyses, as the 
countries share many historical and systemic features. Due to many similarities, the 
Nordic countries also form a useful analytical framework when considering migrant 
integration, but they still have very distinctive features, concerning their migration 
history, the size of the migrant population as well as integration policies.
The Nordic countries differ quite substantially concerning migration patterns and 
the number of migrants living in the countries. Migration to Sweden and Denmark 
started in the 1960s and the countries have fairly large migrant populations. Migration 
to Norway started roughly a decade later than in the two previously mentioned 
countries. Finland forms a deviant case as the country, during the 1960s and 1970s, 
was notably characterised with outwards migration, to, among other countries, 
Sweden. Immigration to Finland started late and it was not until the 1990s that 
Finland received a higher number of migrants, and in 2010 the migrant population 
was still among the smallest in Europe. The Nordic countries also vary concerning 
both the composition of the migrant groups and the main reasons for migrating to the 
country (see Triandafyllidou and Groupas 2007).
In all the Nordic countries the electoral participation of migrants has been 
considerably lower than among the general population. Even though electoral 
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participation has in general been declining in all the Nordic countries during the last 
decade, Denmark, Sweden and Norway still belong to the group of countries with 
high electoral participation, while Finland has dropped below the European average 
(Wass and Wilhelmsson 2009:34). Among migrants, electoral participation has 
generally decreased gradually as voting rights have become more inclusive. There are, 
however, considerable variations in turnout rates between different migrant groups 
and different local contexts, which is a question for further analysis in forthcoming 
studies. While comparing electoral participation amongst migrants in the Nordic 
countries, turnout rates have been highest in Denmark followed by Norway. In 
Sweden electoral participation amongst migrants has been lower and declining ever 
since the introduction of voting rights for foreign citizens in 1975. Finland forms the 
extreme case as electoral participation amongst migrants is considerably lower than 
















Figure 1: Electoral turnout among migrants in municipal elections in the Nordic countries18  
Sources: Denmark; Togeby (1999); Spies (2010), Finland; Statistics Finland, Norway; Melve (2003); 
Sweden; SEB, Benito (2005). 
In the following discussion, some features of the political opportunity structures of 
the Nordic countries will be evaluated based on measurements from the Migration 
 
18 Commentary to the table: For Denmark there are no available figures for 2005 and 2009 (Spies 
2010, 133); for Norway the most recent figures found by the author of this article is from 2003. 
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Integration Policy Index. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) measures 
policies to integrate migrants in 25 EU Member States and 3 non-EU countries. It uses 
over 100 policy indicators to create a rich, multi-dimensional picture of migrants’ 
opportunities to participate in European societies. MIPEX covers six policy areas 
which shape a migrant’s journey to full citizenship. Koopmans argues that the 
political opportunity structures either may stimulate or constrain and channel the 
levels of political involvement among migrants and ethnic minorities (Koopmans 
2004:449). 
Table 5 highlights some policy features of the Nordic countries that are evaluated 
based on the Migration Integration Policy Index. According to the MIPEX index, 
Sweden has the most inclusive integration policies among all European countries as 
well as the most extensive political rights for migrants. Norway and Finland also score 
fairly well on both of the above mentioned dimensions while Denmark only scores 
close the EU average on the index. Overall, each of the Nordic countries, except for 
Denmark with some reservations, score very well on the index. 













Denmark 67 36 33 55 33 40
Finland 65 68 44 81 75 70
Norway 72 66 39 86 54 70
Sweden 76 92 71 93 94 100
EU-15 61 59 48 60 66 64
EU-10 57 55 37 20 48 45
EU-25 59 57 49 43 58 56
When comparing levels of inclusivity of political rights and integration policies, 
with political participation in the Nordic countries, no clear pattern emerges. 
Even though Denmark scores lowest among the Nordic countries on the MIPEX 
index, electoral participation among migrants is significantly higher in Denmark 
than in the other Nordic countries. Based on these figures it is not possible to 
draw any far reaching conclusions on the impact of integration related policies 
on democratic participation. There may be other systemic factors such as how 
policies are implemented, which in practice has a much greater impact on the 
political and social involvement of migrants, as indicated in the discussion 
surrounding table 6.
In table 6 the organisational involvement of migrants in the Nordic countries are 
examined based on the European Social Survey (ESS) to study whether social capital 
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– measured as the degree of participation in organisations can be viewed as bonding 
and exclusive, making it hard for migrants in the Nordic countries to participate in 
organisations.  
Table 6: Organisational memberships and organisational participation among migrants in the Euro-
pean countries (ESS)
Membership (%) Membership (%) Participation (%) Participation (%)
Native Migrant Native Migrant
Sweden 2.5 1.9 0.9 0.6
Denmark 2.5 1.7 0.9 0.7
Norway 2.2 1.7 0.8 0.5
Netherlands 2.2 1.7 0.8 0.5
Austria 2.2 1.5 0.8 0.8
Belgium 1.6 1.2 1 0.8
Ireland 1.6 1.7 0.7 1
Finland 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.5
Great Britain 1.6 1.6 0.9 1.3
Germany 1.5 1 0.7 0.5
France 1 0.8 0.8 0.7
Spain 0.7 0.4 0.4 0.2
Portugal 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3
Greece 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
Commentary: The table is based on data material from the European Social Survey (ESS1-2002). The 
following questions were asked: Are you a member of any of the following organisations? Have you 
during the last year participated in any of the following organisation activities? 12 different catego-
ries of organisations were given in the questionnaire.
Based on data from the European Social Survey, we can discern that people of the 
Nordic countries are among the most active organisation members and they also 
actively participate in organisation activities, which is hardly surprising considering 
the traditionally important role of civil society within the Nordic countries (see Borg 
2005; Siisiäinen and Kankainen 2009). In Finland, involvement is somewhat lower 
both among migrants and among the general population than in the other Nordic 
countries. Also in the other Nordic countries, migrants participate somewhat less in 
civil society organisations than the general population. The figures do not provide 
any strong support for the hypothesis that social capital in the Nordic welfare states 
would be bonding, making it especially hard for migrants to participate in organised 
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activities as Forsander (2004) argues. Based on the data, it seems rather that migrants 
living in the Nordic countries, would from a comparative perspective, be fairly 
actively involved in organisational activities compared to migrants in other European 
countries. 
9.7  Discussion
Political rights certainly form the basic prerequisites for political participation, but 
it seems that political mobilisation requires both favourable institutional structures 
and policies, combined with efforts of political parties and civil society organisations 
and other relevant actors. According to the MIPEX index the Nordic countries seem 
to have fairly open and good integration and citizenship policies, except with some 
reservations for Denmark. All the Nordic countries also offer full political rights for 
non-citizens at the local level. Even though legislation and policies are inclusive, 
there is still a risk of failure in the implementation, concerning which there is limited 
knowledge and data.  
Social capital in the Nordic welfare states has been claimed to be bonding 
and exclusive due to the homogeneity of the norm base and tight social networks, 
which leads to strong in-group loyalty (Forsander 2004). Concerning involvement 
in organisational activities, our data does not support this hypothesis. There is also 
limited knowledge of how divergent the participation patterns between different 
migrant groups are. There is also some evidence of difficulties that migrants have 
experienced concerning participation in civil society organisations. In all the Nordic 
countries there seem to exist some barriers to participation, such as language skills 
and experiences of racism or discrimination (see for example Harinen 2005). In 
Finland, immigrant organisations are a fairly recent phenomenon, while they have 
a much longer history in the other Nordic countries. Migrants also seem to have 
more difficulties associated with organising internally in Finland than in the other 
Nordic countries, due to the fact that immigrant groups in Finland are small and 
heterogeneous.  
The relationship between organisational participation and political participation 
found at the individual level is less clear on the macro-level. In Denmark some 
immigrant organisations have had political issues on their agendas and have enjoyed 
success in mobilising migrants into political participation (see Melve 2003). In 
Sweden and Finland immigrant organisations have mostly been non-political and 
migrants have mostly participated in organisations without political goals, which 
may affect the degree to which these organisations mobilise immigrants into other 
forms of societal activities. 
Aside from government policies, there are several systemic and contextual 
factors affecting the political mobilisation of migrants. Earlier studies have shown 
that proportional systems that offer the possibility to vote directly for a candidate 
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tend to be more favourable for migrant mobilisation than majority systems with 
closed candidate lists (see Togeby 2008). There are also numerous contextual factors 
affecting the political mobilisation. According to Saukkonen (2007:284-88) minorities 
have usually managed to mobilise politically in circumstances where the group has 
gained significant political or economical power, where political organisations or 
parties have managed to mobilise the minority, where the political system is open for 
new claims or where a minority feels its position is significantly threatened.  
In Denmark, electoral participation has been considerably higher than in the other 
Nordic countries, although the Danish integration regime has been viewed as less 
inclusive than in the other Nordic countries. Lise Togeby, who has compared electoral 
turnout among migrants living in Denmark and Sweden, claims that the Danish 
individual centred electoral system, with a number of migrant candidates connected 
to fairly well organised social networks, particularly in Århus and Copenhagen, has 
resulted in a political mobilisation of migrants (see Togeby 2008).  Even though the 
Finnish electoral system shares many features with the Danish one,19 the political 
mobilisation of migrants has remained low as immigration and integration issues 
have generally had low saliency on the political agenda in Finland and the number of 
candidates with a migrant background has remained low. 
9.8  Conclusions
In this chapter different types of social involvement and their impact on electoral 
participation were tested. The empirical findings indicate that social capital, 
measured as the degree of organisational participation, at least partly explains 
electoral participation among immigrants in Finland, irrespective of other personal 
resources.
The results indicate that organisational participation essentially forms a social 
resource which has a positive effect on electoral participation. The analysis also 
shows that immigrant organisations form an asset for electoral participation. The 
results seem to support claims that ethnic organisations function as a gateway into 
the majority society instead of isolating migrants. The empirical material suggests 
that migrants that are involved in ethnic organisation activities both become involved 
in the social activities within the greater society and to a higher degree participate in 
political activities. Based on the findings it also seems sensible to conclude that it is 
important to support policies designed to lower the barriers for migrants to participate 
in organisational activities. Further research is however needed on how and why social 
participation affects political participation. This raises more interesting questions on 
19 It is even more person centred than the Danish one.
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how these procedures work and if there are differences between different types of 
organisations.
Aside from organisational involvement, citizenship comes out as the most 
decisive predictor of electoral participation. Citizenship provides people with full 
political rights and makes the state of residence permanent, which according to 
earlier studies significantly increases the odds for participation in all types of societal 
activities. This also raises a question of how citizenship policies may act as a barrier for 
political integration and participation. In Finland citizenship policies are rather strict 
from a comparative perspective, which may have a negative impact on the political 
integration of migrants, as it may take almost a decade of permanent residence in the 
country before acquiring full civic rights.  
Other variables which show a statistically significant relationship with electoral 
participation include the time of residence in Finland, gender and education. Gender 
differences may reflect the fact that politics in some cultures are dominated by 
males, making the political integration of women an issue one should direct special 
attention to. Education on the other hand strengthens the skills and abilities to follow 
and engage in political activities. One could thus raise the question, of whether 
education in societal matters should be more strongly incorporated into the agenda 
of the integration courses that are offered to immigrants.
Even though legislation and the rules for participation form an important aspect 
of the process, the results indicate that civil society organisations and political parties 
play a vital role for political mobilisation. Even though Denmark scores lowest on the 
integration scores on the MIPEX index (i.e. has the most unfavourable environment 
for participation) it seems that the Danish individual centred electoral system, the 
fairly high number of migrant candidates as well as well organised migrant groups, 
has resulted in a political mobilisation of migrants in Denmark. Finland on the 
other hand, seems to score fairly well on systemic features, but the short migration 
history in connection to the recent establishment of migrant organisations and the 
fact the political parties have not yet put much effort into mobilising migrants and 
nominating migrant candidates, seem to affect the political participation of migrants. 
Migration and integration issues have only in recent years become a central topic on 
the political agenda in Finland. A high degree of unemployment and discrimination 
of some migrant groups may also play a role. 
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